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PREFACE 
 
 
 Translation pervades every aspect of a Classical scholar's work. We are actively engaged in 
translating and interpreting texts at every stage of research. The ancient Greeks and Romans 
themselves were often reading and writing in at least two languages (occasionally at the same 
time). Cicero's remark to L. Papirius Paetus that a particular expression works better in Greek, and 
that Paetus should simply translate it himself is a clear testament to the embedded bilingualism of 
the ancient world: “habeo,” inquit, “non habeor a Laide” (Graece hoc melius; tu, si voles, 
interpretabere).1 With this in mind, it is surprising that there has been relatively little 
communication between scholars of Classics and Translation Studies. The benefits of establishing 
contact between the fields have not gone entirely unnoticed, however, and recent attempts have 
been made at opening a dialogue. Siobhán McElduff and Enrica Sciarrino's 2011 collection of 
essays, Complicating the History of Western Translation: The Ancient Mediterranean in 
Perspective is a welcome attempt at fostering interdisciplinary collaboration, aiming to “point out 
to scholars the value of translation as a category to be taken seriously” and “encourage a dialogue 
between the discipline of Translation Studies and the fields of research represented by this 
collection”.2 Moreover, several manuscripts cover the history of translation, spanning from 
antiquity to modern day.3 
                                                      
1 “I possess her,” he said, “I am not possessed by Laide” (this is better in Greek; you can translate it 
if you want). Cic. Ad. Fam. 9.26.2, ed. Shackleton Bailey. 
2 McElduff, Siobhán, and Enrica Sciarrino (2011:189). Complicating the History of Western 
Translation: The Ancient Mediterrannean in Perspective. Manchester, UK; Kinderhook, NY: St. 
Jerome Pub. 
3 For an overview of translation from antiquity to modern times, see Kelly (1979), Rener (1989), 
Robinson (2002), Rousseau (1995). There are two important texts which emphasize the importance 
of translation. One, Naomi Seidman’s 2006 Faithful Renderings: Jewish-Christian Difference and 
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This dissertation aims to address the current approach to Rufinus’ translations in a way that 
can also be applied to other translated works in antiquity. Studies of translation in the Christian 
period become even more relevant due to the decline in the use of Greek as an intellectual language 
in the Western Empire. Thus, even highly educated individuals became wholly reliant on the Latin 
renditions of essential works. Additionally, since many of the original Greek texts were lost or no 
longer widely circulated, even those who could read the Greek no longer had access to it.4 The 
above linguistic phenomena granted unprecedented power to translators such as Rufinus. In the 
spirit of keeping the translation processes transparent, all English translations made in this 
dissertation, unless otherwise noted, are my own. 
 
 
                                                      
the Politics of Translation, presents the practice of translation as part of the history of conflict 
between Jews and Christians. She argues that translation is a crucial part of the conflict, and in fact 
is so powerful a phenomenon that it even intensified the tension between the two religious groups. 
The other is Lawrence Venuti’s 1995 The Translator’s Invisibility. Venuti, though concentrating 
specifically on the modern Western English-language translation, discusses the emphasis on the 
invisibility of the translator and how this illusion gives rise to the idea that a translation can be seen 
as having the same force and effect as the original. Not strictly dealing with translation theory, but 
still insightful for the purposes of thinking about translation are Derrida’s 1998 book 
Monolingualism of the Other, which deals with the negotiations between languages and the idea of 
the “possession” of a language by its native speakers, and Abdelfattah Kilito’s 2002 book, Thou 
Shalt Not Speak My Language, which discusses translation as an interpretive process. The works of 
Naomi Seidman and Lawerence Venuti will be discussed at length in Chapter One. 
4 See Carla Lo Cicero’s 2008 book Tradurre I Greci Nel IV Secolo: Rufino Di Aquileia E Le 
Omelie Di Basilio. Roma: Herder. 
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Glossary  
 
Translation Theory 
Domesticizing Translation 
As outlined by Lawrence Venuti (1995), a 
domesticizing translation is one that prefers the 
target text to feel as natural as possible. 
Foreignizing Translation 
In contrast to a domesticizing translation, a 
foreignizing translation gives priority to the 
source text, endeavoring to follow it as closely as 
possible in translation, often at the expense of 
readability in the target language. 
Accessory Text 
An outside text used by a translator to inform or 
corroborate her own translation. Mentioned by 
Lawrence Venuti (1995), though not by this name, 
with the example of lexica or reference texts. In 
this dissertation, I expand Venuti’s conception to 
include any outside text that the translator 
consults, including other similar works in either 
the source or target language. 
  
 
 
  xvii 
Philosophy 
logismos 
Stoic: a thought that has been assented to and for which 
we are responsible. 
Origen: thoughts we have accepted and for which we 
are responsible. Logismoi in Origen are judgments, and 
are indicative of real emotion. 
Evagrius: a temptation to fight off, often implanted into 
humans by demons (though these types of thoughts can 
also be implanted by angels, or arise within ourselves. 
noēsis 
Stoic: a type of thought for which we are not 
responsible. Occurs before assent. 
Origen: a type of thought that signifies comprehension, 
as with an understanding of scripture. 
phantasia 
Stoic: Used by Chrysippus to mean a representation, 
something that strikes our senses. As Cicero states in 
his discussion of sense perception, the phantasia is 
“sort of like a blow inflicted from the outside” (quasi 
impulsione oblata extrinsecus). The phantasia, then, is 
the strike given to our minds and bodies when we are 
affected by the appearance of the outside world. 
Origen: Like the Stoics, Origen is careful to separate 
phantasia (which we are not responsible for) from 
those things that we are. 
  xviii 
sunkatathesis 
Stoic: the act of accepting a representation (whether it 
be sensory or emotional), and thereby taking 
responsibility for it. 
hormê 
Stoic: An impulse which the act of assent triggers and 
necessarily results in action. 
Origen: an emotional impulse that provokes action, 
requiring assent. 
cogitatio 
Rufinus’ translation of both noēsis and logismos. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation is invested in an interdisciplinary approach to the study of translation in 
the antique world. From this perspective, the project demonstrates how the study of the translator 
Rufinus of Aquileia can be informed by relevant modern translation theories. Rufinus’ project of 
translating the works of Origen takes place in a time when charges of “Origenism” were 
synonymous with charges of heresy, and thus Rufinus was engaging in a very sensitive endeavor. 
Informed by modern translation theorists such as Lawrence Venuti, Roger Bell, Tejaswini 
Niranjana, and Eugene Nida, the dissertation studies translation as a process and highlights the 
role of the translator as interpreter and active agent. The emphasis is on uncovering the overall 
narrative of the translation process, viewing translations as rewritings, and recommending a more 
mindful approach to using translations in research today. Rufinus’ translations have been subject 
to a substantial amount of critical work, and many scholars use his Latin texts in place of 
Origen’s lost Greek versions. I argue that this approach to Rufinus’ Latin texts has resulted in a 
misconception about how Origen viewed thought formation, and that a fresh look at Rufinus’ 
translation process reveals that he has undermined Origen’s moral psychology. Due in part to 
Rufinus’ reliance on the philosophy of thinking developed by his contemporary Evagrius 
Ponticus, the line between thoughts and emotions is blurred in translation, and so thoughts, 
conflated with passions, themselves become sinful. Rufinus’ translation resulted in a radical shift 
in the history of consciousness and the concept of thoughts as constituting sinful states, in and of 
themselves. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation is motivated by a desire to apply interdisciplinary methods to the study of 
ancient translations. More specifically, the following chapters aim to uncover forgotten or 
overlooked elements of Rufinus of Aquileia’s translation of Origen of Alexandria. Although it 
focuses on Rufinus’ process of translation, it does not claim to be a complete survey of Rufinus’ 
translations of Origen. I will work within the framework of the narrative of the Origen’s moral 
psychology, following the soul’s descent to embodiment, and focusing on Rufinus’ transformation 
of the philosophical themes and terminology drawn from Stoic and Platonic sources. The 
evaluation of Rufinus’ translations is not meant to uncover a degree of “reliability” or 
“faithfulness.” Instead, the emphasis is on uncovering the narrative of a translation, illustrating 
translations as rewritings, and recommending a more mindful approach to using translations in 
research today. Therefore, it does not attempt to rate the quality of Rufinus’ translation, preferring 
to situate his work and its effects in the historical context and to create awareness of the process of 
his translation. I will incorporate applicable translation theories and methodology along the course, 
but I am not attempting to address the entire field of translation studies. As an emerging and 
growing field, mainly focused on modern translations, not everything in it is useful for my 
investigation. I have drawn out a number of relevant and useful themes of translation theory to 
apply to this work and will cover their applicability at length in Chapter One. Each of the 
subsequent chapters will treat relevant aspects of those themes — audience, capability, history, and 
politics, and accessory texts — in order to highlight each step in the narrative of Rufinus’ 
translation. In Chapter Two, I will show that Rufinus’ translation choices make thoughts, rather 
than emotions, sinful in the works of Origen. This radical shift in the history of consciousness, 
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created through the process of translation, can be explained through the study of the above 
translation themes. Rufinus’ considerations of his Latin-speaking audience play a role in his 
translation choices, as does the social and political climate in which he operates. Rufinus’ 
capabilities as a translator and interpreter of non-Christian philosophy will also affect his 
translation choices. Finally, in Chapter Three I will argue that the emergence of sinful thoughts in 
Rufinus’ Latin can also be explained by the interpolation of the discussion of thoughts in Evagrius 
Ponticus. I will present evidence that Rufinus used Evagrius as an “accessory text” in his 
translation process. Rufinus’ reliance on the texts of Evagrius can help to clarify the shift from 
sinful emotions to sinful thoughts.  
Some, such as Richard Sorabji, have identified Origen as the initiator of the shift towards 
sinful thoughts. The idea of sinful thoughts can be found in later Christian writers, such as 
Evagrius, who will be the focus of Chapter Three. The evidence for the transformation of thoughts 
in Origen comes from Rufinus’ translations. Several of the arguments laid out by scholars based on 
Rufinus’ translations will be discussed over the course of the dissertation. But, as I will show, the 
contention that it was Origen himself who made this shift from sinful actions to sinful thoughts is 
tenuous because it relies on Rufinus’ own interpretation of his work.  
Thus, the focus of this dissertation is an investigation of the moral psychology of Origen 
through the narrative of the descent of the soul into embodiment and its struggles with emotion and 
thought formation there. I intend to illustrate how this narrative changes in Rufinus’ translation, as 
well as provide the background for these changes. To do this, I have borrowed methodology from 
the field of translations studies, which I believe provides a productive access point for discussing 
Rufinus’ translation. The translation theory that I outline in Chapter One is a crucial part of 
understanding how thoughts become sinful. It is only through applying the translation methodology 
I discuss in Chapter One that we can truly see the extent to which Rufinus altered Origen’s moral 
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psychology.  
Viewing translation as a narrative and the translator Rufinus as an active agent and 
interpreter in the process also helps to fill out potential reasons for why these alterations were made 
in translation. I conclude that Rufinus’ alterations can be explained in part by his agenda of 
creating a complete and harmonious Christian corpus,5 his concerns of saving Origen from the 
Origenist controversy,6 and also by his use of what I have referred to in the dissertation as 
accessory texts, in this case, the texts of Evagrius. Instead of viewing Origen as the originator of 
sinful thoughts, instead the texts of Evagrius become interlopers on Origen’s texts through the 
translation of Rufinus. 
The narrative of the soul’s descent is covered in Books 3 and 4 of Origen’s Peri Arkhōn. 
This specific narrative provides a particularly clear example of Rufinus’ translation practices 
because much of Books 3 and 4 are also extant in Greek. Many of the themes presented therein can 
also be verified by Greek texts of Origen’s commentaries on various Homilies. 
 
 
Rufinus: Life and Works 
 
 
 Rufinus was born in Julia Concordia in 345.7 He studied for eight years in Alexandria under 
Didymus the Blind, and, after exploring Egypt in search of ascetic teachers, founded a monastic 
                                                      
5 See Catherine Chin’s 2010 article Rufinus of Aquileia and Alexandrian Afterlives: Translation  
as Origenism. Journal of Early Christian Studies, 18(4), 617-647.  
 
6 See Elizabeth Clark’s 1992 book: The Origenist controversy: the cultural construction of an  
early Christian debate. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
7 All biographical data are taken from F.X. Murphy (1945) Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411) His Life 
and Works. 
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community in Jerusalem. He was friends with many ascetics, including Macarius the Elder, 
Melania the Elder, and Evagrius. He eventually settled in Rome. During his life, he wrote a number 
of original works and commentaries, including a Church History and an Historia Eremitica, 
detailing the lives of monks in the Nitrian desert. Besides producing his own writings, he is known 
for engaging in a substantial project of translation. His most contested translation was perhaps 
Origen’s Peri Arkhōn in 398,8 but he also translated his Homilies and his Commentaries on the 
Heptateuch, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, and Homiles on the Book of Numbers.9 He 
also translated the works of Basil of Caesarea, Eusebius and Evagrius. 
The German scholar Heinrich Marti situates Rufinus’ translations in two traditions: in the 
world of the testaments (the Psalms, Gospels and Pauline letters), and in the world of pagan 
antiquity.10 Rufinus spent his life expanding an impressive library, a fact that is attested in a letter 
written by Jerome to Florentinus in which he requests a number of books from Rufinus’ library be 
copied.11 Caroline P. Hammond speculates that Rufinus’ library was initially stocked with 
primarily Latin works because the books requested by Jerome are all written in Latin.12 By the end 
of the 390s, however, as Rufinus’ translations of Greek texts were being published, it seems he was 
expanding his library to include Greek texts as well, given his project of translating a number of 
Greek texts into Latin. 
                                                      
8 Although Murphy (1945: 158) points out that although his translation of the Peri Arkhōn and the 
general Origenist controversy he was pulled into dominate discussions of Rufinus (both in antiquity 
and today), it does not seem to have consumed too much of Rufinus’ life. He continued to write his 
own works, as well as create further translations. 
9 See Murphy (1945). 
10 See Marti, H. (2012: 1-21), Nosce Te Ipsum ... Animam Tuam ... Deum: Predigt 3 Des Basilius 
Caesariensis in Der Ubersetzung Des Rufinus, De Gruyter. 
11 Jerome Letter 5 2.1-5 (PG vol. 22). 
12 See Hammond (1996), in Origeniana et Rufiniana vol 29 Freiburg: Verlag Herder. 
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 One year after Rufinus’ translated Origen’s Peri Arkhōn, Jerome made his own translation 
of the work in an attempt to correct what he perceived to be critical problems with Rufinus’ 
rendition.13 Although Rufinus and Jerome had once been friends and admirers of Origen,14 
disagreements over Origen’s place in their faith seem to have strained and finally broken their 
friendship. The first of their quarrels over Origen began in 39315 and coincided with condemnations 
of Origen. Rufinus and Jerome found themselves on opposite sides of the Origenist debate. 
Although they seem to reach peace on the matter in 397, their disagreements re-surged after 
Rufinus’ translation of Peri Arkhōn.16  
 
 
Translation in the Time of Rufinus: Audience and his Status as Author 
 
 
Studying Rufinus as a translator is particularly important because of the increasingly 
monolingual audience for whom he was writing. Carla Lo Cicero argues that the audience in the 
Western Empire by the time of Rufinus’ translation project was becoming increasingly 
monolingual and therefore relied on Rufinus’ translations. This is supported in part by Jerome’s 
Letter 133, in which he laments that so many texts have become more widely read in the west due 
to Rufinus’ translations. Rufinus himself claims in his preface to Book 1 of the Peri Arkhōn that he 
was asked to translate Origen into Latin so that Roman readers could enjoy his texts as well.17 He 
also attributes the interest in reading Origen in Latin to Jerome’s earlier translations of Origen’s 
                                                      
13 Murphy (1945: 234). 
14 See Jerome Liber tertius adversus libros Rufini (PL: 23, 464), III, 9, where he states that both he 
and Rufinus were once praising Origen, but should now stand together and condemn him. 
15 See Murphy (1945: 59-81). 
16 Murphy (1945: 138-157). 
17 See Rufinus, De Principiis epil. 1 (ed. Koetschau, GCS 22, 3-6). 
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Homilies.18 The fact that Rufinus’ translations of great works of Christian literature encouraged his 
audience to read in Latin instead of Greek made him that much more powerful as a translator. The 
power he wields is also why we should analyze his work more carefully. 
I contend that Rufinus certainly imagined his audience as primarily monolingual and Latin-
reading given that he undertook the project of translating so much of Origen’s corpus. Even if he 
had readers who could also read Origen in the original Greek, Rufinus encouraged these readers to 
prefer his Latin translation by claiming that the Greek was subject to textual corruption. Further, 
the fact that Jerome published a competing translation of Origen’s Peri Arkhōn points to the fact 
that Rufinus’ translation was indeed being read and that the target audience would need a more 
accurate (according to Jerome) translation in place of Rufinus’.  
When studying Rufinus as a translator, it is necessary to understand the concept and 
practice of translation in Rufinus’ time. As Carla Lo Cicero clarifies in her 2008 book, Tradurre I 
Greci Nel IV Secolo: Rufino Di Aquileia E Le Omelie Di Basilio, there are key differences between 
Classic and Christian translations. The Christian translations were more creative interpretations, 
and the Christian translators acted as mediators between the original text and their audience.19 
What is quite remarkable is that many of these texts, Rufinus’ included, were meant for people who 
were not “in grado di leggere gli originali.”20 Since most of Rufinus’ readers were only reading 
Latin, they were not able to take advantage of texts co-circulating in both Greek and Latin. In fact, 
because of the declining number of Christians reading Greek and the dominance of Latin education 
in the west, Latin translations such as Rufinus’ became more popular and influential than the 
original.  
                                                      
18 Ibid.  
19 See Lo Cicero, C. (2008: 2) Tradurre I Greci Nel IV Secolo: Rufino Di Aquileia E Le Omelie Di 
Basilio. Roma: Herder. 
20 Ibid, p. 4-7. 
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 That the audience in the time of Rufinus was becoming increasingly monolingual has 
practical consequences for translators. When translating for a bilingual audience, it is possible to 
retain some original text even in the translation. We still do it today in modern scholarship, 
including in this dissertation, often using phrases from French, German, or Italian under the 
assumption that our target audience would be familiar with these phrases. This practice thrived in 
antiquity as well, in periods where the audience was expected to have knowledge of both Greek 
and Latin. Cicero, for example, has a habit of retaining original Greek terms when discussing 
philosophy in Latin. In his discussion of Zeno, he retains the Greek word πάθος to make clear what 
he is referring to in his Latin description: 
Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio sit, quod πάθος ille dicit, aversa 
a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem 
esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius 
discesserit a naturae constantia. 
Cicero tusc. disp. 4.1121 
“This is Zeno’s definition: a perturbatio, which he calls pathos, is a movement of 
the mind turning away from reason and contrary to nature. Certain [Stoics] more 
briefly state that a perturbatio is an excessive impulse, but by excessive they 
mean one which deviates from the constancy of nature.”22 
 This makes it clear that when Cicero refers to a pertubatio, he means the Greek pathos. 
To a bilingual reader, this would be a most helpful custom, as it can ground her knowledge base 
and provide concrete connections between the Greek and Latin texts. To a reader who studied only 
Latin, however, it can be confusing. 
 We find that Christian translators also retain Greek words in a simliar way. Jerome, for 
example, retains Greek terms in his Latin descriptions of Greek philosophy. In the same context as 
                                                      
21 Cicero, M. Tullius., ed. King, J. E. (1927). Tusculan disputations. Rev. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
22 Trans. Graver, M. Cicero, M. Tullius, (2002). Cicero on the emotions: Tusculan disputations 3 
and 4. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
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Cicero above, Jerome makes clear that the Greek pathos corresponds to the Latin perturbatio: Illi 
enim quae Graeci appellant πάθη, nos perturbationes possumus dicere.23 “Indeed, those things 
which the Greeks call πάθη, we can call perturbationes.” As we will see in the following chapters, 
Rufinus does not follow this practice and does not indicate Greek original terms in his translations. 
 Because of the precise vocabulary often needed to lay out philosophical theories in Greek, 
combined with a relative lack of corresponding terms in Latin, translators have several choices. 
They can either leave the problematic term in Greek, or at least transliterate the Greek term into 
Latin letters (thereby committing to a foreignizing method of translation, to be discussed in detail 
in Chapter One), or use a Latin term that may or may not have the same precise connotations as the 
original Greek. Additionally, they could combine the latter with a precise explication of the 
meaning in a particular context (the domesticating method, to be discussed at length in Chapter 
One). Where Cicero and Jerome have taken to bringing the reader closer to the foreign language by 
retaining Greek words, they manage both to make their philosophical summaries more precise, but 
also potentially less accessible to their target language readers. 
 Rufinus himself did not view his work as an interpretive process. On the subject of whether 
he was in any way an author of his translated works, he was steadfast in saying that he did not 
believe his name should be attached to the work of translation: 
Aiunt enim mihi: In his quae scribes, quoniam plurima in eis tui operis habentur, 
da titulum nominis tui, et scribe: Rufini—uerbi gratia—in epistulam ad Romanos 
explanationum libri, sicut apud auctores—inquiunt—saeculares, non illius qui ex 
Graeco translatus est, sed illius qui transtulit nomen titulus tenet. [. . .] Verum 
ego, qui plus conscientiae meae quam nomini defero, etiam si addere aliqua 
uideor et explere quae desunt, aut breviare quae longa sunt, furari tamen titulum 
eius qui fundamenta operis iecit et construendi aedificii materiam praebuit, 
rectum non puto. 
                                                      
23 Jerome ep. 133, ad Ctesiph (CSEL 56: 246). 
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Rufinus. Comm. Rom. epilogue, 49–5824 
“[My detractors] say to me: Since, in what you write, there is quite a lot of your 
own in his [Origen’s] works, give it a title with your name, and write: ‘Rufinus’ 
Commentary on the letter to the Romans’, just like amongst the secular authors, 
the title does not bear the name of the one who was translated from Greek, but 
rather the name of the one who translated it [. . .] I, however, give more weight to 
my conscience than to my name; and even if I seem to have added some things 
and left other things out, or to have stated briefly things that were long, 
nevertheless I do not think it is right that the title be stolen from the person who 
laid the foundation for the work, and provided the material for the construction of 
the building.” 
 On the one hand, Rufinus’ mention of the opposite practice of “secular” authors further 
serves to distance him from earlier traditions and emphasizes his practice as uniquely Christian. On 
the other, Rufinus’ refusal to be considered an active agent or author of his translations gives us 
important preliminary insight into how wide he sets the boundaries of a translator. 
 
 
 
Rufinus as Translator 
 
 
The Scholarly Debate 
The status of Rufinus as a translator is ever-changing. Although there is no doubt that Rufinus 
omitted what he considered problematic passages and altered others, scholars either only briefly 
reflect on this fact, or some, like Nicola Pace in his extensive study on Rufinus’ translations of 
Origen,25 conclude that the translation does not alter the original in a significant way. Pace offers 
an in-depth analysis of Rufinus’ translation and concludes that although Rufinus brazenly omits 
whole sections of the original Greek, the only substantial change he makes is stylistic. Pace argues 
                                                      
24 CSEA 5.1:254 
 25 Pace, N. (1990) Ricerche sulla traduzione di Rufino del “De principiis” di Origene. 
Publicazioni Della Facolta Di Lettere E Filosofia Dell’universitá Di Milano; Firenze: La Nuova 
Italia. 
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these stylistic changes reflect Rufinus’ wish to make the work more didactic and accessible to his 
Roman readers, rather than sanitize or gain control of the messages in the text. Pace does provide 
an impressive study of Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis, on which I rely over the course of this 
dissertation. Pace acknowledges that investigations of Rufinus’ translations have either been 
incomplete or not deep or investigative enough.26 Following the methodology of J.M. Rist, he also 
grounds his investigation in an analysis of the technical aspects of translation, and in considerations 
of the different time periods in which Origen and Rufinus were living. 
 Pace’s method of incorporating historical perspective into the study of translation was 
inspired by J.M. Rist, who describes the aim for his article in Origeniana as follows: “The aim of 
this paper, if expressed in inflated terms, would be to identify and distinguish the worlds of thought 
in which Origen and Rufinus lived, and to isolate substantial divergences between them”.27 Like 
Pace, I am similarly inclined throughout this dissertation to follow in the footsteps of Rist in this 
regard, and the considerations of politics and history in the translation process that I cover in 
Chapter One have also been inspired in part by Rist. 
 Classics scholars are not the only ones weighing in on Rufinus’ translations. In a variety of 
fields, the overarching view is that although it is clear that Rufinus made alterations to the Greek 
text, the liberty with which he conducted his efforts did not result in many significant changes to 
the overall meaning of Origen’s work. Overall, scholars refer to Rufinus’ work with similar 
attributives: “faithful,” “accurate,” or “reliable,” with little attention to or description of what the 
criteria behind these evaluations are. As Mark Edwards puts it, “those who have studied the 
question know, however, that while the translations of Rufinus may be free, they have not proved 
                                                      
26 Ibid, p. 2. 
27 In Origeniana et Rufiniana (1996: 99) vol 29 Freiburg : Verlag Herder. 
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to be mendacious…”28 Barbara Bruce begins her translation of Origen’s Homilies by confirming 
the “general reliability” of Rufinus’ translations.29 She goes on to say: 
Other studies have confirmed the paraphrastic nature of his [Rufinus’] work, but 
have judged the changes to make for clarity and the thought to remain faithful to 
the Greek.… After explaining how he had expended much labor on changing the 
hortatory manner of the homilies on Leviticus into the form of an exposition and 
supplying what was wanting in the homilies on Genesis and Exodus, he said he 
translated the homilies on Joshua and a few others ‘just as we found them, 
literally and without great effort.’ Annie Jaubert, in her French translation of the 
Homilies, supported Rufinus’s statement. She noted constructions that were more 
dependent on Greek than on Latin syntax and a curtness of speech and density of 
expression that gave the feel of unpolished notes from which he may have been 
working.30 
 
 Gustave Bardy regards Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis as a paraphrase, but one that 
renders the general sense of the text correctly.31 Bardy’s investigation points out interesting 
alterations in the Rufinus’ texts, but in many cases simply indicates the discrepancy without 
                                                      
28 Edwards, M. (2002: 5) Origen Against Plato. Ashgate Studies in Philosophy & Theology in Late 
Antiquity. Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
29 Bruce, Barbara (2010: 11) Homiles on Joshua. The Catholic University of America Press; 
Volume 105. 
30 Ibid. p. 16-18. See also Mark Humphries (2008: 143-64), who agrees with Barbara Bruce on the 
reliability of Rufinus’ Latin translation of Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History, where he concludes: 
Rufinus’s Latin translation of Eusebius’s Ecclesiastical History is customarily 
regarded as an inferior creature to the Greek original. By examining Rufinus’s 
complete translation and continuation together, however, a more sympathetic 
understanding of his Latin version can be reached. This shows that Rufinus’s 
version was by no means a clumsy version of the Greek followed by a mediocre 
continuation, but was conceived of as a unified whole. Hence Rufinus revised 
Eusebius’s text not only where he found it to be deficient, but also to make it fit 
with a new vision of Christian history that took account of events after the age of 
Constantine. Viewed in this light, Rufinus’s version emerges as a more original 
contribution to ecclesiastical historiography than has been acknowledged hitherto. 
 
31 See Bardy, G. (1923), Recherches sur l' histoire du texte, Book II, Paris. 
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commenting on or discussing it. That is not to say that Bardy’s work is not of merit. It will be used 
at length in this study. 
 Heinrich Marti also acknowledges the difficulties inherent in philology and ancient 
translation. He states that the reconstitution of the original text is the goal and concludes by saying 
that Rufinus translated everything for the most part exactly.32 
Others have been slightly more critical. Annie Jaubert’s writes in her work on the Homilies on 
Joshua that although Rufinus’ work remains true to Origen’s thought, we should not consider it a 
translation, but rather an adaptation.33 J. E. L. Oulton agrees with this, saying,  
But even when no temptation lay upon him, Rufinus transgressed the bounds of 
freedom which every translator must be expected to observe. It is not merely that 
he eschews the bad literalism of Aquila or the Latin translator of Irenaeus: he is 
continually taking unjustifiable liberties with his original. He omits, abbreviates, 
transposes, expands according to taste: and perhaps his favorite method is to 
produce a kind of paraphrase which gives the general sense.34  
 As I will demonstrate over the course of the three chapters of this dissertation, Rufinus did indeed 
step well outside the boundaries of translation, as Oulton states. He added and subtracted to the 
original text, made paraphrases (some of which, we will see, misconstrued and confused parts of 
Origen’s text), and also injected Origen’s text with influence from other Christian authors 
contemporary to Rufinus, such as Evagrius of Pontus (to be discussed in Chapter Three).  
 There is also the consideration that in many cases Rufinus’ translations offer us one of the 
                                                      
32 Marti, H. (2008: 36): “Die Aufgaben der Philologie sind im Falle antiker Übersetzungen von 
besonderer Art: Für die Textkonstitution ist ja das Ziel, sofern das Original recht ediert ist, klar 
festgelegt; zwar gibt es gegen 100 lateinische Hss (s. CLC 2, Appendice 3), aber die Stemma-
Analyse ist einfach, da Rufin meist genau übersetzt, der Archetyp also vom Original nur wenig 
abweicht.” 
33 Origen., Rufinus. (1960). Homélies sur Josué. Trans. Annie Jaubert. Paris: Éditions du Cerf. 
34 J.E. Oulton (1929: 150-74), “Rufinus’ Translation of the Church History of Eusebius,” Journal 
of Theological Studies 30. 
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oldest manuscripts with which to work. Speaking of Rufinus’ translations of Gregory, Marti points 
out that original source texts are no longer extant, and the earliest Greek manuscripts we have are 
dated to around the 9th century. Rufinus’ Latin translations of Gregory, on the other hand, are 
available dating to the 6th century: 
Die lateinischen Übersetzungen, auch von 9 Predigten Gregors, sind von 
besonderer Bedeutung, weil ihre Quelltexte erhalten sind, deshalb—anders als im 
Falle des Origenes—mit den Bearbeitungen verglichen werden können. Die 
griechische Textgeschichte ist erst etwa ab dem 9. Jh. faßbar, während die 
lateinische Bezeugung schon im 6. Jh. beginnt.35 
 However, if Rufinus’ translations are not reliable replacements for Origen’s thought, as I 
will show, then their earlier date is less significant. 
 
Translation Practices According to Rufinus 
While scholars debate the extent to which Rufinus’ transltions alter Origen’s original text, 
Rufinus himself details how he engaged with and manipulated the text of Origen in his translations. 
In the preface to Book 1 of De Principiis, Rufinus reveals his preference for using the translation 
process to make edits to the original text. When discussing Damasus’ translations of Origen’s 
Homilies and the Commentaries on St. Paul, Rufinus says: 
In quibus cum aliquanta offendicula inveniantur in graeco, ita elimavit omnia 
interpretando atque purgavit, ut nihil in illis quod a fide nostra discrepet latinus lector 
inveniat. Hunc ergo etiam nos, licet non eloquentiae viribus, disciplinae temen regulis in 
quantum possumus sequimur, observantes scilicet ne ea, quae in libris Origenis a se ipso 
discrepantia inveniuntur atque contraria, proferamus. 
 Rufinus, De Principiis, epilogue 1.34-4136 
 
“Since in these there can be found quite a few things in the Greek likely to be offensive, he 
smoothed these over and emended them in translation, so that the Latin readers would find 
nothing in them out of step with their faith. I also emulate his example; therefore, perhaps 
not with the strengths of his eloquence, but nevertheless following the same rules as much 
                                                      
35 Marti (2008: 35). 
36 All excerpts from Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis have been taken from Henri Crouzel’s 
critical edition: Origen., Crouzel, H. (1978). Traité des principes. Paris: Cerf. 
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as I can, I am careful not to cite those things in Origen’s books that are found to be 
inconsistent with and contrary to his own teachings.” 
 
Thus Rufinus, like his model, Damasus, considered first what might be offensive to his readers, 
and altered these things through the process of translation. He brings Origen closer to his audience 
and providing them a more comfortable reading experience.  
We also find that Rufinus likewise makes edits to Origen’s Greek when he believes it does not 
reflect Origen’s “true” beliefs. In the preface to his translation of Book 3 in particular, Rufinus 
writes:   
quod sicut in prioribus libris fecimus, etiam in istis observavimus, ne ea quae reliquis eius 
sententiis et nostrae fidei contraria videbantur, interpretarer, sed velut inserta ea ab aliis et 
adulterata praeterirem.37 
Rufinus, De Principiis, epilogue 3.23-27 
 
 “… just as I did in the former books, likewise in these I will be careful not to translate 
those things that seem to contradict the rest of Origen’s teaching and our faith; I rather omit 
them, treating them as signs of insertion or corruption by others.” 
 
Rufinus is using his powers as translator to control his audience’s access to information. He 
simply omits anything in his translation that he deems contrary to relinquis eius sententiis, the rest 
of Origen’s corpus as understood by Rufinus (whose understanding, as we will see, was colored by 
many outside factors). He also omits anything he finds that is contrary to nostrae fidei, the 
Christian faith itself, as it was outlined in the time of Rufinus. Rufinus, in his attempt to “save” 
Origen from fading out of the Christian corpus (a motive that will be further extrapolated in the 
following section), blamed any such inconsistencies on textual corruption. He thus gave himself 
free reign to omit any problematic passages he encountered in the text. 
In terms of what Rufinus was specifically referring to when he refers to things that are nostrae 
fidei contraria, he further makes it clear that the works of “pagan philosophers” most certainly 
                                                      
37 Origen., Crouzel, H. (1978).  
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would fall under this purview, as he singles them out by name along with the more general 
category of “heretics”:   
Absurdum namque est poetarum ficta carmina et comoediarum ridiculas fabulas a   
grammaticis exponi, et ea quae vel de deo vel de caelestibus virtutibus ac de omni   
universitate dicuntur, in quibus omnis vel paganorum philosophorum vel haereticorum 
pravus error arguitur, sine magistro et explanatore putare aliquem posse se discere; 
Rufinus, De Principiis, epilogue 3.36-42  
 
“For it is absurd for the made up songs of poets and ridiculous tales found in comedies to be 
explained by grammarians, and to think that anyone can learn on his  own, without a 
teacher or interpreter, about those things said about God or about the heavenly powers, and 
about the whole universe, in which every depraved error, committed either by the pagan 
philosophers or the heretics, is refuted..” 
 
In this case, because Rufinus has very explicitly lays forth his bias against “pagan 
philosophers” in his translation process, it is quite important to consider Rufinus’ translations very 
carefully before using them in the context of tracing the philosophical roots of Origen. 
  
 
Rufinus and the Establishment of a Christian Corpus 
Rufinus may have had a larger goal in mind during his translation process. That he was 
developing a project to consolidate, standardize, and make widely available a solid Christian 
corpus of texts that could replace the standard classical corpus of educational texts (such as Homer, 
Plato, Aristotle, and other non-Christian authors), can explain in part why he would want to cut 
away any influence from these traditions. 
Catherine Chin provides an excellent explanation of Rufinus’ attempt to displace classical 
literary culture with a body of Christian literature.38 Her main goal is to contrast Rufinus’ agenda, 
namely seeing Christian literature as an aggregate corpus, with Jerome’s, who prefers to focus on 
                                                      
38 See Chin, Catherine M. (2010: 617-47). "Rufinus of Aquileia and Alexandrian Afterlives:  
Translation as Origenism." Journal of Early Christian Studies. 
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authors individually. She concludes: 
What we see in Rufinus, then, is an attempt to use Origen’s theology of the movement of 
the souls through life, and into the afterlife, as a way of understanding the life and afterlife 
of texts in a newly Christian world. In the work of Rufinus, textual lives and afterlives are 
filtered through an adaptation of the idea of a library, both as a place of text collection and 
as a place of textual assimilation — that is, the figure of the library as established 
preeminently in Alexandria.39 
 
While her conclusion does not specifically take into account Rufinus’ editing of outside 
influences in his translation, the motive for the editing is likely informed in part by Rufinus’ project 
of creating a Christian corpus. In an age where Christianity was breaking free from its past 
oppression, Rufinus may very well have been trying to breathe new life into the works of Origen. 
Extracting any undue influences from non-Christian, non orthodox sources was part of the process 
of tearing down and rebuilding the new purely Christian corpus.  
However, the idea of Rufinus not as author further emphasizes here his project of creating a 
library of aggregate works for Christian readers. It also serves to explain why he might want to 
standardize the overall textual corpus so that the authors do not state contradictory theories. 
 The question then remains: how should we treat Rufinus’ translation of Origen? If he made 
changes, elaborations, personal interpretations, and has had his own agenda in the process, then it is 
necessary to examine the translations to determine what changes they have suffered before using 
them as stand-ins for Origen’s thought. As I will show in Chapter One, reliability is not a simple 
measure, and it cannot be achieved simply by comparing the linguistic details of one text to those 
of another. Taking a holistic approach to the translated texts breathes a new life into the text and 
informs us how we can use these texts in studies of Origen, Rufinus, and the time periods in which 
they lived. As I will argue in detail in Chapter Two, Rufinus’ translations should not be used as a 
substitute for Origen’s original Greek. These translations can easily be treated as separate texts, 
                                                      
39 Ibid. p. 165. 
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ones which comment on Origen’s writings, but do not replace them. 
 
Origen: Life and Works 
 
 
We learn a considerable amount about Origen’s life through the 4th-century historian 
Eusebius, who writes extensively about Origen in his Ecclesiastical History.40 Pamphilus, a 
disciple of Origen contemporary with Eusebius (who was Pamphilus’ successor, in fact, and thus 
had first-hand access to Origen’s texts41) wrote a defense entitled Apology for Origen,42 where we 
can also garner some biographical details. 
 Born in Alexandria, according to Eusebius HE 6.2.12, Origen was around seventeen when 
Emperor Septimus Severus’ Christian persecution began, meaning he was born around 185. His 
father was imprisoned and executed for his Christian faith, and although Origen wanted to join his 
father in death, according to Eusebius’ account, his mother prevented him from doing so by hiding 
all his clothes.43 He does ultimately die at the hands of Christian persecutors in 255. 
 
The Texts of Origen 
This investigation will rely primarily on Origen’s systematic theological treatise, Peri 
Arkhōn. This text is important to the discussion of translation precisely because so much of it 
                                                      
40 See Crouzel, H (1989) Origen, E.T., Edinburgh, for a thorough presentation of the sources and 
chronology of Origen’s life. 
41 See McGuckin, J. Anthony. (2004). The Westminster handbook to Origen. Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster John Knox Press. 
42 Text in Migne, PG 17.521-616 
43 Eusebius H.E. 6.2.12 
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survives only in Rufinus’ Latin.44 We also have substantial Greek extracts from Books 3 and 4 
preserved in the Philokalia of Basil of Caesarea and Gregory Nazianzen as well as quotations in 
Jerome’s Letter to Avitus and the Letter of the Emperor Justinian to Menas. The Greek fragments 
have been compiled by Paul Koetschau.45 Although Koetschau’s edition of the Peri Arkhōn 
remains the standard text, it is not without potential hazards. Mark Edwards’ distrust of 
Koetschau’s Greek fragments is not entirely unfounded, as they do come from potentially biased 
sources.46 However, his argument against them is often based on the fact that no parallel can be 
found in Rufinus’ Latin. Because of the problems inherent in relying on Rufinus’ translation to 
confirm the Greek, and the similar difficulties with verifying the Greek fragments of Koetschau, I 
contend that a study based only to Origen’s Peri Arkhōn is too limited. Therefore, I have expanded 
the study to include Origen’s biblical commentaries. As much as possible throughout, I will include 
evidence from other texts of Origen in order to confirm his doctrine. Much evidence of Origen’s 
background in philosophy will also be drawn from his response to the philosopher Celsus’ attack 
on Christianity, Contra Celsum.47 
 
 
Origen the Christian Philosopher 
 
Origen openly admits to reading philosophical texts,48 and his teachers included the 
                                                      
44 Rufinus’ Latin translation can be found in Henri Crouzel’s 1978 critical ediction of De Principiis 
and shall be cited in this dissertation using the Latin title De Principiis. 
45 Found in Origen., Koetschau, P. (1899). Origenes Werke. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs.. 
46 See Edwards, M. J. (2002). Origen against Plato. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate. 
47 The text of which can be found in Found in Origen. (1899). Origenes Werke. Leipzig: J. C. 
Hinrichs. 
48 See Hom. Gen. 11.2; Ep. Ad Greg. 2; Cels. 5.62. 
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Platonist Ammonius Saccas, who also became the teacher of Plotinus. Not only that, but his 
teaching material even included philosophical texts, and as Peter Martens writes, “Many of his 
writings reflect a profound integration of philosophical themes into his own reflections on God, the 
cosmos, and humanity.”49 However, Origen’s relationship with Greek philosophy still remains a 
contested topic. Although there is little doubt that Origen was well-versed in the works of Plato, the 
Stoics, and the Neoplatonists, the extent to which he relied on these philosophical foundations in 
his own interpretations of scripture and in formulating his own philosophy is still debated.50 
Throughout this dissertation, I will present the competing views on Origen’s relationship to 
                                                      
49 For more on teaching philosophical texts, see Martens (2015: 599). See also Eusebius H.E. 6.3.9, 
6.3.13, 6.8.6, 6.17.2-3, 6.18.2-4, 6.19.12-14. 
50 See Ramelli, I. (2009) Origen, Patristic Philosophy, and Christian Platonism Re-Thinking the 
Christianisation of Hellenism, where she argues that Origen was a Christian Platonist, and that 
Origen the Neoplatonist is one and the same person as Origen the Christian philosopher. She points 
out that one of the main reasons he was so heavily contested and criticized is exactly because he 
exhibited these Platonic leanings. She further argues that his Peri Arkhōn was composed in the 
style of a pagan philosophical work, and not inspired by earlier Christian works. She is not the only 
one who thinks this; Robert Berchman also sees the structure of the Peri Arkhōn as inspired by 
both the Neoplatonic argument of the relationship of the rest of the world to the One, and 
Aristotle’s Categories. On the other side of the argument, there is Mark Edwards, who titled his 
book Origen Against Plato, as a deliberative method to invoke surprise in his readers. He argues 
that Origen’s works were deliberately constructed as an attack on Plato. He underlines that one 
should not argue for any sort of philosophical ‘influence’ from Plato at all, and that simply using 
what he sees as general philosophical language should not be misread as a ‘contamination’ of 
Origen’s work with Platonism. Schibli, Herman S. (1992) ‘Origen, Didymus, and the Vehicle of 
the Soul’ in Origeniana Quinta ed. Robert J. Daly. Leuven, Leuven University Press, who traces 
the connection between the Neoplatonic conception of the Vehicle of the Soul and Origen’s idea of 
the light and luminous body (augoeides soma, which he also sometimes refers to as the vehicle, 
ochema). Schibli thinks that Origen has taken the idea specifically from Iamblichus, who believes 
there is only one vehicle, which is immortal, as opposed to Proclus’ assertion that there are two, 
one mortal and one immortal. Origen also seems to adopt the Proclus’ hierarchy of One, mind, 
soul, and body, which I will point out in more detail in this chapter. See also Finamore, J. F. 
(1985). Iamblichus and the theory of the vehicle of the soul. Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press. 
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philosophy and will argue for my own view that Origen was borrowing and adapting competing 
philosophical doctrines and weaving them together in a unique and fruitful way. 
I align myself with a view that posits Origen neither as a philosopher per-se nor as an 
opponent of philosophy. Instead, I will consider him as opining a form of “Christianized 
Philosophy,” a term borrowed and adapted from Peter W. Martens’ assessment of Origen as 
practicing a kind of “Christianized Platonism.” Martens challenges Adolf von Harnack’s 
Hellenization of Christianity construct,51 which posits that Greek philosophy infiltrated and 
damaged early Christianity and still lies in the background of many investigations into Origen 
today. 
Although Martens rightfully admits that if the vocabulary and conclusions in Plato and 
Origen overlap, this does not necessarily mean “the former was the ‘ancestor’ of the latter,52 he still 
views Origen as borrowing and adapting from Platonism, but only within the framework of his 
Christian roots. He notes “… a number of passages where he [Origen] frames heresy as the 
adoption of philosophical teachings that conflict with otherwise clear scriptural testimonies, 
especially those incorporated into the church’s rules of faith.”53 Thus, Origen only believes in 
adapting and incorporating philosophical ideas that are not in conflict with existing church wisdom. 
On the specific topic of Origen’s theory of the pre-existence of souls (discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Two), Martens notes that “… it is erroneous to present this teaching within a 
dichotomous Hellenistic/philosophical-versus-Jewish/scriptural framework as if pre-existence were 
                                                      
51 See Harnack, A. von. (1897: 2:333 and 1:49). History of dogma. Boston: Roberts. 
52" Martens (2015:613). 
53 Martens (2015: 598) See also Hom. Gen. 16.3; Princ. 2.3.4; Cels. 3.47, 4.67-8, 4.54. 5.6-13, 6.1-
4, 7.42, 7.44. As Marten also draws attention to, however, Origen is not always critical of 
philosophy, even saying that Christianity has some ideas in common with them in Cels. 3.81. For 
more positive comments, see Hom. Gen. 13.3; Cels. 1.4, 6.3, 6.13-14, 7.6, 7.45-47, 7.71; Princ. 
1.3.1; Ep. Ad Greg. 2. 
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simultaneously philosophical and anti-biblical, and the competing views on embodiment were 
biblical and not philosophical.”54 
Martens concludes that “From his perspective, this doctrine with undeniable Greek roots 
did not corrode orthodox Christianity as the proponents of this thesis have contended, but rather 
precisely the opposite: it was deployed to help defend it.”55 In Chapter Two, I will provide 
examples of how Origen has defended his Christian faith using philosophical doctrines from 
Platonism to the Stoa.  
 
 
The Origenist Controversy 
 
The most intense controversy surrounding Origen, although it was not the first and would 
not be the last, is also the one most relevant to Rufinus’ translation process. In 553, the Fifth 
Ecumenical Council, wrote a series of fifteen anathemas against Origen.56  As Elizabeth Clark 
explains in her 1992 book, The Origenist Controversy,57 the charge of “Origenism” became a way 
of attacking the orthodoxy of Christians at the turn of the 5th century. The main weaknesses of 
Origen’s theology that came under attack concerned the Trinity, pre-existence of souls, and 
eschatology, and apokatastasis.  
Clarks’s book investigates the controversy by deconstructing the debate between Jerome 
                                                      
54 Martens (2015: 604). 
55 Martens (2015: 613). 
56 Text of the Anathemas against Origen found in Philip Schaff, ed. (1994) [1885]. "The 
Anathemas Against Origen". Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II, Volume XIV (The Seven 
Ecumenical Councils). Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers. 
57 Clark, Elizabeth A. The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian 
Debate. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
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and Rufinus.58 She views their discord through the lens of their divergent methods of translating 
Origen’s works from Greek to Latin, and thus Rufinus’ translations of Origen are also important in 
the controversy. Based on early letters written to Rufinus by his fellow writer-translator Jerome, 
the two were on good terms for some time. Unfortunately, at a certain point this friendship 
deteriorated somewhat, as evidenced by Jerome’s sharp criticisms of Rufinus’ work. Clark sees the 
controversy of Origen as mainly a social one, and one which was brought into sharp focus because 
the Origenist framework for investigation, which included the origin of the soul and free will (both 
relevant to this study), was no longer tenable in later Christian society. She states: 
By the first quarter of the fifth century, it struck many Christians as bizarre and unwelcome 
teaching for human intelligence to be thought akin to that of the sun, moon, and stars; for all 
rational beings including the devil to be deemed capable of sloughing off not just sin, but 
bodilessness itself, and of regaining their primordial contemplative ecstasy; for the justice 
of God to be confessed as the singular divine attribute that must be upheld at all costs. 
 
Some of Rufinus’ translation choices may have been informed by the Origenist controversy. 
Since Rufinus’ project took place in a time when the Christian corpus was being solidified, and, 
perhaps more importantly, standardized, the alterations to Origen’s text as rendered by Rufinus can 
illuminate the particular qualities of the original that later became problematic. As we will examine 
in more detail in Chapter Two, Origen did not seem to have any problem mixing his Christian 
devotion and philosophical inclinations. Later, however, these two identities came into conflict, 
and Origen’s philosophical identification with texts outside the Christian corpus had to be muted in 
order for his text to live on. 
 
 
  
                                                      
58 Ibid p. 245 
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Overview of Dissertation 
 
 This dissertation complements existing works on Rufinus’ translations of Origen, as well as 
those discussing Origen’s relationship to philosophy and his narrative of the soul’s descent. I make 
several important contributions in the following chapters. First, in Chapter One, I develop a 
methodological approach to working with ancient translation, one that treats the translation process 
as an overall narrative, providing a theoretical framework on which to ground the investigation of 
Rufinus as translator. In Chapter Two, I demonstrate what Rufinus left out during his process of 
translation, motivated in large part by a will to extract certain types of Hellenistic philosophy from 
Origen's work. I use this knowledge to rethink the overall conception of Origen's moral psychology 
as it is presented in Rufinus’ Latin texts. As Mark M.S. Scott states:  
Origen remains a polarizing figure, however, partly because of his willingness to 
venture into unexplored theological territory and partly because of his ability to 
keep seemingly opposite positions in productive tension… His detractors failed 
to see the experimental and exploratory nature of his theology and were unable to 
grasp his synthetic genius and the apologetic motivation behind his integration of 
philosophy and theology… As only great minds can, he finds harmony where 
others see only antitheses. Part of his genius, then, is his ability to find truth in 
paradoxes.59  
 Rufinus, I will argue, has failed to capture Origen’s skill at weaving seemingly 
incompatible doctrines (both from Christian theology and competing philosophical schools) into 
the harmonious and intricate web of his thought. Much like in an intricately woven tapestry, pulling 
just one thread can quickly and easily unravel the whole piece. I will argue that Rufinus has done 
just that. In his attempt to blur certain philosophical allusions in Origen’s text, he has subverted 
Origen’s doctrine on free will and has created a new type of sinful thought. Last, in Chapter Three, 
                                                      
59 Scott, M.S. (2012: 4-5), Journey Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil. American 
Academy of Religion Academiy Seires. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
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I propose another consequence of Rufinus’ process of translation: the interpolation of the works of 
Evagrius Ponticus into Origen. 
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Chapter Summaries 
 
Chapter One: Translation as a Journey: Methodology for assessing Rufinus as a translator and his 
process of translation 
 
Chapter One outlines the methodology for the dissertation. It provides an introduction to the 
translation theories used throughout, as well as outlines the specific tools with which I will analyze 
Rufinus’ work on Origen. First, it provides a holistic definition of translation, including both the 
final product and the process of translating. This definition then underpins the assessment of 
translation as a form of rewriting. The key elements in a theory of translation are laid out thereafter. 
The bulk of the chapter is concerned with detailing a specific methodology for approaching ancient 
translations. By combining modern theories of translation with arguments from Classics scholars, 
four categories of consideration will be presented: the expertise of the translator, considerations of 
audience, historical and political environment, and use of accessory texts. Finally, I will outline 
how to apply this methodology to the translations of Rufinus. 
 
Chapter Two: Crossing the Border: Rufinus’ translation choices and their consequences for 
Origen’s doctrine on the soul’s journey to embodiment and the psychological processes of 
embodied thought 
 
Chapter Two provides the necessary background for an engagement with the translations of 
Origen's works by tracing his theory of the soul as we find it in the extant Greek corpus. Special 
attention is paid to the terminology he uses to describe the soul's faculties, in particular with regard 
to human emotion, decision-making, and thought. Consideration is then given to exploring the 
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above topics in Platonic and Stoic sources. I intend to illuminate the influence of Platonism and 
Stoicism on Origen and Origen's appropriation of Platonic and Stoic terminology in his works. 
Attention is paid to the overarching historical and cultural context that allowed Origen readily to 
adopt philosophical terms in his writings. Once the similarities to Stoic and Platonic sources have 
been identified, it will thereby be easier to discover and assess the deviations found in Rufinus' 
translations. I will provide an overview of Rufinus’ process of translation of Origen’s moral 
psychology. Each section of this chapter presents each of the first three categories of analyzing 
translation covered in Chapter One: Rufinus' expertise, his considerations of audience, and the 
effects of his historical and political environment. Each category will include an examination of 
Rufinus' process, relying on both his own commentaries as well as historical analysis and a close 
reading of the Greek and Latin texts relevant to each case. The two main purposes of this chapter 
are to establish that Rufinus made significant alterations to Origen's works in his translation 
project, and to illustrate the consequences of those alterations. 
 
 
Chapter 3: In Foreign Lands: Evagrius’ works as accessory texts and their infiltration into Origen 
through Rufinus 
This final chapter is focused on the analysis of a set of accessory texts used by Rufinus: the 
works of Evagrius. I will first explore the connection between Rufinus and Evagrius. Next, I will 
present close readings and examples of alterations to Origen's text that closely mirror the works of 
Evagrius. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the power that an intervening text can have. 
The works of Evagrius, emerging from a different time and perspective, have come to retroactively 
alter the translations of Origen in the process of translation. Finally, I will examine a consequence 
that Rufinus as rewriter, active agent, and author in his own right has enacted on Origen's text 
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through his translation: by cross-breeding Origen with Evagrius, Rufinus has created a new 
relationship between thought and sin. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Where Mark S.M. Scott's task was the retrieval of Origen's thought, to “recover his 
neglected theological legacy”,60 mine is similarly to uncover Origen’s thought by shedding light on 
Rufinus as translator and active agent in the rewriting of Origen. To understand Rufinus as 
translator, we must begin with a method of analyzing translation and understanding the role of the 
translator. Chapter One begins with this task. 
 
 
 
                                                      
60 Scott (2012: 7). 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Translation as Journey 
Methodology for assessing Rufinus as Translator and his process of translation 
 
 
Translation Theory and its Application 
 
 Translation theory, although a relatively new field itself, has obvious interdisciplinary 
benefits and has developed to work seamlessly with other disciplines, including linguistics, 
philosophy, cultural studies, language engineering, and literary studies.61 Due to the relative lack of 
comprehensive studies of translation in antiquity in the field of Classical Studies, I have combined 
the approaches used by modern translation theorists with already established principles and 
methodologies in the field. In pursuit of this goal, I am greatly indebted to the works of modern 
Anglo-Saxon and post colonial translation theorists. Lawrence Venuti’s work on “invisible” 
translators has been especially helpful in directing my methodology in analyzing Rufinus’ 
translations. The works of Roger Bell and Jacques Derrida have also provided a stable base for 
discussion of translation as an intellectual implement. Amongst Classical, Byzantine, and Near 
Eastern scholars focusing on ancient translations, I will rely in particular on the work of Naomi 
Seidman, Marianne Pade, and Catherine Chin. 
  The main aim of this chapter is to lay down the framework for an analysis of translation. I 
will argue that translation is fundamentally a form of rewriting, and in some cases even closer to a 
                                                      
61 Hatim, B., & Munday, J. (2004:8). Translation: An advanced resource book. London: Routledge. 
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commentary on the original text. I will first present a definition for translation that encompasses 
not only the product of translation but also the process. Next, the relevant theories from both 
modern translation theorists and scholars in Classics and related fields will be laid out. Following 
will be a discussion of the difficulties in producing a “transparent” translation, which is an 
impossible goal propagated by the current ideal of creating a translated text that can stand in place 
of the original. I will present a basic formula for a useful translation theory and within the 
framework of the former, I will proceed to outline the methodology used in this dissertation will be 
outlined. Using a modified version of Lawrence Venuti’s approach to modern Anglo-Saxon 
translations, I will conduct investigations in four categories which serve to reveal the entire process 
of translation: audience, politics and history, accessory texts, and the translator’s expertise. 
Examples will be provided on how each of these categories uncovers a piece of the story of a 
translation. Finally, I will provide a brief overview of how the above will be applied in the case of 
Origen, Rufinus, and Evagrius. Overall, this chapter endeavors to highlight the translator as an 
active and effective agent in the process of translation and not simply a conduit through which a 
text travels unaltered from one language to another. Furthermore, revealing the translator as agent 
will underline the importance of studying translation not only from the standpoint of the final 
product (the target language text), but also the utility of approaching the process of translation itself 
as a sort of history of the text; the journey the text takes is a story in itself, full of contact points at 
which it is vulnerable to outside influence on its way to being formed into the final translation.
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A Complete Definition of Translation 
 
 The process of translation can appear to some as a task similar to mathematics: simply 
substituting one word in the source text for the equivalent one in the target language. This sort of 
concept of translation as a calculable formula is evidenced by the fact that modern technology is 
now used in foreign language learning to create word-for-word and line-by-line translations to aid 
in the mastery of a new language. The advent and ubiquitous use of online programs such as 
Google Translate also point to the idea that translation is somehow programmable. There is also an 
expectation that translated works are readily available, whether in print or digital format, in 
particular in dominant world languages (such as English). In a globalized world, most anyone can 
pick up a new book written across the world but conveniently available in her own tongue. 
Although it can appear to be an exact science, it is undeniable that a translated text cannot be 
viewed as equivalent in all senses to the original. Translators require more than to be simply trained 
to use a dictionary, and despite Google Translate’s popularity, it is far from capable of replacing a 
human translator. In the case of translation, then, what does a human have that a machine does not? 
She has the ability to understand the underlying context of a foreign text, which is colored not only 
by the plurality and varying shades of meaning inherent in each word and phrase, but also the 
underlying cultural environment62 in which the text was produced. She can then reproduce that 
context in another language, using a set of cultural norms inherent in the target language’s users. 
                                                      
62 According to Miller et al. (2010: 12), culture can be defined as “the social process whereby 
people communicate meanings, make sense of their world, construct their identities, and define 
their beliefs and values.” Seen from another perspective, as quoted in Levine, Donald, ed. (1971: 6) 
Simmel: On individuality and social forms. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Georg Simmel 
defines it as “the cultivation of individuals through the agency of external forms which have been 
objectified in the course of history”. Thus, culture can be viewed both on an individual level and on 
the level of broad scale societal organization and interaction. 
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Even if two translators approach the same text, they will necessarily produce different outputs 
precisely because they are not machines computing inputs and producing outputs based on one-to-
one correspondence. Every word or phrase, every idiom used by a translator is the result of a 
choice. The powerful influence of the translator on her text cannot be emphasized enough.  
Roger Bell (1991: 13) defines translation as an amalgam of three different subsections: 
translating (the process), a translation (the product) and translation (the abstract concept that 
includes both the process of translating and the outcome of translating: a translation). A proper 
discussion of translation in general necessarily includes all three parts making up the whole. 
I will use Lawerence Venuti’s definition of the process of translating (inspired by Jacques 
Derrida) in this dissertation: 
Translation is a process by which the chain of signifiers that constitutes the source-language 
text is replaced by a chain of signifiers in the target language which the translator provides 
on the strength of an interpretation. Because meaning is an effect of relations and 
differences among signifiers along a potentially endless chain (polysemous, intertextual, 
subject to infinite linkages), it is always differential and deferred, never present as an 
original unity.63 
 
Although translation may appear as a creative form of mathematics, it is impossible to 
simply “replace” signifiers from one language to the next. It is, indeed, the overall goal in 
translation as specified by Venuti’s opening statement. However, the step is untenable without the 
addition of a translator’s interpretation. Meaning is relational, and the translator must interpret the 
context of a passage in order to translate even one word. This is of course the root of reason that 
computers today overwhelmingly fail at creating translations, in particular in the case of literary 
texts. The complexity of meaning as contextual prevents a simple substitution of one set of 
signifiers in one language to another set in another. As Venuti expresses in a different way, 
                                                      
63 Venuti (1999: 17-18). See also Derrida, J. (1982) “Difference,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. 
A.Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
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“Meaning is a plural and contingent relation, not an unchanging unified essence, and therefore a 
translation cannot be judged according to mathematics-based concepts of semantic equivalence or 
one-to-one correspondence.”64 Because of the plurality of meaning and the unavoidable addition of 
the translator’s interpretation, analyzing the process of translation necessitates a more thorough 
analysis with a wide set of considerations. 
Working under the above parameters, analysis of a translation should examine the mirror 
reflection of the translator in her text and the process of translation to reach the target language. It 
must treat the translator not as a mere conduit through which a text has the potential to be 
seamlessly transformed, but rather as an interpreter of the original text. I shall argue that dealing 
with a translation from the standpoint of the process requires one part paleography (dealing with 
possible manuscript errors, created by the translator, as one normally would working with 
potentially corrupt or incomplete manuscripts), and one part commentary analysis (considering a 
translation as a commentary on the original text rather than a replacement of it.), in order to fully 
understand the translation process.  
  
                                                      
64 p. 18 
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The Invisible Translator: Translation as a Rewriting 
 
 A drawback to the overwhelming modern criteria for analyzing a translation, one which 
inevitably asserts its influence to a certain extent on the field of Classics (and other disciplines 
dealing with multi-lingual texts), is that rather than taking a holistic view, the emphasis often rests 
almost entirely on the readability of the target text instead: 
A translated text, whether prose or poetry, fiction or nonfiction, is judged acceptable by 
most publishers, reviewers, and readers when it reads fluently, when the absence of any 
linguistic or stylistic peculiarities makes it seem transparent, giving the appearance that it 
reflects the foreign writer’s personality or intention or the essential meaning of the foreign 
text—the appearance, in other words, that the translation is not in fact a translation, but the 
“original.”65 
 
The result of this approach to textual analysis is that a text that reads fluently and adheres to 
the translator’s and target audience’s expectation and sense of taste is more likely to be considered 
a reliable translation; however, readability in the target language is far from a guarantee of 
faithfulness to the source.  
There is still a great deal of emphasis on preserving the meaning and force of the original 
text. But in modern translation, and even in the translations that classicists themselves produce, 
readability often is also thought to be synonymous with faithfulness. The translator Norman 
Shapiro boldly claims: 
I see translation as the attempt to produce a text so transparent that it does not seem to be 
translated. A good translation is like a pane of glass. You only notice that it's there when 
there are little imperfections—scratches, bubbles. Ideally, there shouldn't be any. It should 
never call attention to itself.66 
                                                      
65 Venuti (1999: 1) 
66 Quoted by Venuti (1999: 1). 
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While this is a worthy goal for a translator, it underestimates the profound influence that 
she has on the text with which she engages.67A pane of glass allows a clear view of what is behind 
it without distortion. However, the very act of translation is a distortion, and thus can never 
function in the way Shapiro describes. In fact, there are countless other variables at play even in the 
original text, and these variables are only compounded when rendered in a new language. Both the 
translator and the original author are under the influence of forces both internal and external. 
Venuti summarizes: 
Both foreign text and translation are derivative: both consist of diverse linguistic and 
cultural materials that neither the foreign writer nor the translator originates, and that 
destabilize the work of signification, inevitably exceeding and possibly conflicting with 
their intentions. As a result, a foreign text is the site of many different semantic possibilities 
that are fixed only provisionally in any one translation, on the basis of varying cultural 
assumptions and interpretive choices, in specific social situations, in different historical 
periods.68  
 
The interpretation of non-translated texts has become standard and obvious to scholars. 
Uncovering what is “derivative” in a text and under what variety of influences the author composed 
it is an established part of modern scholarly work. But, this “derivativeness” is compounded in 
translation, depending entirely on the “cultural assumptions” and “interpretive choices” of the 
individual translator in his own time and environment. Uncovering these factors is crucial to 
understanding the translation process. 
If we cannot view translation as transparent and ineffective, the question that must be 
considered is how one can judge a “good” translation. Furthermore, what does it mean for a 
                                                      
67 See Venuti (1999; 1-2): “The illusion of transparency is an effect of fluent discourse, of the 
translator’s effort to insure easy readability by adhering to current usage, maintaining continuous 
syntax, fixing a precise meaning. What is so remarkable here is that this illusory effect conceals the 
numerous conditions under which the translation is made, starting with the translator’s crucial 
intervention in the foreign text The more fluent the translation, the more invisible the translator, 
and, presumably, the more visible the writer or meaning of the foreign text.” 
68 p. 4 
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translation to go unnoticed, and what can this say about the process of translation? Ultimately, what 
constitutes a good translation involves a complex number of factors and relative calculations. 
“Good” is judged differently depending on whether one considers it form the point of view of the 
original author or its new readers, and a translation that does not draw attention to itself may very 
well be quite pleasing to readers in the target language but may nevertheless have travelled a long 
way from the source text. 
Unfortunately, considering a translation as something that can be transparent (or should be) 
is rather misleading. More than just a conduit or a pane of glass, as Lawrence Venuti emphasizes, 
translation is a process of “rewriting”.69 More specifically, it is a “manipulation, undertaken in the 
service of power”.70 The transfer from one language to the next entails alteration, no matter the 
diligence or skill of the translator. The translator has complete power over the text, as well as 
power over what and how he transmits it to his target audience. No matter the process, a translation 
is committing some violence to the original text. This is not meant to disparage translation as a 
practice. Indeed, it has many positive effects. For one, Venuti writes that these rewritings “can help 
in the evolution of a literature and a society. Rewritings can introduce new concepts, new genres, 
new devices, and the history of translation is the history also of literary innovation, of the shaping 
power of one culture upon another”. 71 As we will see in the following sections, rewritings and 
alterations made through translation can bring foreign and seemingly inexplicable concepts to new 
audiences, or can make cultural, scientific, or historical concepts clear to non-expert readers. It can 
create connections that were not previously tenable and enhances the flow of knowledge across 
languages and cultures. On the negative side, rewriting “can also repress innovation, distort and 
                                                      
69 See Venuti (1999; 8). 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid 
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contain.” 72 The original text is completely at the mercy of the translator. She is able to impart a 
version of the text to her target community in the way she deems most suitable. It may be in 
accordance to her own personal tastes, or perhaps simply in line with her current cultural 
environment. She is colored by her own experiences, culture, morals and values. Ultimately, the 
translator is exercising absolute power over the text: “All rewritings, whatever their intention, 
reflect a certain ideology and a poetics and as such manipulate literature to function in a given 
society in a given way.” 73 Unveiling the manipulative power of translation is one of the main aims 
of this dissertation. 
Whether the manipulation of texts is positive or negative, or whether the translator’s 
intention has a role to play, in the end it is important to simply be aware that these influences exist. 
“The violence wreaked by translation is partly inevitable, inherent in the translation process, partly 
potential, emerging at any point in the production and reception of the translated text, varying with 
specific cultural and social formations at different historical moments.”74 The assumption of 
translation as rewriting and the inevitability of violence on a translated text can help scholars study 
and better situate these special texts in their own time and socio-political environment, and 
contributes to a better overall understanding of their place in history. 
Naturally, scholars who work with texts across various languages have more sophisticated 
techniques for analyzing translations than mass market publishers and their readers (from where 
many of the above expectations for translated texts come). However, some of the overall mentality 
from these contemporary sources still bleeds into scholarship analyzing translation as well. There is 
                                                      
72 Ibid 
73 Venuti (1999: 8). 
74 Venuti (1995: 19). 
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no doubt that current trends in translation have an effect on the discipline of Classics, in particular 
for those who are not themselves involved with the methods of translation theory.75  
The most recent translations of the Odyssey and the Aeneid are two good examples of the 
juggling act inherent in translating ancient texts, as well as how these translations are evaluated by 
modern scholars and publishers. 
A principal challenge inherent in both aforementioned texts is rendering Greek and Latin 
metered poetry into English. Even a very simple example from antiquity can suffice to illustrate the 
point. The first line of the Iliad, in Greek, μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος is enough to elicit a 
necessary compromise. Peter Green’s translation (“Wrath, goddess, sing of Achilles Peleus's 
son's”), and Robert Fagles’ (“Rage--Goddess sing the rage of Peleus's son Achilles”) both retain 
μῆνιν as the first word. Richmond Lattimore renders it “Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus' son 
Achilleus”. On the one hand, Green and Fagles keep the emphasis in the correct place. It is a poetic 
work, and in poetry (but also to a greater or lesser degree in prose), the word order makes up part 
of the artistic portrayal as well. We are meant to see the word μῆνιν first in this poem. On the other 
hand, retaining this word order is a stretch for the English language. 
Some translators (such as Robert Fagles), chose to simply to bypass this issue by writing in 
free verse and sticking to the content rather than the composition. Others have crafted English 
versions in meter but prefer iambic pentameter (such as Richmond Lattimore) because it is more 
fitting to the English language than the original dactylic hexameter. 
                                                      
75 On the current status of modern translations, Venuti (1995; 2) states: “On those rare occasions 
when reviewers address the translation at all, their brief comments usually focus on its style, 
neglecting such other possible questions as its accuracy, its intended audience, its economic value 
in the current book market, its relation to literary trends in English, its place in the translator’s 
career.“ Much of this general conception of translation is also prevalent in commentaries on ancient 
translations, as we saw in the case of Graves, and will encounter again in the case of Rufinus. 
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Gregory Hays, in his review of Emily Wilson’s new 2018 translation of the Odyssey,76 
underscores a strength of her translation is that it attempts to stay as true to the original poetic feel 
and structure as possible. Wilson adheres to a strict iambic pentameter, and even commits to 
maintaining the same number of lines in the English version as there are in the original. This does 
illustrate a growing preference in the field for maintaining as much of the feel of the original as 
possible. Retaining the meter as strictly as possible certainly reaches for Schleiermacher’s ideal of 
creating an equivalent relationship between audience and text in translation. 
Ultimately, there are still signs of modern translation’s preference for the readability of the 
target text. The publisher’s blurb of Wilson’s translation praises it as “A lean, fleet-footed 
translation”, refers to it as “fresh” and “authoritative”, “Written in iambic pentameter verse and a 
vivid, contemporary idiom”.77 The reviews similarly use key terms pointing to fluency and 
readability in English, lauding it as “fluent”, “elegant”, “irresistibly readable”, and “the most 
accessible, yet accurate translation of Homer’s masterwork that I have ever read”.78 
                                                      
76 Hays, Gregory. “A Version of Homer that Dares to Match Him Line for Line”. The New York 
Times 5 December 2017. Nytimes.com. 
77 “The Odyssey”. WW Norton & Company, Inc. November 2017. books.wwnorton.com. Web. 
 
78 Ibid. “A masterpiece of translation—fluent, elegant, vigorous.” — Rowan Williams, Master of 
Magdalene College, University of Cambridge 
 
“Irresistibly readable…turns Homeric epic into a poetic feast.” — Froma Zeitlin, Princeton 
University 
 
“A staggeringly superior translation—true, poetic, lively and readable, and always closely engaged 
with the original Greek—that brings to life the fascinating variety of voices in Homer’s great epic.” 
— Richard F. Thomas, Harvard University 
 
“This will surely be the Odyssey of choice for a generation.” — Lorna Hardwick, The Open 
University, London 
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There is also evidence that evaluators of new Greek and Latin translations admit the 
translator’s inherent powerful agency over the text, although they at times do so obliquely. When 
commenting on David Ferry’s translation of Vergil’s eighth Eclogue, April Bernard remarks: 
Here Virgil (or is it Ferry?) hangs perfectly poised between the personal and the 
general, between private suffering and the public good made from it—the public 
good that, in an ocean of lies, continues to survive in poetry’s truth. 
She is admitting here the extent to which Ferry has control over the text he has translated. 
Whose verse are we really reading, Vergil’s or Ferry’s? To be an excellent translator of poetry, one 
must also be an excellent poet.  
That even translation of classical works has been colored by modern sentiment (driven 
mainly by the fluency and readability of the target language text) on what constitutes a 
praiseworthy translation is not to say that there has been no thorough or thoughtful analysis of 
Rufinus. In the specific case of Rufinus, many scholars have voiced their opinions on the quality of 
his translations (to be discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections), but we lack a specific 
system of analysis, and thus it is difficult to draw convincing conclusions. In the following section, 
I will outline a series of themes to consider in the analysis of a translation. The application and 
analysis of these themes should aid in tracing the influences the translator has on the process of 
creating a text. As Venuti concludes, “the study of the manipulative processes of literature as 
exemplified by translation can help us toward a greater awareness of the world in which we live.”79 
The following section will outline how we can uncover the rewritings in Rufinus’ translations and 
                                                      
“Emily Wilson has produced a clear, vigorous, sensitive Odyssey that conveys both the grand scale 
and the individual pathos of this foundational story. This is the most accessible, and yet accurate, 
translation of Homer’s masterwork that I have ever read.” — Susan Wise Bauer, author of The 
History of the Ancient World 
79 Venuti (1995: 32). 
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thus gain a more acute awareness of the history of his translated text, and the specific process 
undergone through translation. 
 
 
Building a theory of translation 
 
It is possible to build a theory of translation that focuses on the product of the translation or 
the process itself. But developing a comprehensive theory of translation requires not only a careful 
examination of the end product of translation, but also an intimate awareness and understanding of 
how a translation is produced, thereby combining the analysis of process and product. Roger Bell80 
delineates these three potential translation theories in the following way: 
(1) “A theory of translation as process. This would require a study of information 
processing and would draw heavily on psychology and on psycholinguistics.” 
(2) “A theory of translation as product. This would require a study of texts not merely by 
means of the traditional levels of linguistic analysis (syntax and semantics) but also making use of 
stylistics and recent advances in text-linguistics and discourse analysis.” 
(3) “A theory of translation as both process and product. This would require the integrated 
study of both and such a general theory is, presumably, the long-term goal for translation studies.” 
According to Eddie Ronowicz81 (2006:2), an ideal theory must possess five characteristics: 
(1) Consistent with other knowledge 
(2) Consistent within itself 
                                                      
80 Bell, R. T., & Candlin, C. (1991:26). Translation and translating: Theory and practice. London: 
Longman. 
81 Eddie Ronowicz & Colin Yallop eds. (2007: 2): English: one language, different 
cultures, Second Edition, Continuum, London 
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(3) Consistent in the use of terminology 
(4) “Elegant” 
(5) Empirically verifiable 
Finally, Ronowicz states that a theory of translation consists of five components: 
assumptions or axioms, methodology, language, descriptions and explanations.82 
In addition to Ronowicz’s criterion, Bell adds the following necessary characteristics of a 
good translation theory83: 
(1) “determinism: it must be able to predict” 
(2) “parsimony: it must be simple” 
(3) “generality: it must be comprehensive.” 
This dissertation attempts to create a workable and comprehensive translation theory for 
application in the case of Rufinus and Origen that in line with Bell above: incorporating an analysis 
of both the process of translation and the product. That it is consistent with other knowledge, 
within itself, in its use of terminology, elegant, and empirically verifiable, as well as embodying 
Bell’s three necessary characteristics shall be demonstrated in due course. 
 The incorporation of a study of both the process and product can be accomplished in two 
phases: first, analyzing the translator and his influences (to unfold the process of translation), and 
second, engaging in a detailed linguistic and stylistic analysis of the translation itself in the context 
of the procedural findings (to reveal the product of the translation). I will assume the basic structure 
of Venuti’s model for analyzing a translator and his translation, adding two critical aspects 
necessary for the examination of Rufinus’ translations. 
                                                      
82 Ibid 
83 Bell (1991: 27). 
 
42 
Venuti’s terms his own method for analyzing a translation “symptomatic reading”, a 
process in which he endeavors to ground a reading of translated texts on a “foreignizing method of 
translation that assumes a determinate concept of subjectivity.”84 A symptomatic reading treats a 
translated text as an amalgam of influences, each word, phrase, sentence, idiom, or passage as a 
whole as a symptom of the translation process. This method ensures that the translator does not 
remain “invisible”, but he and his process of translation rather become part of the narrative of a 
translated text. The end goal of this kind of reading is the following:  
To combat the translator’s invisibility with a history of—and in opposition to—
contemporary English-language translation. Insofar as it is a cultural history with a 
professed political agenda, it follows the genealogical method developed by Nietzsche and 
Foucault and abandons the two principles that govern much conventional historiography: 
teleology and objectivity.85 
 
Venuti’s use of the geneaological method is helpful because it helps us to view translation 
as a part of the history of the text. The translator has connections and is under various influences 
that naturally become part of the translation itself. Although Venuti’s material is contemporary 
English language translations, the basic tenets of his theory can be applied in the case of ancient 
translations as well. Viewing a translated text as a part of the socio-political history rather than a 
stand-in for the original texts can prove very fruitful no matter the date of the text, or the language 
pair. Venuti in theory assumes a “foreignizing method of translation” which is a key matter of 
consideration in analyzing translated texts. A translator can approach the text to be translated in a 
foreignizing or domesticating way. A translator who creates the target text while prioritizing the 
source text is engaging in a foreignizing method of translation. Domesticizing is the opposite: 
prioritizing the needs of the target language in creating the translation. The latter results in a 
translation that sounds very “natural” in the target language. As we will see, the general preference 
                                                      
84 Venuti (1995: 29). 
85 Ibid (1995: 39). 
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in modern translation is the domesticating method (although a curious example of success of a 
foreignizing method, in the case of Haruki Murakami, will be presented). In addition to outlining 
Venuti’s own symptomatic reading as a method for approaching translation, leading domesticating 
and foreignizing theories will be examined. 
Venuti’s examination of foreignizing and domesticating translations is conducted through 
two main channels: an analysis of how the translator interacts with his potential audience, and the 
consideration of potential political and cultural influences. Naomi Seidman, as we will see, also 
adapts Venuti’s method and brings the politics and history in Jewish and Christian translations in 
sharper focus. 
I will add to this investigation two more categories of consideration: accessory texts and the 
capability of the translator. An accessory text is one which is used to triangulate a proper 
translation into the target language. While using a third text to verify a translation can on the one 
hand add strength and legitimacy to a translation, it can equally cause harm if the accessory text is 
poorly chosen. While Venuti does touch briefly on the general concept of accessory text (which 
will be discussed in greater detail below), I believe for the purposes of translations in Classics, and 
particular in the case of ancient Christian and philosophical texts, a consideration of accessory texts 
is crucial. Arguments from scholars who have put the study of accessory texts to use will also be 
presented. 
The consideration of the capability of the translator is one which is already being exercised 
in the field. Research into translators such as Rufinus typically include a summary and analysis of 
the life, experiences, and expertise of the translator. My aim in including it as an “addition” to 
Venuti’s method is only to give this set of data a more central role: no longer simply a part of the 
“background”, but rather a vital piece of the analysis of a translated text. 
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The Translator’s Audience 
 
 The target audience of a translation can have a considerable impact on how the translator 
works. The target language also plays a role. What may be natural and comprehensible in one 
language may not translate well into another. We can take an example from modern marketing 
translation to illustrate this. Braniff International Airways’ slogan “Fly in leather”, a phrase that 
brings to mind images of luxury and class to English-speakers, was unfortunately translated quite 
literally into Spanish as “Vuela en cuero”, an idiom meaning “fly naked”.86 This is a case of 
translator error due to apparent unfamiliarity with the target language. A translator who could 
recognize that a literal translation would not suffice would have to make a choice about whether to 
keep something that may be sound awkward to her target readers, or rather make adjustments so 
that the text has a natural feeling in the target language. Similarly, readers of the target language 
may have certain expectations or preferences when it comes to the text being translated. The 
translator may try to fulfill these expectations. In general, a translator can consider what would be 
the most digestible to her target audience (domesticizing the text), or she can endeavor to retain the 
foreign elements of a text in the target language (foreignizing). In the following, I will first set up 
Schleiermacher’s Dichotomy: the choice between domesticating and foreignizing translation. A 
domesticating translation is created with the target audience in mind and is exemplified by the 
current dominant conception of a good translation, as discussed above. A foreignizing translation 
prefers to stay as close to the source text as possible, even if it means at times sacrificing the 
comfort of the target audience. Next, I will present two examples: one of the result of a 
foreignizing translation (Haruki Murakami), and the other of a domesticating one (Leo Tolstoy). 
                                                      
86 Brady, D. (2011) Essentials of international Marketing. ME Sharpe. 
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These examples will be followed by an examination of two translation theories, one from Eugene 
Nida and the other from Philip Lewis. Finally, I will look more in-depth at Venuti’s symptomatic 
reading method and present two examples of its application (analyzing translations of Sigmund 
Freud and Robert Graves). 
 
Schleiermacher’s Dichotamy 
Friedrich Schleiermacher maintained that there are two options when a translator considers 
the interaction between the text and the reader: “Either the translator leaves the author in peace, as 
much as possible, and moves the reader towards him; or he leaves the reader in peace, as much as 
possible, and moves the author towards him” (as quoted by Lefevere 1977:74).87 By moving the 
reader towards the author, the translator retains the foreign aspects of the text, perhaps rendering 
some of the phrases and sentences in unnatural ways in the target language. Venuti summarizes 
that a translation such as this “signifies the difference of the foreign text, yet only by disrupting the 
cultural codes that prevail in the target language.”88 It is likely that some readers may find the text 
uncomfortable to read, as they are being transported abroad to the world of the source text. 
Although they recognize the language of the text, they cannot find their culture in it. Venuti 
summarizes this effect, writing that “In its effort to do right abroad, this translation method must do 
wrong at home, deviating enough from native norms to stage an alien reading experience” 89 In a 
contemporary Anglo-American culture that values fluency and readability in translated texts, a text 
                                                      
87 See also Venuti (1995: 20): “Schleiermacher allowed the translator to choose between a 
domesticating method, an ethnocentric reduction of the foreign text to target-language cultural 
values, bringing the author back home, and a foreignizing method, an ethnodeviant pressure on 
those values to register the linguistic and cultural difference of the foreign text, sending the reader 
abroad.” 
88 Venuti (1995: 19). 
89 Ibid. 
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that has been translated in this way could be accused of being written in “translationese”. Naturally, 
even a text translated using a foreignizing method cannot be said to be without alterations. 
Although, according to Venuti: 
Schleiermacher made clear that his choice was foreignizing translation, and this led the 
French translator and translation theorist Antoine Berman to treat Schleiermacher’s 
argument as an ethics of translation, concerned with making the translated text a place 
where a cultural other is manifested—although, of course, an otherness that can never be 
manifested in its own terms, only in those of the target language, and hence always already 
encoded.90 
 
Considering the foreignizing method an “ethics” of translation creates the illusion that this 
method is doing less violence to the text by retaining its otherness. However, since the dramatic 
transformation of rendering the text into another language is still necessary, and because language 
translation isn’t as simple as plugging in new words with a one-to-one correspondence, the 
foreignness is still only accessible through a distorted picture. Thus, though it may have some 
advantages over the domesticizing translation, the first and foremost being that it endeavors to 
retain as many original features of the text as possible, a foreignizing translator cannot be 
considered invisible, nor her text without its own part in the historical narrative. 
Schleiermacher’s other option, to move the author closer to the reader, is domesticizing the 
text. The reader feels as though they are in a comfortable space, accessing a foreign text from the 
comfort of their own home. The vocabulary used in the translation is up to date and relevant in the 
target language and culture. Subtle, or sometimes quite overt choices may be taken to align the 
translated text to current social and cultural norms in the target language society. Further, there are 
often short elaborations and explanations added by the translator that help to orient the reader in 
this foreign world. As we will see, Rufinus engages in this kind of translation. He does not leave 
                                                      
90 Venuti, (1999: 33). Referring to Berman (1985:87–91). 
 
 
47 
Origen alone in the 3rd century, rather he brings Origen closer to 5th century Latin-speaking 
Christian readers. He both adds to the text to bring context to the reader and makes alterations and 
extractions that bring the text in line with the contemporary Christian norms. 
Foreignizing Translation: Haruki Murakami 
An example of a foreignizing translation can be found amongst the translated works of 
Haruki Murakami, a Japanese author of bestselling books both in Japan and abroad. His works 
have been translated into 50 languages, including English. Murakami chose Jay Rubin as his 
official translator for his 1997 collection of stories, The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle, and this 
propelled his novel to the mainstream in the English-speaking world. However, another translation, 
made by Alfred Birnbaum in a collection of Murakami’s stories that included the same story Rubin 
translated, became a fan favorite and has since become the voice of Murakami in English today. 
The introductory passage of book will be compared below: 
When the phone rang I was in the kitchen, boiling a potful of spaghetti and whistling along 
with an FM broadcast of the overture to Rossini’s The Thieving Magpie, which has to be the 
perfect music for cooking pasta. 
The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle, trans. Jay Rubin91 
I’m in the kitchen cooking spaghetti when the woman calls. Another moment until the 
spaghetti is done; there I am, whistling the prelude to Rossini’s La Gazza Ladra along with 
the FM radio. Perfect spaghetti-cooking music. 
The Elephant vanishes, trans. Alfred Birnbaum92 
Although a thorough evaluation of the above translations should include an analysis of 
Murakami’s original Japanese text, I believe there is still much to be learned about the process of 
translation and the intention of the translator simply by comparing the two English versions. As 
will be demonstrated in this chapter, Venuti’s method of analyzing translations can be applied only 
                                                      
91 Haruki, M.(1999) The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle. Trans. Jay Rubin. London: Harvill Press. 
92 Murakami, H. (1994). The Elephant vanishes. Trans. Alfred Birnbaum. New York: Vintage 
Books. 
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to the target text (in cases where either the scholar does not know the source language, or the 
original is not available). This can also prove fruitful in cases where an original text is lost, as often 
happens in the case of Rufinus. 
The first example, written by Murakami’s chosen translator, has a smooth and comfortable 
style. It combines the entire scene into one grammatically correct and complete sentence. The 
dependent clauses flow naturally from one to the next, and the relative clause leads clearly from its 
antecedent. The tense choices are natural for the context. The simple past “rang” and past 
continuous “was boiling” and “[was] whistling” are used to indicate an interrupted action in the 
past. Furthermore, the title of the opera piece is given in English. These all serve to bring the text 
closer to the English-speaking audience. It is easy and clear to read. There are no foreign elements, 
let alone words, for the reader to grapple with. 
On the other hand, the second version has an entirely different tone and flow. Birnbaum 
chose to break the scene into four sentences, creating a more disjointed sequence of events. The use 
of narrative present tense throughout, although not at all incorrect usage, lends an urgency to the 
events and even adds a bit of foreignness to the text in comparison to the more flowing and natural 
sounding tense changes used by Rubin. Birnbaum also chose to leave Rossini’s opera in Italian, 
further adding a foreign feeling to the text, as well as making the narrator seem more educated and 
pretentious. Of course, the foreignness in this case does not stems from the original language, but 
nevertheless represents a decision not to bring the text fully to the reader by rendering the title in 
English. In Birnbaum’s translation, the final sentence is not properly a full sentence. While 
sentence fragments can also be found in original English language literature, it still draws attention 
to itself, especially when compared to Rubin’s translation. Birnbaum also chose to render the more 
forced and awkward “spaghetti-cooking music”, which requires that he create a new complex noun 
in English, rather than Rubin’s solution of expanding the idea into a phrase “the perfect music for 
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cooking pasta”. In addition, Birnbaum repeats the word “spaghetti” at both the beginning and the 
end, rather than the perhaps stylistically more elegant solution of first specifying that he is cooking 
spaghetti and later simply referring to pasta. Thus, it appears that Rubin was concerned with 
making the target audience comfortable, whereas Birnbaum created a text that could at times leave 
the audience feeling the opposite. 
Domesticating Translation: Leo Tolstoy 
Two interesting examples of domesticizing translations can be found in two translations of 
War and Peace. A hefty and dense novel, full of culturally and historically specific details about 
nineteenth-century Russia, it is no doubt a difficult text to translate into English, and two 
translators took the liberty of domesticizing their translations in order to better appeal to their target 
audiences. First, British translator Andrew Bromfield received mixed reviews in 2006 when he 
took the liberty of creating Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace in English as a shorter, happier novel. The 
Russian publisher of the Bromfield War and Peace stated that this version of the novel is “twice as 
short, four times as interesting … more peace, less war.”93 This was seen as major violence against 
the original text and is an extreme example of a type of domesticizing a translation. Finally, the 
publisher defended its choice by pointing out that the text was translated using an older manuscript 
written by Tolstoy that he later expanded. Although this means that the choices the translator made 
were not as violent to the text as it originally seemed (he did not arbitrarily choose which sections 
to cut, nor did he write a happy ending himself), it still is an excellent example of domesticizing 
translation. Bromfield and the publishers deliberately chose a version of the text (arguably an 
unfinished one) because they anticipated that it would be more pleasing to their target audience. 
                                                      
93 Glaister, D. “Publishers weigh into War and Peace battle” The Guardian www.theguardian.com 
October 27, 2007. 
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The “more peace” text, complete with a happy ending fits nicely into the twenty first-century 
English- speaking world, certainly more so than a long, complex, depressing novel. 
Similarly, Constance Garnett came under fire for her translations of Tolstoy and 
Dostoyevsky. She translated large volumes of text in an incredibly short amount of time (creating 
70 translations of Russian literature throughout her lifetime) and was known to skip over awkward 
passages. D.H. Lawrence, who knew Garnett, wrote that she was often 
sitting out in the garden turning out reams of her marvelous translations from the Russian. 
She would finish a page, and throw it off on a pile on the floor without looking up, and start 
a new page. The pile would be this high…really almost up to her knees, and all magical.94 
 
She received a great deal of criticism from Russian speakers, who accused her of making 
the translations too British. In a review of her translation of Dostoyevsky’s Notes from 
Underground, Kornei Chukovsky wrote:  
In reading the original, who does not feel the convulsions, the nervous trembling of 
Dostoevsky’s style? It is expressed in convulsions of syntax, in a frenzied and somehow 
piercing diction where malicious irony is mixed with sorrow and despair. But with 
Constance Garnett it becomes a safe blandscript: not a volcano, but a smooth lawn mowed 
in the English manner—which is to say a complete distortion of the original.95 
 
With similar sentiments, Joseph Brodsky theorized that “The reason English-speaking 
readers can barely tell the difference between Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky is that they aren’t reading 
the prose of either one. They’re reading Constance Garnett.”96 Garnett is obviously being accused 
of translation in a domesticating manner. While her texts might read quite smoothly and easily in 
English, her Russian critics uncover that this resulted in a “distortion” of the original. The remark 
that readers of her translations are not actually reading the original Russian authors, but they are 
                                                      
94 As quoted in Richard Garnett, Constance Garnett: A Heroic Life (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 
1991), p. 133 
95 Chukovksy, K. (1984:220-21) The Art of Translation: Kornei Chukovsky’s High Art, translated 
and edited by Lauren G. Leighton University of Tennessee Press. 
96 Cited by David Remnick, “The Translation Wars,” The New Yorker, November 7, 2005. 
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rather “reading Constance Garnett” illustrates quite clearly the translator’s powerful agency in the 
process, and the potential for rewriting and enacting violence on the source text through the process 
of translation. 
While the above examples involve conscious efforts to appease a particular audience, a 
translator can also unconsciously make adjustments to the texts they are working on based on 
audience expectation.97 
In the end, knowing the audience of the translated work can have a marked effect on the 
translator. Whether a translator makes purposeful moves to render the text more digestible to their 
target audience, as in the case with the War and Peace translation, or if it is simply a consideration 
of time and practicality, as with Constance Garnett, it is important to take note of any audience-
based influence on the translated text. It is worth noting that although overt displays of 
domesticizing or altering a text in any way is received with skepticism, these practices often 
happen in a more subtle way. As we will see in the following, those who engage in domesticizing 
translation are often regarded as the most faithful and impartial. 
 
Nida’s Dynamic Equivalence 
Eugene Nida’s theory of translation was first developed in 1964, and later expanded and 
developed in numerous books and articles. Inspired by his work as a bible translator, his theory 
focuses on translating as a process, and considers how the audience interacts with the target text. A 
                                                      
97 See Venuti (1995; 18-19): “The aim of translation is to bring back a cultural other as the same, 
the recognizable, even the familiar; and this aim always risks a wholesale domestication of the 
foreign text, often in highly self-conscious projects, where translation serves an appropriation of 
foreign cultures for domestic agendas, cultural, economic, political. Translation can be considered 
the communication of a foreign text, but it is always a communication limited by its address to a 
specific reading audience.” 
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consideration of this method reveals that it rests on a mixture of domesticizing and foreignizing 
translation. Nida describes “A translation of dynamic equivalence aims at complete naturalness of 
expression, and tries to relate the receptor to modes of behavior relevant within the context of his 
own culture” 98 He prioritized the rendering of the source language text “first in terms of meaning 
and secondly in terms of style”.99 His shift towards considering the target language text and how to 
most effectively reproduce the text with a “naturalness of expression” effectively domesticizes the 
foreign text100 and has exerted considerable influence worldwide in translation theory and practice, 
particularly in Germany, the United States, England and China. On the other hand, it also has been 
criticized by some scholars as too narrow (focusing only on Biblical texts) and ultimately 
unattainable, since the translator cannot know for sure what the effect on each reader will be.101 
According to Nida, achieving “dynamic equivalence” requires a consideration not of one-
to-one translation or emphasis on structure or grammar. Rather, it involves identifying the 
relationship of the text to the reader and the experience transmitted through their interaction. Thus,  
one is not so concerned with matching the receptor-language message with the source-
language message, but with the dynamic relationship, that the relationship between the 
receptor and the message should be substantially the same as that which existed between 
the original receptors and the message.” 102 
 
Furthermore,  
Dynamic equivalence is therefore to be defined in terms of the degree to which the 
receptors of the message in the receptor language respond to it in substantially the same 
manner as the receptors in the source language.” 103 
                                                      
98 Nida (1964:159). 
99 Nida and Taber (1969: 12). 
100 See also Venuti (1995; 39): “The phrase ‘naturalness of expression’ signals the importance of a 
fluent strategy to this theory of translation, and in Nida’s work it is obvious that fluency involves 
domestication.” 
101 See Qian Hu (1993), Edwin Gentzler (2001), Andrew Chesterman (2002). 
102 Nida (1964: 159). 
103 Nida and Taber, (1969:24). 
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Achieving dynamic equivalence in translating involves two further priorities: 
1) The devaluation of exact and literal translations. According to Nida, “strict verbal 
consistency may result in serious distortion of the meaning.” 104 Thus, relying on an interpretation 
of individual meanings of words, or attempting to follow the structure or linguistic style of the 
source text may ultimately change the meaning in the translation because the readers will interact 
with it differently from the readers of the original text. A strange or foreign translation will produce 
a different result in the readers than one that focuses on creating fluent prose. 
2) The prioritization of the needs of the audience. Nida maintains that “the translator must 
be a person who can draw aside the curtains of linguistic and cultural differences so that people 
may see clearly the relevance of the original message”.105 Here, the goal is to render the text with 
the audience in mind. The text must be readable and understandable in the target language, as well 
as relay the original message. 
Although Nida prioritizes the target language and the needs of his audience, he does place 
emphasis on accurately rendering the foreign text (and the inherent difficulties therein), admitting 
that “an easy and natural style in translating, despite the extreme difficulty of producing it […] is 
nevertheless essential to producing in the ultimate receptors a response similar to that of the 
original receptors”.106 In this way, the target language readers should relate to the text in the same 
way that the source language readers do.107 Indeed this is a monumental task for the translator, who 
                                                      
104 Ibid. (1969:21). 
105 Nida and de Waard (1986:14). 
106 Nida (1964:163). 
107 See Venuti (1995; 40) on this point: “he is in fact imposing the English-language valorization of 
transparent discourse on every foreign culture, masking a basic disjunction between the source-and 
target-language texts which puts into question the possibility of eliciting a “similar” response.” 
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should be able to create the effect that “the receptors of a translation should comprehend the 
translated text to such an extent that they can understand how the original receptors must have 
understood the original text”. 108 Ultimately, this method still produces a domesticated text, since it 
prioritizes the needs of the target language audience and emphasizes fluency and readability. The 
relevance of the text is specific to the reader and her cultural norms.109 
 
Lewis’ Abusive Fidelity 
On the opposite end of the spectrum to Nida, we find Philip Lewis. His concept of “abusive 
fidelity” rests on the assumption that one must resist domestication of a text. He endeavors to resist 
the temptation of achieving fluency in the target language, and rather prefers a “translation that 
values experimentation, tampers with usage, seeks to match the polyvalencies or plurivocities or 
expressive stresses of the original by producing its own” (Lewis 1985:41). This method actively 
resists conforming to the expectations of the target language and culture. It is self-conscious of the 
potential damage that a domesticizing translation can enact on a text. Even so, it cannot avoid 
altering the text. As Venuti puts it, “Such a translation strategy can best be called resistancy, not 
merely because it avoids fluency, but because it challenges the target-language culture even as it 
enacts its own ethnocentric violence on the foreign text”.110  
 
                                                      
108 Ibid. p. 36. 
109 See Venuti (1995: 32) on the relevance of the translation: “This is of course a relevance to the 
target-language culture, something with which foreign writers are usually not concerned when they 
write their texts, so that relevance can be established in the translation process only by replacing 
source- language features that are not recognizable with target-language ones that are… 
Communication here is initiated and controlled by the target- language culture, it is in fact an 
interested interpretation, and therefore it seems less an exchange of information than an 
appropriation of a foreign text for domestic purposes.” 
110 Venuti (199: 22). 
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Venuti’s Symptomatic Reading 
Venuti describes the preferred method used in Translator’s Invisibility as his “own attempt 
to ground a symptomatic reading of translated texts on a foreignizing method of translation that 
assumes a determinate concept of subjectivity.”111 This method recognizes the inevitable effect that 
a translation has on the text and attempts to be aware of this both when translating and when 
working with translations. This method of reading also is cognizant of how to recognize these 
alternations and thereby combat the idea of transparency in translation: 
 In some translations, the discontinuities are readily apparent, unintentionally disturbing the 
fluency of the language, revealing the inscription of the domestic culture; other translations 
bear prefaces that announce the translator’s strategy and alert the reader to the presence of 
noticeable stylistic peculiarities.112  
 
As we will see, Venuti’s methodology can also be applied first by looking only at the 
translated texts alone without the source text. Besides shining light on the translator as visible and 
effective, Venuti’s symptomatic reading also acknowledges the historical environment surrounding 
even the process of uncovering the translation process: 
A symptomatic reading, in contrast, is historicizing: it assumes a concept of determinate 
subjectivity that exposes both the ethnocentric violence of translating and the interested 
nature of its own historicist approach.113  
 
The historical environment, as we will see in the examples below, of the readers of the text 
is another crucial element to consider. A translation (or any text) will be read and interpreted 
differently depending on the present historical, societal, and cultural circumstances. What follows 
are two examples of a symptomatic reading of two translations: Freud and Suetonius. 
 
 
                                                      
111 Venuti (199: 29). 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
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Example One: A Symptomatic Reading of Freud 
Venuti demonstrates his method of symptomatic reading in the case of the translation of 
Freud’s texts for the Standard Edition. Although the Standard Edition was nearly unequivocally 
lauded as the most relevant and faithful translation of Freud, it was not until the criticism of Bruno 
Bettelheim that potential issues arose. Bettelheim concluded that the English translation can make 
Freud’s writings “appear to readers of English as abstract, depersonalized, highly theoretical, 
erudite, and mechanized—in short, “scientific”—statements about the strange and very complex 
workings of our mind”.114 He argues that this is, in fact, in contradiction to Freud’s simpler and 
more comprehensible German text. In one example, he points out that the translation uses the term 
“parapraxis”. While this is a very scientific term in English, it is in fact a translation of the much 
simpler German word Fehlleistungen, which Bettelheim would have rendered as “faulty 
achievement”.115 
In this instance, as well as others, Venuti argues that a close reading of the German text is 
not even necessary to realize the stylistic inconsistencies in the translation. For example, they can 
be garnered even from the following passage in English: 
I now return to the forgetting of names. So far we have not exhaustively considered either 
the case-material or the motives behind it. As this is exactly the kind of parapraxis that I can 
from time to time observe abundantly in myself, I am at no loss for examples. The mild 
attacks of migraine from which I still suffer usually announce themselves hours in advance 
by my forgetting names, and at the height of these attacks, during which I am not forced to 
abandon my work, it frequently happens that all proper names go out of my head.116 
 
As Venuti points out, the diction of the passage is on the whole “so simple and common 
(‘forgetting’), even coloquial (‘go out of my head’), that ‘parapraxis’ represents a conspicuous 
                                                      
114 Bettelheim (1988:5). 
115 Ibid. (1983: 87). 
116 Freud (1960: 21). 
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difference, an inconsistency in word choice which exposes the translation process.”117 In addition 
to the strange juxtaposition of personal “everyday” examples that Freud uses, he himself 
underscores the non-specialized nature of his work in a footnote: 
This book is of an entirely popular character; it merely aims, by an accumulation of 
examples, at paving the way for the necessary assumption of unconscious yet operative 
mental processes, and it avoids all theoretical considerations on the nature of the 
unconscious.118 
 
In light of the above, the Standard Edition of Freud’s writings have certain domesticating 
and misleading elements that have gone almost entirely unnoticed until recently. Freud’s texts can 
seem unapproachable to the average English reader, and perhaps the translator rendered them in 
this way because of a contemporary prevailing culture of psychology as an “expert” and theoretical 
discipline, and not one that is regularly accessed by laymen. Whatever the reasons behind it, this 
anecdotal example illustrates that even in the case of translations that are generally accepted as 
standard, closer examinations may reveal inconsistencies. The field of Classics is not exempt from 
this anomaly, as the following example will show. 
 
Example Two: A Symptomatic Reading of Graves 
Robert Graves, widely known as the author of the novel I, Claudius, can be thanked for a 
number of translations, including Suetonius’s Twelve Caesars. This particular translation, 
published as a Penguin Classics text, was for many years considered an “accurate” translation. 
Despite its wide success and praise as a transparent translation, Graves himself admitted quite 
directly in his preface that he used a domesticating approach to the translation: 
                                                      
117 For more detailed and extensive examples, see Venuti (1995: 38): “a comparison between the 
English versions of key Freudian terms easily demonstrates the inconsistency in kinds of diction I 
have located in the translated passage: ‘id’ vs. ‘unconscious’; ‘cathexis’ vs. ‘charge,’ or ‘energy’; 
‘lIbidinal’ vs. ‘sexual.’” 
118 Freud (1960: 272n.). 
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For English readers Suetonius’s sentences, and sometimes even groups of sentences, must 
often be turned inside-out. Wherever his references are incomprehensible to anyone not 
closely familiar with the Roman scene, I have also brought up into the text a few words of 
explanation that would normally have appeared in a footnote. Dates have been everywhere 
changed from the pagan to the Christian era; modern names of cities used whenever they 
are more familiar to the common reader than the classical ones; and sums in sesterces 
reduced to gold pieces, at 100 to a gold piece (of twenty denarii), which resembled a British 
sovereign.119 
 
Although some of these changes may seem harmless, such as using familiar city names and 
currencies, and others purely educational, such as explaining potential unfamiliar concepts to 
inexpert readers, they nonetheless cause changes to the text and bring the author closer to his 
foreign readership. The explanations provided in the course of the text (as opposed to in a footnote 
or comment, making it clear that it is the addition of the translator 120), requires a significant level 
of trust in the translator that the reader may not even be aware she is granting.  
Furthermore, in his essay Moral Principles in Translation, Graves further clarifies his 
prioritization of the potential audience, saying that the average reader of a classical text (in this 
case Diodorus) “wants mere factual information, laid out in good order for his hasty eye to 
catch”.121 He comments similarly on the prose of Apuleius, saying that although he “wrote a very 
ornate North African Latin,” Graves translated it “for the general public in the plainest possible 
prose.” Thus, there is no doubt that he engaged in large-scale domesticization of the texts he was 
translating. 
                                                      
119 Graves (1957:8). 
120 For more on the use of adding comments into the stream of the narrative rather than using 
footnotes, see Cohen (1962: 33), who states that “The translator […] aims to make everything 
plain, though without the use of footnotes since the conditions of reading have radically changed 
and the young person of today is generally reading in far less comfortable surroundings than his 
father or grandfather. He has therefore to carry forward on an irresistible stream of narrative. Little 
can be demanded of him except his attention. Knowledge, standards of comparison, Classical 
background: all must be supplied by the translator in his choice of words or in the briefest of 
introductions.” 
121 Graves (1965: 51). 
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Interestingly, despite Graves’ frank admission that he has made both small alterations and 
added explanatory sections in text, his translation has still been regarded as “accurate” (if not 
“precise”). Even the scholar tasked to edit Graves’ translation in 1979 proclaimed its accuracy and 
“inimitable” nature: 
[It] conveys the peculiarities of Suetonius’s methods and character better than any other 
translation. Why, then, have I been asked to “edit” it? Because Robert Graves (who 
explicitly refrained from catering for students) did not aim at producing a precise 
translation—introducing, as he himself points out, sentences of explanation, omitting 
passages which do not seem to help the sense, and “turning sentences, and sometimes even 
groups of sentences, inside-out.” […] What I have tried to do, therefore, is to make such 
adjustments as will bring his version inside the range of what is now generally regarded by 
readers of the Penguin Classics as a “translation”—without, I hope, detracting from his 
excellent and inimitable manner.122 
 
Grant thus acknowledges Graves’ domesticizing strategies and praises the accuracy of his 
translation in the same breath. Unfortunately, besides the obvious manipulation that Graves openly 
admits, a closer examination of the text reveals many potential biases and drastic changes to the 
meaning and understanding of the original text.123 
Although Graves’ translations are meant for students with little or no background in ancient 
history and would therefore not be used by scholars in their investigations of the ancient world, his 
translations nevertheless have imbedded biases and distortions which are passed on through the 
dissemination of his works. Venuti points to the following passage as a prime example of how 
much influence a translator can have on a text. In the following passage on Caesar’s military 
campaigns, Venuti sees Graves’ additions to the text as rendering it more conclusive and biased 
against Caesar, rather than open-ended and contemplative. Further, Venuti points out phrases used 
                                                      
122 Grant (1980: 8–9). 
123 For a complete analysis of these changes, see Venuti (1995: 22-39). 
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by Graves which embeds homophobic bias in the English not present in the Latin. The passage 
reads as follows: 
Stipendia prima in Asia fecit Marci Thermi praetoris contubernio; a quo ad 
accersendam classem in Bithyniam missus desedit apud Nicomeden, non sine 
rumorem prostratae regi pudicitiae; quern rumorem auxit intra paucos rursus 
dies repetita Bithynia per causam exigendae pecuniae, quae deberetur cuidam 
libertino clienti suo. reliqua militia secundiore fama fuit et a Thermo in 
expugnatione Mytilenarum corona civica donatus est. 
Suetonius, Divus Julius 2124  
 
“Caesar first saw military service in Asia, where he went as aidedecamp to 
Marcus Thermus, the provincial governor. When Thermus sent Caesar to raise a 
fleet in Bithynia, he wasted so much time at King Nicomedes’ court that a 
homosexual relationship between them was suspected, and suspicion gave place 
to scandal when, soon after his return to headquarters, he revisited Bithynia: 
ostensibly collecting a debt incurred there by one of his freedmen. However, 
Caesar’s reputation improved later in the campaign, when Thermus awarded him 
the civic crown of oak leaves, at the storming of Mytilene, for saving a fellow 
soldier’s life.”125 
 
As Venuti illustrates, although both texts are based on second-hand stories and not hard 
evidence (“rumorem”, and “suspicion”), Graves makes additions to the text that lend more 
certainty to these stories about Caesar, and more bias against him. First, the use of “homosexual 
relationship” for prostratae regi pudicitiae (“surrendered his modesty to the king”) is “an 
anachronism, a late nineteenth-century scientific term that diagnoses same-sex sexual activity as 
pathological and is therefore inappropriate for an ancient culture in which sexual acts were not 
categorized according to the participants’ sex.”126 Graves’ further makes the story more a certainty 
than simply heresay by translating rumorem auxit (“the rumor spread”) as “suspicion gave place to 
scandal,” and has inserted “ostensibly” into the translation, when it was not present in the Latin 
                                                      
124 Butler and Cary (1927:1–2). 
125 Trans. Graves (1957: 10). 
126 Venuti (1995: 33). See also OED; Wiseman 1985:10–14. 
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text. Read in this way, it is possible to see how a translator’s own milieu and view of a text can 
alter the translation. 
The case of Graves, however, is not unlike that of Rufinus. As we will see in the following 
chapters, Rufinus’ translations were also meant as an educational tool, and he likewise frankly 
admitted to changing and omitting sections of Origen’s text, as well as adding explanatory notes 
into the body of his translations. Furthermore, just as Graves, despite evidence to the contrary and 
his own admission, Rufinus has often been praised as providing a faithful and accurate translation, 
one which scholars can consider representative of Origen’s original thought. 
 
The History and Politics of Translation 
 
In the discussion of the politics of translation, I rely heavily on Naomi Seidman’s book 
Faithful Renderings. In it, she highlights how politics and age can influence translations on 
multiple levels. When introducing her book, she provides a telling example of political translation 
in action. It is a story of her father, who was living in post-liberation Paris. Both a Yiddish and 
French speaker, he once came to the aid of a group of Jewish refugees being questioned by the 
police. He reassured the refugees, promising them that he would help and that no one would be 
hurt. The police officers were naturally interested in what he said: 
One of the police officers, curious about my father’s rapid-fire Yiddish exchange with the 
crowd, asked him what he had said to calm them. Thinking fast, and thinking in French, my 
father ‘translated’ his Yiddish words for the policemen: ‘I quoted to them the words of the 
great Frenchman: ‘Every free man has two homelands — his own, and France.’ I assured 
them that they, who had suffered so much, had arrived at a safe haven, the birthplace of 
human liberty.’ As my father told it, the gendarmes wiped away patriotic tears at his 
speech.127 
                                                      
127 Seidman (2006: 2). 
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Her father’s rather stylized translation of what he had said is, of course, colored by the 
contemporary political age he lived in, as well as the specific circumstances he found himself in. 
That he was able to calm the refugees as well as provide a rendition that pleased the guards shows 
his understanding of both languages, and indeed of both cultures too. Although this is an extreme, 
clear example of politics influencing a translation, the same thing happens in almost every 
translated text to varying degrees. The translator is a prisoner of the age and culture she lives in. 
Every word she uses in the target language has shades and colors that may or may not be present in 
the source text. Or perhaps she chooses to portray her translation in a certain light in order to 
appease the current socio-political system she lives in. Or it may not be a conscious choice at all. 
The social, cultural, and political strata around her may be having an effect on her and her 
translation whether she chooses her words with them in mind, as with Seidman’s father, or not.  
Seidman’s book, relying on the work of translation studies,128 brings up the particular 
interesting case of Tejaswini Niranjana’s conception of translation. Niranjana sees translation not 
as solely the final product that is created, but rather as a “border zone” or “transit station”, “in 
which what does not succeed in crossing the border is at least as interesting as what makes it 
across.”129 Thus, the process of translation is just as important to consider as the product itself. 
These bits that are lost in translation, that do not make it past the border control, can tell us much 
more than a simple investigation of the translated text. 
                                                      
128 “In focusing on translation performances that demonstrate the asymmetrical relations between 
cultures rather than essentially symmetrical relations between languages, I am indebted to the work 
of postcolonial translation studies. This subfield is often said to begin with the groundbreaking 
publication of Tejaswini Niranjana's Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the 
Colonial Context (1992).” (2006: 16). 
129 Niranjana (1992: 42). 
 
63 
One of the elements standing at the border crossing is politics, and this is exactly the focus 
of Seidman’s book. She concentrates on the translation between Jewish and Christian texts and 
languages, with particular emphasis on the “contingent political situations in which translation and, 
inevitably, mistranslation arise”.130 She argues that we have often subserved narrative as history or 
literature to theory, and that not much investigation into the historical or political influences on 
translation has been conducted. Like Venuti, she notes that too much emphasis is placed on 
translations simply sounding fluid and recreating the original:  
As banal as this insistence might seem, the historical and political dimensions of translation 
have often remained unacknowledged. In Western translation discourse, narrative as history 
or as literature has taken a secondary role to theory. There may be reasons for this that 
inhere in the conceptualization of translation in Western thought. Because translation is 
conceived as the production of a linguistic equivalent that will substitute for an "original" 
text, and because the dominant method for rendering such apparent equivalents has been the 
production of a fluent text that "reads like the original!” the very figure of the translator, as 
a historical figure exercising creative agency, has been an encumbrance. As Lawrence 
Venuti argues in The Translator's Invisibility, the figure of the translator has been elided by 
the normative logic of translation. And it is not only the translator who has been forgotten 
in Western translation. History, too, as the temporal horizon within which translations 
emerge and acquire their meaning, is collapsed and neutralized in a discourse that imagines 
translation as the "recovery" of the original meaning...131 
 
Seidman agrees that more focus should be placed on the role of the translator, who is 
“exercising creative agency” and has been mostly forgotten. But even further, she believes that 
history, too, has been ignored in the study of translation. Historical considerations on both sides of 
the translation process (those which are pertinent to the original text, as well as to the translator and 
her readers) should be considered. Situating the original text in its historical context can help 
illuminate potential conflicting factors between that text and the target language and culture. The 
                                                      
130 Seidman, N. (2006: 18): “This book situates translation between Jewish and non-Jewish 
languages (and particularly between Jews and Christians) not in the abstractions of linguistic theory 
but squarely in the contingent political situations in which translation and, inevitably, 
mistranslation arise.” 
131 Ibid. 
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historical factors affecting the translator and his audience can explain why certain discrepancies 
between source and target text are found. 
Naturally, not every discrepancy in translation is intentional. In this case, the meaningful 
transformation often takes place on the product side of the process. On the subject of simple 
translation errors, Seidman notes their significance not only in terms of linguistics, but also within 
the context of culture and society: 
Even the notion of “linguistic error” is subject to variation, since mistranslations, especially 
in literary texts, can be not merely intelligible but significant in the target-language culture. 
The viability of a translation is established by its relationship to the cultural and social 
conditions under which it is produced and read.132 
 
Thus, errors themselves not only have consequence in the target text, but also can be 
influenced and read differently depending on the current “cultural and social conditions”. This 
historical and cultural reading can happen on both sides of the translation process: either the 
translator makes a linguistic mistake due to the influence of current societal factors or her position 
in the present socio-political context. On the other hand, it can simply be a linguistic error which is 
then interpreted in a new and profound way in the target text, due to the current influencing socio-
political environment. Regardless, errors can also tell stories of the history of a translation. 
  
                                                      
132 Ibid. 
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Accessory Texts 
 
In the discussion to follow, I describe as an “accessory text” a third text used by the 
translator with the purpose of strengthening or supplementing the target language text, or simply as 
an aid in the translation process. This can be as basic as a lexicon, or as complex as a text covering 
the same or a similar topic.133 Using the lexicon to render difficult vocabulary seems quite natural, 
but even this can produce a misleading translation unless the specific context of the word being 
looked up is considered. How can I choose between a lexicon entry that includes “likelihood”, 
“probability”, and “chance”, for example? This requires not only a keen sense of the target 
language, but also an understanding of the source language terminology and context, more broadly 
within the field and specifically within the particular passage. The translator’s capability doubtless 
plays a role here, as will be discussed in the following section. On a more complex level, the use of 
accessory texts can be for the purpose of triangulating the writings of the source text in the target 
language or confirming terminology or style. For example, if a translator is rendering a 
mathematical text on Einstein’s general theory of relativity in English from a German source, he 
might consult existing English sources discussing the theory of relativity in order to familiarize 
himself with what type of mathematical and physics terms are commonly used in English to 
describe Einstein’s theory. This might be an excellent triangulation strategy, especially if he is not 
                                                      
133 viz. Venuti (1995: 24): “Thus, the translator consults many different target-language cultural 
materials, ranging from dictionaries and grammars to texts, discursive strategies, and translations, 
to values, paradigms, and ideologies, both canonical and marginal. Although intended to reproduce 
the source-language text, the translator’s consultation of these materials inevitably reduces and 
supplements it, even when source-language cultural materials are also consulted.” This is an overall 
negative view of using outside materials, in that they tend to “reduce” a text. Although it is possible 
that they can also strengthen and legitimize a translated text, it is undeniable they are still outside 
influences working on the text. 
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well versed in the theory in English. It can also add credibility to a translation because he has 
consulted an outside source and because it is then likely that the text will read in a manner that 
English speakers are already used to when reading about Einstein’s theories. Any time he uses an 
outside text, however, it is influencing his translation, and causing alternations to the text itself 
(just as he himself is also influencing the text based on his translation choices). At the very worst 
the influence of accessory texts can dramatically alter the resulting translation depending on the 
accessory texts used. An accessory text in a similar field but with a slightly (or even dramatically) 
different perspective on the subject matter can result in alternations made to the translation via the 
outside influence of the accessory.  
Another way accessory texts can cause damage, as Venuti notes, is that: “Their sheer 
heterogeneity leads to discontinuities—between the source-language text and the translation and 
within the translation itself—that are symptomatic of its ethnocentric violence.”134 Using a variety 
of accessory texts in the process of translation equates to adding a variety of small outside 
influences on the text. The text thus has many authors and many sources acting on it. This is, of 
course, also the case with the original text. Although it has one author, every author is under his 
own influences. He takes inspiration from his environment and education. Thus, although the 
added influence of accessory texts is inevitable, it need not be detrimental. However, ignoring the 
influence of potential accessory texts can be a problem. Much as the influences on an original 
author are analyzed as a matter of course, the influences on a translator and the effects on the 
translated text should similarly be critiqued. 
Guarino Guarini’s Accessory Text Usage 
                                                      
134 Venuti (1995: 24). 
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An interesting example of undue influence of an accessory text in translation is pointed out 
by Danish scholar Marianne Pade. Aptly titling her article: For ikke at kede læseren (So as not to 
bore the readers), she examines Guarino Guarini’s fifteenth-century translation method in the case 
of a Hymn of Homer. He was asked to render the Homeric Greek into Latin by a close friend of 
his, Girolamo Gualdo. The translation itself is unfortunately lost, however there is a letter Guarini 
wrote to Gualdo which describes his translation method: 
Guarinus Veronensis Hieronymo suo sal. pl. d. 
[...] Curavi ut versus illos Homeri tibi traducerem in linguam latinam. Eos tibi transmitto, 
in quibus nonnulla ex verbo ferme converti, quaedam summatim exposui, quod a Virgilio 
nostro factitatum animadverti, nam cum plura particulatim intelligenda sint, ut in pane 
faciundo, satis habuit dicere ‘Cerealiaque arma’ (Aen. 1,177), ne pistoria enumerans 
instrumenta fastidio afficeret auditorem vel ad infima et vulgaria descendens, carmini 
dignitatem auferret. Homerus contra in omnibus exponendis rebus poeta diligentissimus et 
usque ad minutissima accuratissimus cum lecti ab Ulixe facti mentionem faceret, cuiusdam 
oleagini trunci delationem descripsit, deinde ad rubricam directum, tum perforatum 
pedibus impositis expressit; quae singula paucis dixisse contentus particularia tacui, 
quocirca eos versus (Od. 23,190-204) tibi latine <o>missos, graece scribere neglexi. Illud 
autem in primis annotare debebis, quod post annos viginti rediens in patriam Ulixes 
‘multum terris iactatus et alto’ (Verg. Aen. 1,3), domi procos invenit, petulantissimos et 
clarissimos Ithacae et adiacentium insularum primores; mendici vero habitu simulatus erat. 
Eis interfectis sese uxori cognoscendum offert, at Penelope non facilis ad credendum, cum 
non plane virum noscitaret, ei lectulum extra Ulixis cubile parari ab ancillis iubet, ut sic de 
Ulixe periculum faceret: tanta non modo pudicitia sed et gravitate pollebat. Habes velut 
ipsorum versuum argumentum, qui in libro Odysseae XXIII sunt; is autem ab litterarum 
ordine Ψ inscribitur.  
Nuper alios quoque converti latine claro iurisconsulto Madio nostro de Dolone (Il. 10), 
quos si voles, eos autem velle debebis, ipsos ex Madio petes [...] Vale. 
<Verona settembre 1427>.7 
“Guarino from Verona greets his Hieronymos cordially. 
{…} I managed to translate that verse of Homer you asked me into Latin. I translated some 
of it mostly word for word, but other parts I produced in summary, as I noticed Vergil often 
did. For when a multitude of things can be expressed simply, as in the case of making 
bread, it’s enough to say ‘weapons of Ceres’ (Aen. 1,177), so as not to bore the readers by 
enumerating the tools nor, reducing it to the low or normal, take away from the dignity of 
the verse. In contrast, Homer, on the other hand, was very diligent as a poet when it came to 
descriptions, and he is extremely accurate even down to the most minute detail: when he 
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mentions the bed Odysseus made, he describes how the trunk of the olive tree was cut, and 
next how it was made up with red, and perforated when the legs were put in. I left out the 
particular details and was satisfied with just a few words. Therefore, I did not transcribe the 
Greek verses (Od. 23, 190-204) which I skipped in Latin for you. You should first and 
foremost feel that when Odysseus turned home ‘greatly tossed about on land and in sea’ 
after 20 years, then finds suitors in his house, the basest and most well-known great men of 
Ithaca and the surrounding islands. However, he disguised himself as a beggar. After they 
were killed, he reveals himself to his wife, but it was not easy for Penelope to believe it, and 
since she really didn’t recognize her husband, she orders a servant girl to make his bed 
outside Odysseus’ bedchamber to test him. She was marked not only by chasteness, but also 
by gravitas. You have herewith a summary of those verses, which are in the Odyssey 23; 
and it is marked by the letter Ψ in the alphabetical order. 
By the way, I also translated the verses on Dolon into Latin for the brilliant lawyer, Maggio. 
If you would like them, and you should, ask Maggio about them. […] Goodbye. 
<Verona September 1427> 7.” 
 
As Pade herself notes, Guarino chose to translate Homer to Latin with Vergil as the 
model.135 She argues that Guarino is imitating a classic Roman author in his translation of a Greek 
epic. Of course, Vergil was himself a writer of epic and was in part bringing a Homeric world to a 
Roman audience in his Aeneid.136 Thus Guarino is using an accessory text in his translation: 
creating Homer in Latin through the lens of Vergil. Not only this, but Guarino’s own conception of 
Vergil is colored by his reading of Servius’ late antique commentary of Vergil, adding a further 
distortion to the text. Pade points out that Guarino, for certain in this instance if not others, is 
                                                      
135 Pade, Aigis. Suppl. II (2013: 6): “Spørgsmålet er så hvilken pakke Guarino vælger, og det 
svarer han selv på. Som andre 1400-tals humanister kommer til at gøre, vælger han at oversætte 
Homer til latin med Vergil som forbillede.” See also Sabbadinis’ commentary on Guarino (ed.) 
1915-1519, III, 218. 
136 Pade (2013: 6): “Som jeg beskrev ovenfor, imiterer Guarino i sin latinske oversættelse af et 
græsk epos en klassisk romersk forfatter der på sin side er kendt for at have imiteret det 
pågældende epos. Og Vergil var naturligvis den romerske Homerimitator par excellence. Ikke 
alene var han den største romerske episke digter, han havde også i sin Æneide så at sige importeret 
det homeriske univers ind i en romersk kontekst, samtidig med at han på utallige måder alluderede 
til sin store forgænger, i de første seks sange mest til Odysseen og i de sidste mest til Iliaden.” 
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following the “vergilistic” poetics found in Servius’ late antique commentaries. 137 This is not the 
only instance of a particular commentary coloring the reading of a text. Pade points to Kirsten 
Friis-Jensen showing how Petrach’s reading and use of Horace was majorly influenced by the 
commentary he used. Furthermore, Trine Arlund Hass has worked on translations of Vergil’s 
Ecologues that were created by leaning heavily on certain commentaries. She has also 
demonstrated the Vergilian influence on later Latin translations of Theocritus’ Idylls. 138 All of the 
above point towards a trend of reading one text through the lens of a familiar (if also similar) text at 
hand. The levels of influences can even build from there, depending also on the commentaries 
used. As Pade concludes: 
Selv i Guarinos afsluttende resume af 23. sang får Odysseus en lille vergiliansk 
beskrivelse med, han er “multum terris iactatus et altoˮ (Verg. Aen. 1,3). Homer bliver 
ikke bare oversat, han bliver ’romanificeret’, gjort romersk, synes det. Men når Guarino i 
brevet til Gualdo beskriver en masse detaljer ved sengebyggeriet som han sprang over i 
oversættelsen, så kan man alligevel ikke lade være med at tænke over om det er en elegant 
pointe, en hilsen til en mere homerisk poetik.139 
 
“Even in Guarinos’ final resume of the 23th stanza, Odysseus gets in a little Vergilian 
description: he is “multum terris iactatus et alto” (Verg. Aen. 1,3). Homer was not only 
translated, he was ‘romanified’, made Roman, it seems. But when Guarino describes the 
many details he skipped in the bed building in the letter to Gualdo, then in any case can we 
not help but think over whether it is an elegant point, a greeting to a more Homeric 
poetic.” 
 
                                                      
137 Pade (2013: 7):“Guarino opfatter således Vergil – i hvert tilfælde på dette punkt – gennem 
Servius’ kommentar, og den ‘vergilianske’ poetik han følger i sin latinske Homeroversættelse er 
formuleret af den senantikke grammatiker.” 
138 Pade (2013: 7): “Karsten Friis-Jensen har ved flere lejligheder vist, hvordan Petrarcas læsning 
og brug af Horats i stort omfang var præget af den kommentar han brugte,12 og Trine Arlund Hass 
har i sin ph.d.-afhandling vist hvordan nylatinske kommentarer til Vergils ekloger kommer til at 
fungere som poetikker for samtidens eklogedigtere. Hun har også påvist et oversættelsessyn, der 
ligner det jeg her har beskrevet hos Guarino, hos nylatinske oversættere af Theokrits Idyller. Her 
var Vergil naturligvis igen den indlysende model, denne gang hans ekloger, men igen bruger 
oversætterne den vergilianske poetik formidlet gennem Servius’ kommentar, eller de forholder sig 
til den.13 Hass 2011, 127-44 og Hass under udgivelse, a-b.” 
139 Pade (2013: 8). 
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Thus, Guarino both uses Vergilian sentiments (as transmitted through the commentary of 
Servius) in his translation and even quotes Vergil himself in the Latin Homeric verse translation. 
He succeeded in making Homer Roman through the use of an accessory text, that is, Vergil (also 
colored even further by the commentary on Vergil that Guarino consulted). The process of 
translation illuminates the transformation of the product itself. 
 
  
The Translator’s Capability 
 
 The capability of the translator herself, of course, cannot be ignored. There are several 
aspects to consider in this regard. First, one should examine the amount of experience she has in 
translation in general, as well as her level of expertise in the relevant language pair. Second, the 
expert field of the translator has an effect on the quality of the translation. If an ancient historian 
were to translate a modern text detailing current unsolved mathematical problems, he would likely 
not have as many relevant skills as a translator with a background in mathematical research.
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Applying Translation Theory to the Translation of Origen 
 
 In the study of Origen there is also remarkably little conversation about translation. 
Although there has been some background debate on whether Rufinus is a reliable translator, as 
detailed in the introduction, an investigation into Rufinus’ translations can and should consider 
many key factors. My aim moving forward is to apply a systematic method for evaluating Rufinus’ 
translations of Origen. This will entail a focus not only on the final product of the translation, but 
also on the process itself, in line with Bell’s method for studying translation. The investigation will 
be carried out in three phases: 1) discovering Rufinus as a translator and the influences under 
which he worked (the process of translation), 2) engaging in a close reading and analysis of the 
resulting translation (the product of translation), and 3) analyzing how the first two phases relate to 
each other (a holistic view of Rufinus’ translations). The application of the above theory will first 
analyze Rufinus as a translator and his process of translation. Each translation process examination 
will be followed by linguistic analysis of the final product of translation, thereby considering the 
visible results that the process of translation has on the product. In this way, the criterion of a 
translation theory that encompasses both process and product will be satisfied. Furthermore, a more 
holistic and penetrative view on Rufinus’ translation will be compiled. 
The background for all phases of investigation will be Venuti’s symptomatic reading: 
assuming a foreignizing translation and the inherent subjectivity of the text. Translation will be 
regarded as a form of rewriting, and Rufinus’ agency as translator will be highlighted. 
The above will be accomplished through a discussion in different categories of 
investigation. I will first examine Rufinus as a translator. His experience, background, motivation 
for creating his translations, and his potential for linguistic error or mistranslation will be covered. 
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Next, I will uncover the influence of Rufinus’ audience, referring to the foreignizing and 
domesticating models laid out by Nida. Next, I will go over the history and politics of Rufinus’ 
translation, keeping in mind Niranjana’s concept of translation as a “border zone”, and attempt to 
discover what may have been lost while crossing the border from one language to another. Each 
category of investigation will be paired with deep textual analysis in order to illustrate the effects 
of Rufinus’ various influences.  
The preservation of both the original Greek and the Latin translations of much of Origen’s 
First Principles and Commentary on the Gospels gives us a unique opportunity to study the journey 
of a philosophical idea as it goes through the process of translation. In some cases, we are left only 
with the Latin translation. In such instances, the establishment of crucial accessory texts, such as 
the writings of Evagrius, can provide valuable insights into potential alterations to the text and 
thereby present a clearer picture of the story of Rufinus’ translation. 
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Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, we need a translation theory that combines both the process of translation 
and the product. The obstacle for the current approaches to translations is that they tend to favor an 
investigation only of the product — its readability, its relation to the source text on the linguistic, 
semantic, and stylistic levels. As I have demonstrated above, with the help of scholars of history 
and translation theory, there is a method for examining the process of translation as well. This 
involves addressing how the translator is affected by his capability and experience, the audience of 
the target text, contemporary history and politics, and finally potential accessory texts used to 
create the translation. My aim is to combine a research into the above factors with a close 
examination of the product of translation. In this way, the translations studied in this dissertation 
can be laid out in their entirety. The story of the text will unfold, and the translator will be given his 
rightful place as active agent in its production. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
Crossing the Border 
Rufinus’ translation choices and their consequences for Origen’s doctrine on the soul’s journey to 
embodiment and the psychological processes of embodied thought 
 
 
 Translation is a complex process, a journey not unlike a physical crossing from one country 
to another. Viewing the translation process as similar to a physical journey, the foundational 
question driving this chapter is: what was present in Origen’s original Greek, at the beginning of 
the journey that may have been subject to “border control” measures in Rufinus’ translation 
process, and what consequences does their absence have for the Latin text? Framing the 
investigation using Tejaswini Niranjana’s translation border zones will aid in answering this 
question. A secondary aim for this chapter is to illustrate the importance of analyzing the whole 
process of Rufinus’ translation of Origen: viewing translation as a narrative can reveal previously 
undiscovered realities. 
Discovering what was lost requires more than just a simple investigation of the translated 
text. A thorough understanding of the source text is an essential part of discovering the elements 
lost in the translation process, and consequently the study of the translation process should not 
begin with the product itself, as is often done. Nor is it sufficient to simply compare the product 
with the original. To have comprehensive understanding of the entire translation process, one must 
begin with a thorough examination of the source text. Further, pointing out the parts of the text that 
were lost in the translation is not the final aim. An analysis of why these elements were left out and 
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what the consequences for a reading of the target text are is also a crucial part of the translation 
analysis.  
In pursuit of the above, Chapter Two first provides the necessary background for an 
engagement with the translations of Origen's works by exploring his descriptions of the journey of 
the soul in its descent into embodiment and struggle with thought and emotion as we find it in the 
extant Greek corpus, in addition to detailing how it adapts Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Stoic 
doctrines in various ways. The descent of the soul uncovers issues of theodicy and the pre-
existence of souls, as well as important questions of free will. The purpose of this chapter is to 
establish a baseline and then use it to measure the effects of the translation process on Origen's 
philosophy. Once the similarities to Stoic and Platonic sources have been identified, it will clear the 
path towards uncovering and properly assessing the deviations found in Rufinus' translations. 
Special attention is paid to the terminology Origen uses to describe the soul's faculties, in particular 
with regard to human emotion and thought. I intend to illuminate Origen’s appropriation of 
Platonic images and Stoic terminology to complete his narrative of the soul’s journey. These 
“philosophical markers”, as I refer to them, have been extracted in the process of translation. 
 
 
Completing the Narrative 
To accomplish the above goals, I will begin the chapter by demonstrating the presence of 
certain philosophical images and terms that have their roots in Platonism and Stoicism. I will 
emphasize the philosophical markers present in Origen’s text that point back to Platonic and Stoic 
sources. I will then demonstrate that many of the philosophical markers in Origen’s Greek have 
been subject to strict “border controls” in Rufinus’ translation process. The analysis of both 
Origen’s works and Rufinus’ translations of them will include both “big picture” considerations, 
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such as concept and style, as well as more specific details, such as grammar and the use of 
individual terms. Next, I will develop the reasons behind Rufinus’ abandonment of certain 
elements of Origen’s Greek text. Rufinus’ social and political motivations, and his considerations 
of audience, discussed in the previous chapter, will be emphasized, and how these may have 
affected his choice to leave certain traces of Platonism and Stoicism behind in the original Greek. 
Finally, I will rethink the resulting narrative of the Latin translation and how it differs from the 
original in key ways. 
 
Narrating the Steps in the Soul’s Journey 
The journey of the soul in Origen from its place with God down to its embodied trials on 
earth mirrors the journey of the text through the process of translation. Origen’s doctrines on evil, 
the pre-existence of souls, free will, emotion, and the role of thought and sinfulness are all stops 
along the journey, and all crucial aspects of Origen’s theology. In this chapter, I will show the 
processes of embodiment in Origen in terms of their cosmic structure and relationship to Platonism, 
and subsequently the psychological processes of embodied thought and their relationship to 
Stoicism. I will demonstrate that in the process of translation, Rufinus makes alterations that may 
seem innocuous seen individually, but when viewed from the prospective of the overall journey of 
the soul, it becomes clear that they have serious consequences for the reading of Origen’s theory of 
free will. 
The four steps of the soul’s journey are:  
1) Descent. The soul first descends from God into its embodied state on earth. The stages it 
goes through on the way are strikingly similar to the Neoplatonic description of the descent of the 
intellect and its transformation into an embodied soul. It also borrows elements from Plato’s 
Phaedrus. The description of descent and embodiment also points to the pre-existence of souls, a 
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concept that similarly has Platonic undertones. That the soul first existed as intellect and then 
transitioned into the body seems to indicate that the soul existed before the body;  
2) Free will. The second stop in the journey of the soul is existence in an embodied state, 
when it is faced with many challenges to overcome in order to avoid sin. The soul’s ability to make 
its own decision about avoiding and succumbing to sin is due to its free will, a topic that Origen 
will discuss in terms of the ‘self-moved mover’ of Plato’s Phaedrus;  
3) Emotion. Step three, avoidance of emotion, presents another challenge to the embodied 
soul. Here Origen leans heavily on Stoic terminology and framework. He also incorporates the 
concept of propatheia, or pre-emotions, as outlined in Seneca. 
4) Thoughts. Origen stresses the proper assessment of thoughts and their relationship with 
sin. He borrows two different types of thought used in the Stoa: noēsis and logismos to differentiate 
thoughts that are implanted in us and those to which we have assented and for which we are 
therefore responsible. 
After a brief investigation into the relationship between the above steps in Origen and the 
philosophical concepts he borrowed and adapted for his work, I will turn to uncovering the 
differences in Rufinus’ translations.  
In step one, Rufinus’ translation suppresses the suggestion of pre-existence of the soul by 
changing the verb forms in the Latin text. Instead of the intellect becoming a soul, and afterwards 
becoming embodied, Rufinus renders the process simply a question of nomenclature, and not a 
change of state. The soul is only called by different names during its descent, which makes it less 
clear whether it existed before it became embodied. 
Step two also shows signs of Rufinus’ agency as translator. Rufinus is careful with how 
much he allows Origen’s explanation of free will resemble the Platonic self-moved mover in the 
Phaedrus.  
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Next, in the third step, Rufinus’ discussion of emotions in translation conflates key 
emotional terms. He blurs the strict line between pre-emotions (for which we are not responsible), 
and true emotions (for which we are). Further, he equates a phantasia, something which is 
presented to our senses or mind, with a hormê, or emotional impulse that provokes action. He thus 
creates an inconsistent picture of Origen’s precise formulation of the formation of and 
consequences for emotions.  
Finally, in step 4, Rufinus makes the most significant alteration to the text, resulting in a 
profound downgrading of the previous steps. He collapses an important distinction between two 
different types of thought: noēsis and logismos. In doing so, he takes away the power of free will 
when he renders a person responsible for implanted thoughts. This subverts the strong emphasis 
Origen places on free will, a key component in his explanation of evil, and his narrative of the 
soul’s descent. 
 
Consequences for Rufinus’ Translation Choices 
The obvious outcome of the translation is that the Latin texts no longer exhibit the 
symptoms of philosophical influence. In the process of translation, the elements of revised and 
adapted Platonic and Stoic narratives are left behind at the border crossing, resulting in a 
discontinuity between the emphasis on the importance of free will and the weakened agency a 
person has over her thoughts. By blurring the line between thoughts that are up to us and those that 
are implanted, and further collapsing two Greek terms (noēsis and logismos) into one in Latin 
(cogitatio), Rufinus fundamentally changes Origen’s psychological processes of embodied thought. 
This change also has a profound impact on Origen’s doctrine of free will. Thus, Rufinus’ 
translation limits the agency a person has over his thought, and thereby downgrades her free will as 
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well. But there is a further consequence: the philosophical purging of the texts disrupts the delicate 
balance and artistry of Origen’s original Greek, thus conflating Origen’s own doctrine.  
 
 
Origen and Philosophy 
 
 Origen’s conception of the pre-existence of souls, the process of embodiment, and the 
psychological processes of embodied thought are informed by Platonic and Stoic thinking. Indeed, 
as Peter W. Martens argues, the “Christianized Platonism” present in Origen’s work describes 
exactly how he interacted both with the Platonic and Stoic sources. Origen believed he was 
improving upon their doctrines by utilizing them to explain and enrich his own Christian 
philosophy and scriptural commentary. I will thus not treat the traces of philosophical doctrines 
that I demonstrate in this chapter are present in Origen’s work as infiltrations on his work. Nor do I 
mean to argue that Origen was a “Platonist” or a “Stoic” based on the fact that he saw utility in 
some of their thoughts. Instead, I will treat Origen as a “man of the Church”, as he himself 
professes to be. 140 Most importantly, I will treat him as an independent thinker who makes sense of 
scripture, his faith, and the world around him, by weaving together diverse methods of critical 
thinking. 
  
                                                      
140 “But I hope to be a man of the Church. I hope to be addressed not by the name of some 
heresiarch, but by the name of Christ. I hope to have his name, which is blessed upon earth. I 
desire, both in deed and in thought, both to be and to be called a Christian” (HomLc 16.6). For the 
critical edition, see Origène: Homélies sur s. Luc, trans., Henri Crouzel, François Fournier, and 
Pierre Périchon, Sources Chrétiennes 87 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1998). For the English, see 
Origen: Homilies on Luke, Fragments on Luke, FOC 94, trans., Joseph T. Lienhard (Washington, 
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996). 
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The Journey 
 
Step 1: The Descent of the Soul  
 
In his treatise Peri Arkhōn, Origen describes the descent of the intellect from God, 
thereafter becoming a soul and further entering into a body on earth. At a certain point, the soul has 
the possibility to become an intellect again and rise up once more. As Mark M.S. Scott unpacks in 
his book Journey Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil,141, Origen’s narrative of the soul’s 
descent is the starting point for his explanation of evil, which relies on the fact that the soul is given 
free will to choose its path. That the soul has free will to choose explains how there can be inequity 
in the world, despite the fact that God created everything to be equal. Scott summarizes: 
Origen construes the problem of evil as the problem of failed providence: on the 
surface, it seems that God does not govern creation equitably. Appearances, 
however, are often deceiving in Origen’s theological landscape. As he searches 
for meanings “worthy of God” beneath the problematic surface narratives of the 
Bible, so he searches for meanings worthy of God beneath the inequities of the 
world. In an effort to preserve cosmic coherence, he unveils a striking vision of 
creation and restoration that explains evil and orients the soul in its journey back 
to God. His theodicy, then, functions both as a defense of providence and as a 
map for the questing soul in its journey from sin and suffering to purification 
and, ultimately, eternal beatitude. 
 
In addition, Rowan Greer similarly emphasizes the importance of the fall of the soul for 
Origen’s discussion of evil, saying “His theological story is a kind of theodicy and has the function 
                                                      
141 Scott, M. S. M. (2012: 8). Journey back to God: Origen on the problem of evil. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
81 
of explaining why evil has arisen; the precosmic minds misused their freedom and brought into 
existence this fallen order.”142 
Another question that often arises when considering Origen’s narrative of the soul’s descent 
is: does he subscribe to the theory of the pre-existence of souls? This became a problematic 
question by the time of the emperor Justinian’s anathemas in 533.143 It was an established fact in 
the Christian faith by the time of Rufinus’ translations of Origen that souls were not pre-existent 
before their entry into bodies. The church was adamant about the soul being created together with 
the body, not before. Justinian wrote in 553 on this topic, and singles out Origen: 
Πυθαγόρας τοίνυν καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Πλωτῖνος καὶ οἱ τῆς ἐκείνων συμμορίας 
ἀνθανάτους εῖναι τὰς ψυχὰς συνομολογήσαντες προυπάρχειν ταύτας ἔφησαν τῶν 
σωμάτων καὶ δῆμον εἶναι ψυχῶν, καὶ τὰς πλημμελούσας εἰς σώματα 
καταπίπτειν, ὡς ἔφην, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πικροὺς καὶ πονηροὺς εἰς παρδάλεις, τοὺς δὲ 
ἁρπακτικοὺς εἰς λύκους, τοὺς δὲ δολεροὺς εἰς ἀλωπεκας, τοὺς δὲ Θηλυμαινεῖς 
εἰς ἵππους. ἡ δὲ ἐκκλησία τοῖς Θείοις ἑπομένη λόγοις φάσκει τὴν ψυχὴν 
συνδημιουργηθῆναι τῷ σώματι καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, κατὰ τὴν 
Ὠριγένους φρενοβλάβειαν. 
Justinian, quoted in Georgius Monachus, Chronicon144 
 “So Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, and their followers, who agree that souls are 
immortal, declared that they exist prior to bodies and that there is a great 
company of souls, of which those that transgress descend into bodies … But the 
                                                      
142 Rowan A. Greer (1979), Introduction, Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, On Prayer, First 
Principles: Book IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on 
Numbers, trans., Rowan A. Greer New York: Paulist, 1979].  For more on the importance of the 
soul’s descent in Origen’s explanation of evil, see Adolf Harnack (1976: 343–344, ft. 2), History of 
Dogma, Volumes II and III, trans., Neil Buchanan Gloucester, MA:“To Origen the problem of evil 
was one the most important [theological problems]” (343), and Hal Koch (1932: 96-62), Pronoia 
und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus, AKG 22 Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter. 
143 See Justinian (2009: 2.283-4), Letter of Justinian to the Holy Council about Origen and those 
Like-Minded, in The Acts of the Council of Constantinople of 553, with related texts on the Three 
Chapters Controversy trans. Richard Price; 2 vols.; Translated Texts for Historians 51; Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press; Georgius Monachus, Chronicon ed. Carl. De Boor: 2 vols.: Stuttgart: 
Teubner, 1904 2:630-33. 
144 DeBoor: 2: 630-33 
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church, following the divine scriptures, affirms that the soul is created together 
with the body, not first one and the other later, according to the insanity of 
Origen.”145 
 
Thus, the fact that Origen was contemplating the existence of souls before bodies, as I will 
argue in this chapter (in line with other scholars who have similarly attested this), was problematic 
for a Christian text in the time of Rufinus. It is no surprise, then that Rufinus’ translation attempted 
to leave this question a little more open, thereby removing the Platonic influence from the text and 
simultaneously aligning Origen with the orthodoxy of the Church in the time of Rufinus. 
  
Descent: The Philosophical Background 
Plotinus describes a very similar paradigm to the one we will see in Origen. He envisions a 
hierarchy that emanates from the One: first the intellect, then the soul, and finally corporeal matter: 
καὶ πρώτη οἷον γέννησις αὕτη· ὂ γὰρ τέλειον τῷ μηδὲν ζητεῖν μηδὲ ἔχειν μηδὲ 
δεῖσθαι οἷον ῥπερερρύη δαὶ τὸ ὑπερπλῆρες αὐτοῦ πεποίηκεν ἄλλο· τὸ δὲ 
γενόμενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ 
νοῦς οὗτος. Καὶ ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο στάσις αὐτοῦ τὸ ὂν ἐποίησεν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ 
θέα τὸν νοῦν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστη πρὸς αὐτό, ἵνα ἴδῃ, ὁμοῦ νοῦς ψίψνεται καὶ ὄν. 
Οὗτος οὖν ὢν οἷον ἐκεῖνος τὰ ὅμοια ποιεῖ δύναμιν προχέας πολλήν — εἶδος δὲ 
καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ — ὥσπερ αὖ τὸ αὐτοῦ πρότερον προέχεε· καὶ αὕτη ἐκ τῆς 
οὐσίας ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς τοῦτο μένοντος ἐκείνου γενομένη· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς 
μένοντος τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο. Ἡ δὲ οὐ μένουσα ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινηθεῖσα ἐγέννα 
εἴδωλον. Ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν Βλέπουσα, ὅθεν ἐγένετο, πληροῦται, προεθοῦσα δὲ εἰς 
κίνησιν ἄλλην καὶ ἐναντίαν γεννᾷ εἴδωλον αὐτῆς αἴσθησιν καὶ φύσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς 
φυτοῖς. Plotinus, Enn. V 2, 1.7-21146 
“This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One, perfect because it seeks 
nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows, as it were, and its 
superabundance makes something other than itself. This, when it has come into 
being, turns back upon the One and is fill, and becomes Intellect by looking 
towards it. It's halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its gaze upon 
the One, Intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it 
                                                      
145 Trans. Price (2009: 2.283-4). 
146 Henry, P. & Schwyzer, H. R. (1974). Plotini Opera. Tomus III. Enneades VI. Tijdschrift Voor 
Filosofie 36 (2):368-369. 
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becomes at once Intellect and being. Resembling the One thus, Intellect produces 
in the same way, pouring forth a multiple potency— this is a likeness of it — just 
as that which was before it poured it forth. This activity sprinting from the 
essence of Intellect is Soul, which comes to be this while Intellect abides 
unchanged: for Intellect too comes into being while that which is before it abides 
unchanged. But Soul does not abide unchanged when it produces: it is moved and 
so brings forth an image. It looks to its source, and is filled, and going forth to 
another opposed movement generates its own image, which is sensation and the 
principle of growth in plants.”147 
Plotinus describes the generation of the soul through the various steps leading from the 
One. The One creates Intellect, and from the Intellect comes the Soul. As we will see when 
examining Origen’s text, this procession from One (in Origen’s case, God), to Intellect and finally 
Soul bears the most striking resemblance to the style and concept of Origen’s description of the 
soul’s descent in style and formulation. The sense of becoming something new in each phase of the 
descent will be mirrored in Origen’s Greek. The narrative of the soul’s descent has even older 
precursors than Plotinus, however. 
Plotinus bases his explaination of the soul’s creation on Plato’s description of the soul’s 
descent in the Phaedrus. Indeed, the overall narrative in Plato shares many similarities with 
Origen’s. This has not gone unnoticed in scholarship; scholars such as Mark Edwards and 
Panayiotis Tzamalikos both contend that Origen did not take any inspiration from Plato, and even 
further that Origen did not argue that souls were pre-existent before their bodies. As Tzamalikos 
writes, “to ascribe to Origen a Platonic notion about pre-existing personal incorporeal rational 
creatures, which received a body, is just a simplistic and misleading solution, which garbles his real 
doctrine.”148 As I will demonstrate, the claim that Origen did not believe in the pre-existence of 
                                                      
147 Trans. Armstrong, A.H. (1984). Loeb Classical Library. Harvard University Press 
148 Panayiotis Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology And Ontology of Time (Supplements to Vigiliae 
Christianae 77; Leiden, Brill, 2006) 80-81. See also Ibid. 4-5; 25; 28-29; 36-38; 41-42; 61; 68-79; 
87; 88n 146; 93-95. 
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souls is difficult to prove. On this topic, Peter W. Martens similarly agrees that Origen clearly 
wrote on the pre-existence of souls. He also presents a convincing argument that Origen did in fact 
take his inspiration from Plato and adapted (or rather, from Origen’s perspective, improved on) 
Plato’s narrative of the descent. This is the viewpoint that I fall in step with.149 
Besides highlighting that Origen’s view on the pre-existence of souls was in fact 
widespread in his day,150 Martens also makes an important contribution when he emphasizes the 
fact that Origen himself refers to Plato’s version of the descent and even states that his own version 
is “superior” to it: 
καὶ ὁ ἐκβαλλόμενος δὲ ἐχ τοῦ παραδείσου ἄνθωπος μετὰ τῆς γυναικὸς, τοὺς 
δερματίνους ἠμφιεσμένος χιτῶνας οὕς διὰ τὴν παράβασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐποίσε 
τοῖς ἁμαρτήσασιν ὁ Θεὸς, ἀπόρ᾿ῥητόν τινα καὶ μυστικὸν ἔχει λόγον ὑπὲρ τὸν 
κατὰ Πλάτωνα, τῆς ψυχῆς πτεροφυούσης καὶ δεῦρο φερομένης, ἕως ἄν στερεοῦ 
τινος λάβηται. 
Cels. 4.40151 
“And the statement that the man who was cast out of the garden with the woman 
was clothed with the “coats of skins” (Gen 3:21), which God made for those who 
had sinned on account of the transgression of mankind, has a certain secret and 
mysterious meaning, superior to the Platonic doctrine of the descent of the soul 
which loses its wings and is carried hither “unto it finds some firm resting-place.” 
Origen is engaging in a practice of assuming and then improving upon Plato’s narrative of 
the soul’s descent. Having established this, I will now move on to examining the narrative of 
descent in Origen’s works in order to highlight specific signs that he did prescribe to the notion of 
the pre-existence of souls, and that he drew inspiration from Plato and Plotinus in his formulations. 
 
 
 
                                                      
149 See Martens (2015). 
150 Ibid. p. 601. See also Terry’s L. Givens, When Souls Had Wings: Pre-Mortal Existence in 
Western Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 9-70. 
151 PG v.11 1096A transl. Chadwich, H. (1953: 216-17). Origen: Contra Celsum trans. Henry 
Chadwick: Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, alluding to Phaedr. 246b-c. 
 
85 
Descent in Origen 
 
 Origen makes the pre-existence of the soul quite clear in his Commentary on John: 
Τῷ γάρ τηροῦμτι τὸ μηδὲν ἀδίκως, μηδὲ κατὰ συντυχίαν, ἢ ἀποχλήρωσιν ποιεῖν, 
ἀναγχαῖον παραδέξασθαι πρεσβυτέραν οὖσαν τὴν Ἰωάννου ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος, 
καὶ πρότερον ὑφεστῶσαν πεπέμφθαι ἐπὶ διακονίαν τῆς περὶ τοῦ φωτὸς 
μαρτυρίας. Πρὸς τούτοις δὲ οὐ καταφρονητέον καὶ τοῦ, <Οὗτός ἐστιν Ἠλίας ὁ 
μέλλων ἔρχεσθαι.> Ἐὰν δὲ κρατῇ ὁ καθόλου περὶ ψυχῆς λόγος, ὡς οὐ 
συνεσπαρμένης τῷ σώματι, ἀλλὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τυγχανούσης, καὶ διὰ ποικίλας 
αἰτίας ἐνδυομένης σαρχὶ καὶ αἵματι, τὸ <ἀπεσταλμένος ὑπὸ Θεοῦ,> οὐκέτι δόξει 
ἐξαίρετον εἶναι περὶ Ἰωάννου λεγόμενον. 
Origen, Comm. Jo. 2.181-82152 
“He who sedulously guards himself in his dealings with Scripture against forced, 
or casual, or capricious procedure must assume that John’s soul, being older than 
his body and subsisting prior to it, was sent to the ministry of testimony 
concerning the light … now if the general theory concerning the soul prevails, 
that is, that it has not been sown with the body but exists before it and for various 
reasons is clothed with flesh and blood, the expression “sent by God” will no 
longer seem to be exceptional when it is used of John.”153 
In contemplating the salvation of the soul, Origen describes a very similar hierarchy to the 
Plotinean one. When souls reside with God, they are in fact not souls but minds. Origen 
contemplates whether a soul that has been saved is still a soul. His conclusion is that it is no longer 
a soul but changes back to an intellect when it reunites with God: 
Ὥσπερ σῶσαι ἦλθεν τὸ ἀπολωλὸς’ ὁ σωτήρ, ὅτε µέντοι σῴζεται τὸ ἀπολωλός, 
οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἀπολωλός· οὕτως ἣν σῶσαι ἦλθε ψυχήν, ὡς σῶσαι τὸ ἀπολωλός, 
οὐκέτι µένει ψυχὴ ἡ σωθεῖσα ψυχή. … νοῦς οὖν γέγονε ψυχὴ, καὶ ψυχὴ 
κατορθωθεῖσα γινεται νοῦς.  
Origen, Peri Arkhōn, 2.8.3154 
“Just as the savior came to save what was lost, when that which was lost was 
saved, it was no longer lost. Thus, he came to save the soul, to save what was 
lost. And thus, the saved soul was no longer a soul… the intellect, when falling, 
became the soul and the soul, when formed again in virtues, will become the 
intellect again.” 
                                                      
152 GCS 4, 87.6-15 PG v. 14, 2.24. 
153 Trans. Ronald E. Heine (1989:143-44) Origen: Commentary on the Gospel according to John, 
Books 1-10; Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. See also Comm. Cant. 
2.5.22-23, Princ. 1. pref.5; Cels. 4.30; Comm. Jo. 6.14. 
154 Frag 21, Koetschau, from Justinian Ep. ad Menam. 
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Once again, this passage emphasizes the change of state that occurs when the intellect 
becomes a soul during the descent, and vice versa. Origen’s Greek is quite clear, succinct, and 
precise. There is no speculation or qualification in his language. As we will now see, Rufinus’ 
translation not only changes the language from becoming (a state change), to being named (a 
semantic question of nomenclature), but also introduces more tentative expressions, thereby 
rendering Origen’s clear and precise claims more speculative. 
 
Descent: Rufinus’ Translation 
 Rufinus’ De Principiis 2.8.3 is as follows: 
aut si cum ad beatitudinem venerit, iam anima non dicetur? Sed videamus ne 
forte potest hoc modo responderi, quia sicut salvator venit salvare quod perierat, 
et iam cum salvatur, non est perditum quod prius perditum dicebatur: ita 
fortassis etiam hoc quod salvatur anima dicitur; cum autem iam salva facta 
fuerit, ex perfectioris partis suae vocabulo nuncupabitur. Sed et illud adici posse 
videbatur quibusdam, quia sicut hoc, quod perditum est, erat sine dubio 
antequam periret, cum aliud nescio quid erat quam perditum, sicut et erit utique 
cum iam non est perditum: ita etiam anima, quae perisse dicitur, videbitur fuisse 
quid aliquando, cum nondum perisset et propter hoc anima diceretur, quae 
rursum ex perditione libertata potest iterum illud esse quod fuit, antequam 
periret et anima diceretur.  
Rufinus, De Principiis, 2.8.3155 
 
“or when it attains blessedness, should it be no longer called a soul? Let us see if 
perhaps an answer may be given in this way, that as the Saviour came to save 
what was lost, that which formerly was said to be lost is not lost when it is saved; 
so also, perhaps, this which is saved is called a soul, and when it has been placed 
in a state of salvation will receive a name from the Word that denotes its more 
perfect condition. But it appears to some that this also may be added, that as the 
thing which was lost undoubtedly existed before it was lost, at which time it was 
something else than destroyed, so also will be the case when it is no longer in a 
ruined condition. In like manner also, the soul which is said to have perished will 
appear to have been something at one time, when as yet it had not perished, and 
on that account would be termed soul, and being again freed from destruction, it 
may become a second time what it was before it perished and be called a soul.” 
                                                      
155 GCS v. 5, 95. 
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There is no doubt that the two passages have the same general message. However, in this case, the 
particular word choices that Rufinus makes are quite striking. In Origen's account, when the soul is 
saved and brought up to God, it actually becomes something else (namely, mind). When the soul is 
‘saved,' it ascends towards God and actually changes into intellect, mimicking the Plotinan 
hierarchy. Origen chose to use forms of εἴναι to describe the process. Rufinus, on the other hand, 
translates these forms of “to be” with the much softer terms such as dicetur or videbatur, 
nuncupabitur, as I have highlighted in the above Latin. Where Origen’s Greek actually takes the 
soul from one level to the next, Rufinus’ translation keeps intellect and soul on the same equal 
level. This renders the changes undergone in descent as simply a difference of how we talk about 
them at each stage.  
Besides the verb changes, Rufinus also adds speculative vocabulary to the narrative, such as 
“perhaps” or “it appears to some”, as I have underlined in his Latin rendition. This serves to 
distance Origen from these arguments and gives the impression that he is speaking more hesitantly. 
Even if a reader were to recognize any philosophical adaptation of Plotinus’ hierarchy or Plato’s 
Phaedrus, it could easily be dismissed as not representative of Origen’s thought because of the 
speculative language Rufinus uses. 
 
 
 
Conclusions on Descent 
 While Origen’s descent of the soul makes it clear that the soul existed before entering into 
its embodied state, Rufinus makes significant changes when he translates. The differences may 
seem fairly benign, but when read in the greater context of Origen’s doctrine of pre-existence and 
his adaptation of the Plotinus, the changes become more significant. I have demonstrated that 
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Rufinus’ Latin obstructs the reader’s view of the aforementioned concepts by changing the verb 
forms in the Latin text. Instead of the intellect becoming a soul, and afterwards becoming 
embodied, Rufinus renders the process simply a question of nomenclature, and not a change of 
state. The soul is only called by different names during its descent, which makes it less clear 
whether it existed before it became embodied. 
 
 
Step Two: Free Will 
 
 The soul exercises its free will when it descends to earth in its embodied state, and thus it is 
responsible for its own decisions. That our embodied souls have the power of free will is a crucial 
tenet in Origen’s doctrine. Indeed, his explanation of evil hinges on our soul’s power to choose. 
The following analysis will concentrate on Origen’s description of the soul as a “self-moved 
mover” and its similarity to Plato’s description of the soul in the Phaedrus. I will then move on to 
demonstrate how Rufinus’ translation makes the passage more hesitant and speculative. In 
particular, Rufinus’ Latin, in contrast to Origen’s Greek, does not offer a definitive answer for 
whether non-animate objects such as plants are ensouled. We will see in the description of the soul 
as self-moved mover that although Rufinus does not make significant alterations directly to 
Origen’s doctrine of the soul’s free will, further alterations made in steps three and four result in an 
undermining of the free will established in the first two steps. 
 
Self-Moved Mover: The Philosophical Background 
 
 In the Phaedrus 245c5 and following, Plato explains the soul’s immortality based on the 
fact that it is a self-mover (τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν). It is moved by itself, as opposed to something that is 
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moved by something else (ὑπ’ ἄλλου κινούµενον). He goes on to say that this self-mover is also 
the source and origin of movement in other things (ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγὴ 
καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως): 
Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον· τὸ δ’ ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ’ 
ἄλλου κινούµενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς. µόνον δὴ τὸ αὑτὸ 
κινοῦν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπολεῖπον ἑαυτό, οὔποτε λήγει κινούµενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις 
ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.  
Plato, Phaed, 245c5-9156 
“Every soul is immortal, for what is ever-moving is immortal; but what moves 
something else and is moved by another, since it has an end to its movement, it 
has an end to its life. Only that which moves itself, since it does not abandon 
itself, never stops moving, but this is also the source and origin of movement for 
other things that are moved.”157 
Plato recognizes that something which is the sole cause of motion in itself never has to stop, and 
thus never dies. Something that requires an outside influence to move, however, runs the risk of 
being abandoned by its mover and thus is subject to death if it stops being moved by the outside 
influence. 
 
The Self-Moved Mover in Origen 
 We similarly find that Origen, when he begins his discussion on fate, feels he must first establish 
the characteristics of the soul, specifically that it is an entity which serves as the cause of its own 
movement (τὰ µέν τινα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχει τὴν τῆς κινήσεως αἰτίαν), and is moved from inside, as 
opposed to something that is moved from the outside (ἕτερα δὲ ἔξωθεν µόνον κινεῖται). He 
further refers to fire, which he states is moved from the outside, as a self-mover (καὶ τὸ πῦρ 
                                                      
156 Plato., Yunis, H. (2011). Phaedrus. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
157 Trans. Fowler, Harold N. (1925) Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 9 Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 
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αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι). He establishes the soul as a self-mover in order to show that the soul has 
control over its own will and thus also its fate: 
Τῶν κινουµένων τὰ µέν τινα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχει τὴν τῆς κινήσεως αἰτίαν, ἕτερα δὲ 
ἔξωθεν µόνον κινεῖται. ἔξωθεν µὲν οὖν µόνον κινεῖται τὰ φορητά, οἷον ξύλα καὶ 
λίθοι καὶ πᾶσα ἡ ὑπὸ ἕξεως µόνης συνεχοµένη ὕλη. ὑπεξῃρήσθω δὲ νῦν τοῦ 
λόγου τὸ κίνησιν λέγειν τὴν ῥύσιν τῶν σωµάτων, ἐπεὶ µὴ χρεία τούτου πρὸς τὸ 
προκείµενον. ἐν ἑαυτοῖς δὲ ἔχει τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ 
ἁπαξαπλῶς ὅσα ὑπὸ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς συνέχεται· ἐξ ὧν φασιν εἶναι καὶ τὰ 
µέταλλα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι, τάχα δὲ καὶ αἱ πηγαί. τῶν 
δὲ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐχόντων τὰ µέν φασιν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν 
κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν·ἐξ ἑαυτῶν µὲν τὰ ἄψυχα, ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν δὲ τὰ ἔµψυχα. 
καὶ ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν κινεῖται τὰ ἔµψυχα φαντασίας ἐγγινοµένης ὁρµὴν 
προκαλουµένης.  
Origen, Peri Arkhōn 3.1.2158 
“Of things that move, some have the cause of their movement outside of 
themselves, yet others are moved only externally. Those which are moved only 
from externally are lifeless, such as wood and stones and all things which are 
held together by the constitution of their matter alone. That view must indeed be 
dismissed which would regard the dissolution of bodies by corruption as motion, 
for it has no bearing upon our present purpose. Other things have the cause of 
their motion in themselves, such as animals, or trees, and all things held together 
by natural life or a soul, among which some think veins of metal belong. Fire is 
also supposed to be the cause of its own motion, and perhaps also springs of 
water. And of those things which have the causes of their motion in themselves, 
some are said to be moved out of themselves, others by themselves. Those things 
moved out of themselves are without a soul, whereas those things which are 
moved by themselves have a soul. And those ensouled entities move by 
themselves when a representation calls forth an impulse.” 
 Because the soul has control over its own movement, this grants it free will. If it were 
moved from the outside, then it would not have to take responsibility for its actions. Although 
Origen uses the image of the self-moved mover for a different purpose, the connection to the 
Phaedrus both in the terminology and conceptualization of the soul as an entity moved from within 
                                                      
158 H. Görgemanns and H. Karpp, ed. (1976: 462-560). Origenes vier Bücher von den 
Prinzipien, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 
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and thus in some way responsible for its actions makes it difficult to doubt that Origen did not have 
the Phaedrus in mind when composing this passage. It also serves as a fitting illustration of how 
Origen extracted certain philosophical tenets or themes and adapted them to advance his own 
theological narratives. This particular narrative is altered through the process of translation, as we 
shall now see. 
 
Rufinus’ Self-Moved Mover 
 
Compare Rufinus’ translation of the same passage above: 
Omnium quae moventur alia in semet ipsis causas motuum suorum gerunt, alia 
extrinsecus accipiunt: ut puta extrinsecus tantummodo moventur omnia, quae 
sine vita sunt, ut lapides vel ligna et quaecumque huiusmodi sunt, quae solo 
habitu materiae suae vel corporum constant ... Alia vero in semet ipsis habent 
movendi causam, ut animalia vel arbores et omnia, quae vel per naturalem vitam 
vel per animam constant; inter quae etiam metallorum venas deputari aliquibus 
visum est, sed et ignis sui motus esse putandus est, fortassis autem etiam et fontes 
aquarum. Haec autem, quae in semet ipsis causam suorum motuum habent, 
quaedam dicunt ex se, quaedam ab se moveri; et ita dividunt quod ex se 
moveantur ea, quae vivunt quidem non tamen animantia sunt;  
Rufinus, De Principiis, 3.1.2-3159 
“Of things that are moved, some have the cause of their motion within 
themselves, others receive it from without: the result is that all things which are 
only moved by an external force are things without life, like rocks or wood or 
other things of this type, which consist only in a state of material or bodies. That 
view must indeed be dismissed which would regard the dissolution of bodies by 
corruption as motion, for it has no bearing upon our present purpose. Others, 
again, have the cause of motion in themselves, such as animals, or trees, and all 
things which are held together through having a natural life or a soul; among 
these some think it is clear that veins of metals belong, fire is also thought to be 
its own mover, perhaps even fountains of water. These things, however, which 
have the cause of their motion in themselves, they say some move out of 
themselves, others by themselves, and thus they separate things which move by 
themselves because they live but are nevertheless do not have a soul.” 
 
                                                      
159 GCS v. 5, 95. 
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 On the whole, it may appear that Rufinus has translated this passage accurately. The fact 
that it is considerably longer than the original Greek has much to do with the explanatory 
comments interwoven in the text, something which Rufinus himself admits that he has done in his 
prefaces. There are, however, some very clear instances where one can point to Rufinus’ translation 
losing its relationship to previous philosophical traditions through small but significant changes to 
the meaning of Origen’s Greek text. The exclusionary notion of vel … vel in the categorization of 
animals and plants that are moved from within themselves tends towards a completely different 
conclusion than the simple καὶ from the original Greek. Origen's point is considerably vaguer: both 
animals and plants have in themselves the cause of motion, as well as all those things which are 
held together by nature and soul (ἐν ἑαυτοῖς δὲ ἔχει τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ 
ἁπαξαπλῶς ὅσα ὑπὸ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς συνέχεται·). Here, it is not completely clear whether we 
should read this “and” as exclusive or inclusive. These self-movers are held together both by the 
fact that they have a soul and that they have some sort of nature that allows them to move 
themselves. It is possible they have only one of the two elements, but it is likewise possible that 
they have both. If we were to read the explanation in this way, it would allow the possibility that 
both animals and plants (and other things which are self-movers) have souls.  
 The omissions made in the process of translation show a great deal about what Rufinus’ 
motivations were. Several lines describing the effect of a representation on ensouled beings are 
simply missing from the Latin translation. The concept of a representation striking the being from 
without and bringing forth an impulse is entirely missing, and thus we also miss a great deal of 
Stoic influence in the Latin text.160 
                                                      
160 For more on the Origen’s adaptation of the Stoic doctrines, see Steps Three and Four in this 
dissertation. 
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 Ultimately, Rufinus translated Origen in a vague way, and his rendering of the passage 
makes it more speculative and hypothetical. It leaves it up to the reader to decide: animals and trees 
have the cause of their motion within themselves, as do all things which exist either because they 
have a soul or because they have a natural life. Rufinus not only precludes the possibility that 
something like a plant would have a soul, but he likewise cuts off the interaction this passage could 
have with other philosophical passages. According to Rufinus, self-moved things either have some 
natural life (presumably this would include things such as plants), or they have souls (like us), and 
certainly not both as the idea of ensouled plants would not please Rufinus' Christian readers. It 
might also remind the readers of the forbidden pagan philosophical doctrines. 
 
Conclusions on Free Will 
Rufinus is careful with how much he allows Origen’s self-moved mover to borrow from the 
Phaedrus. He translated the passage on the self-moved mover in such a way that some clear 
conclusions Origen made were rendered more speculative or hypothetical, a method of rewriting 
through translation he also employed in the passage describing the soul’s descent in Step One. In 
Step Two, Rufinus makes small, yet significant, alterations to Origen’s discussion of the soul. As 
we move forward to consider the psychological processes of embodied emotion and thought, we 
will see that the changes made in those additional steps of the soul’s journey further undermine the 
crucial establishment of free will. 
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Step 3: The Psychological Processes of Embodied Emotion 
 
Once the soul has descended to its embodied state, it must use its ability to choose to 
combat the temptations of sin. One of the methods of avoiding sin is avoiding bad emotions. 
Origen expresses doubt about the value of emotions. As we shall see, he is careful not to ascribe 
real emotion to God or Christ, but he does admit to a type of pre-emotion that does not count as a 
full emotion. He further cautions mortals to steer clear of emotions, which he describes as winds 
that wreak havoc on the soul. The descriptions of the psychological processes of emotion and pre-
emotion draw heavily from Stoc sources, as shall be demonstrated.  
When we turn to Rufinus’ translation, we find that his discussion of emotions conflates key 
emotional terms. He blurs the strict line between pre-emotions (for which we are not responsible), 
and true emotions (for which we are). Further, he equates a phantasia, something which is 
presented to our senses or mind, with a hormê, or emotional impulse that provokes action. He thus 
creates an inconsistent picture of Origen’s precise formulation of the formation of and 
consequences for emotions.  
 
Emotions: The Philosophical Background 
 In his investigations on emotion, Origen makes use of terms borrowed from Stoic writers. 
Richard Sorabji161 sees in particular the way Origen and other Christian writers adapted the Stoic 
conception of withholding assent to emotions to their own doctrines of withholding assent to 
temptation. Despite the general consensus that Origen relied on the Stoic doctrine, it is not clear to 
what extent he adapted or even misinterpreted the teachings of the Stoa. Sorabji believes that 
                                                      
161 Sorabji (1999). 
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Origen conflated the distinction between feeling and emotion. As I will reveal, however, this 
conflation happened in the translation process. 
 We must first understand the complex system of emotion formation in the Stoic sources 
before we turn a comparison of Origen’s own account. There has been considerable attention given 
to the study of Stoic pathē in recent scholarship. Although the term in its most basic translation 
would be “something suffered or undergone” (from the Greek verb paschein: to suffer or endure), 
scholars use various translations in order to try to capture the specific meaning of the term in Stoic 
thought, including “emotion” or “passion”. Whatever translation is used, the Stoic term pathē 
should not be understood as having the same meaning as emotions or passions in the modern sense. 
While there are many examples of Stoic pathē that could be easily classified as “emotions” in the 
modern sense, there are just as many reactions which we would put in the same category, but that 
the Stoics could not accept as emotions, such as crying over a tragic story or trembling before 
having to give a public speech. We typically treat “emotion” as a state which is not within our 
control (hence we are overwhelmed by anger or drowned in sorrow). Although “passion” is 
etymologically closer to the Greek and Latin terms pathē and passio, the English cognate “passion” 
is associated with a state of excessive emotion. The Stoic pathē are neither simply exaggerated 
emotional states, nor are they states which affect us as passive object. For the sake of consistency, I 
will use the translation “emotion” for pathos. I will also follow Margaret Graver in describing 
anything which does not constitute an emotion (but at times may be so-identified in common 
parlance) as a “feeling”. Having a feeling in modern English is usually a passive sensation that we 
do not control. In this way we can preserve in English the specific delineation in the Stoic doctrine 
between emotions, which are active and in our control, and feelings, which are passive and not in 
our control. 
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 The Greek term pathos is rendered into Latin either as perturbatio (Cicero, Jerome) or 
adfectus (Seneca). The emotions are described by various sources as “judgments” and “opinions”. 
We find this in Cicero: 
sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et opinione, Itaque eas definiunt 
pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, sed etiam quam in nostra sint 
potestate.  
Cicero tusc. disp. 4.14162 
“But they think that all emotions come about through judgment and opinion, and 
thus they define them more narrowly, so that it is not only understood how 
destructive they are, but also how much they are in our power.”163 
 That the emotions are judgments and opinions puts the responsibility for them in our hands, 
and further, it allows for them to be controlled by our reason, and so it is equally within our power 
to refuse to experience them. Cicero cautions that emotions are destructive; this is the reason that 
wise men must not be affected by them: 
Perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt 
opiniones ac iudicia levitatis. Itaque his sapiens semper vacabit.  
Cicero de fin. 3.35164 
 
“Emotions, however, are not moved by any power of nature, and all of them are 
opinions and judgments made out of inconstancy. And it is for this reason that 
the wise man will always be free from them.”165 
The reason that a wise man avoids emotions is not because he does not have opinions or 
make judgements. Emotions are faulty opinions and improper judgements. Once this bad 
opinions or judgements are assented to, they become more difficul to control, and this is the 
reason they must be avoided. 
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Stoic phantasia 
 We encounter many circumstances as we move through our lives, things whose effect on us 
is not in our control. Within the Stoic framework, our reaction to these circumstances, however, is 
what we do have control over. Sometimes our bodies may react, as when something comes near 
our face and we flinch. Other times, our mental state may be affected, as when we feel moved by a 
tragic fresco. Both of these types of reactions, as we shall see, are described by Seneca as pre-
emotions, things to which we have not agreed voluntarily. Having an emotion, however, is 
described in both earlier and later Stoic sources as something to which we actively assent, and once 
we have assented to an emotion, we can end up doing something contrary to our normal reasoning. 
One form of event over which we do not have control is what Chrysippus terms a phantasia, or 
representation. As Cicero states in his discussion of sense perception, the phantasia is “sort of like 
a blow inflicted from the outside” (quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus). The phantasia, then, is the 
strike given to our minds and bodies when we are affected by the appearance of the outside world: 
plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. in qua primum de 
sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi to 
impulsione oblata extrinsecus quam ille φαντασίαν, nos visum appellemus licet...  
Cicero, Acad. 1.40166 
 
“He [Zeno] changed many things however in that third part of the philosophy, in 
which he first said certain new things concerning the senses themselves, which 
he believed are compounded from a sort of blow inflicted from the outside, and 
he termed that blow representation, what we call ‘visum’...”167 
Representations are thus passively received, and they affect how the world appears to us. The 
standard translation of phantasia as “impression” comes from the analogy of an imprint (τύπωσις) 
on the soul. The problem with thinking of the representation as an impression, like that of a signet 
ring into wax, is, as Diogenes Laertius points out in the same passage, you cannot imprint many 
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different things on a strip of wax at the same time. The representation has some sort of effect on 
our minds and/or bodies, and we are passive recipients of it. That the representation inflicts some 
sort of involuntary change on us will become very important when we examine the properties of 
pre-emotions. 
 
Stoic sunkatathēsis 
 
 Once a representation imprints on or reveals itself and its object to us, how we react is up to 
us. Our reaction involves giving, rejecting, or withholding our assent (sunkatathēsis). Here we are 
exercising some control. Cicero reports that representations are ‘received as it were, by the mind’s 
assent, which he takes to be inside of us and voluntary’:  
sed ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adiungit 
animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam.  
Cicero, Acad. 1.40168  
 
“... but he added to these representations received as it were by the senses the 
assent of the mind, which he wants to be within us and voluntary.” 
 If assent is up to us and voluntary, then there must be a choice made as to whether to assent 
to something. Indeed, it turns out that the Stoic sage must know when to assent and when to 
withhold assent, since assenting to the wrong thing amounts to erring and living unworthily: 
τὸ τοὺς | σ̣ο̣φο[ὺ]ς ἀνεξαπατήτους εἶναι καὶ ἀναμαρτή|τους εἶναι κατ̣' ἀξ[ίαν] τε 
ζῆν | καὶ πάντα πράττειν εὖ. διὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς συν|[κ]α̣τάθεσεις ὅπως γίνον|ται μὴ 
ἄλλως, ἀλλὰ με|τὰ καταλήψεως πλεί|ω γέγονεν ἐ[π]ιστ̣ρο|φή.  
Anon. Stoic. (P. Herc. 1020), col. 4, col. 1169 
 
“... wise men cannot be deceived nor make mistakes, and they live according to 
merit and do all things well. Therefore, in the case of assent more attention is 
paid, so that they do not do it otherwise but only with cognition.” 
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An assent made μετὰ καταλήψεως is an informed one that the Stoic sage knows is correct. Assent 
to an emotion, as we shall see below, is one which is always deceptive and incorrect, and this is 
precisely because emotions can quickly slip out of our control. 
 Assent is an integral part of the formation of emotions, as it is this voluntary action of 
assent that results in a state for which we must take responsibility. An emotion, it turns out, is a 
particular type of assent— an impulse, and this impulse is one that drives us into action. The proof 
of this lies in Stobaeus: Πάσας δὲ τὰς ὁρμὰς συγκαταθέσεις εἶναι, τὰς δὲ πρακτικὰς καὶ τὸ 
κινητικὸν περιέχειν. (Stobaeus 2.88, 2 (SVF 3.171, LS 33I): “They say that all impulses are 
assents, and that the practical impulses also contain the power of movement.”). Thus, an impulse 
cannot arise without assent, as it is by definition a type of assent. We find a similar attestation of 
the relationship between assent and impulse in Plutarch: 
καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς ἀγῶσιν ὁ πλεῖστος λόγος αὐτῷ τε 
Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ἀντιπάτρῳ περὶ τίνος γέγονε; περὶ τοῦ ‘μήτε πράττειν μήθ ̓ ὁρμᾶν 
ἀσυγκαταθέτως, ἀλλὰ πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κενὰς; ὑποθέσεις τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας, 
οἰκείας φαντασίας γενομένης, εὐθὺς ὁρμᾶν μὴ εἴξαντας μηδὲ συγκαταθεμένους.’  
Plutarch St. rep. 1057A170 
 
“In their arguments against the Academics, what was most argued about by 
Chrysippus himself and Antipater? The fact that without assent there is neither 
action nor impulse, and that they are talking nonsense and empty assumptions if 
they approve the proposition that when an appropriate impression occurs, there is 
an impulse immediately if they haven’t yielded or given their assent.” 
 In addition, an impulse arises only when an ‘appropriate’ (oikeias) representation arises. 
This indicates that there are certain representations which are not appropriate, and therefore would 
not result in an impulse to take action. Stobaeus, too, further elaborates this point when speaking of 
“What moves an impulse, they say, is nothing other than a representation that immediately 
stimulates a particular function.” (τὸ δὲ κινοῦν τὴν ὁρμην οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ‘ ἢ 
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φαντασίαν ὁρμητικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν). Thus, we need an impulsive representation to 
arise in order to have an impulsive assent to create the action specified by our assent. 
 
Stoic hormē 
 
 The formation of emotions involves a number of factors. Chrysippus links emotions 
explicitly with conscious decisions, even though once these decisions are made, they can spiral out 
of our control. Stobaeus summarizes this view, saying: 
πάθος δ’ εἶναι φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῆ τῶι αἱροῦντι λόγωι ἢ 
κίνησιν ψυχῆς <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν (εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς 
ψυχῆς)... πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικόν ἐστι, ὡς πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς 
πάθεσιν ὄντας ὅτι συμφέρει τόδε οὐ ποῖεν, ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους, 
καθάπερ ὑπό τινος ἀπειθοῦς ἵππου, ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτό ...  
Stobaeus 2.88,6; 89, 4171 
 
“They say that emotion is an impulse that is excessive and disobedient to the 
determination of reason, or an irrational movement of the soul contrary to nature; 
(but that all emotions are of the soul’s commanding faculty)... For every emotion 
is unbridled, since people often, because they are in states of emotion, although 
they see that it would be fitting not to do something, get carried away by the 
intensity, just like by some disobedient horse, and are led along to do it.” 
 Emotions are impulses which we can no longer control with our power of reason. This 
underlies the fundamental principle that emotions should be avoided, since they ultimately go 
against what we really would want. Nevertheless, a disobedient horse is only disobedient if we 
allow it to be; if we train a horse well, he will not throw us off, or run at full speed to the left when 
we’ve asked him to walk calmly to the right. We can learn to resist emotional impulses in the same 
way by withholding assent. Galen likewise describes impulses over which we lose control with 
similar terminology and metaphor:   
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οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πορεύεσθαι καθ’ ὁρμὴν οὐ πλεονάζει ἡ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ἀλλὰ 
συναπαρτίζει τι τῇ ὁρμῇ ὥστε καὶ στῆναι, ὅταν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ μεταβάλλειν. ἐπὶ δὲ 
τῶν τρεχόντων καθ’ ὁρμὴν οὐκέτι τοιοῦτον γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλεονάζει παρὰ τὴν 
ὁρμὴν ἡ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ὥστε ἐκφέρεσθαι καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εὐπειθῶς 
οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐναρξαμένων.  
Galen plac. 4.2 15-16172 
 
“For example, in the case of walking in accordance with impulse, the movement 
of one’s legs is not excessive but commensurate with the impulse, so that one can 
stop or change direction whenever she wishes. But in the case of running in 
accordance with impulse, this sort of thing no longer happens. The movement of 
her legs surpasses the impulse, so that it [the motion] is carried away and does 
not change obediently, as soon as her legs have begun.” 
 Here he describes a different species of impulse, exemplified by walking, which you can 
easily stop or change. This is not an emotional impulse, but rather a type of impulse that is 
appropriate rather than excessive. An emotion, however, according to Stobaeus, is by definition an 
excessive impulse. We see in Galen the same descriptions: once the impulse becomes excessive 
(πλεονάζει, as in the case of the ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν in Stobaeus above), it becomes disobedient 
(μὴ εὐπειθῶς, compare to Stobaeus’ horse, which is ἀπειθοῦς), and this leads to the movement of 
the legs being carried away (ἐκφέρεσθαι, just as people under the influence of emotion are 
ἐκφερομένους in Stobaeus’ account). On the one hand, we can assent to reasonable impulses; this 
would be the equivalent of walking in Galen’s metaphor. As all impulses, they produce an action, 
such as walking, but the reasonable impulse is one that does not overrun reason, hence we are able 
to stop walking, or change the direction we are going. An emotion, however, is a type of impulse 
that disregards our reason. Although we hold the power of creating to the impulse, it then becomes 
uncontrollable, as when our legs get carried away when running and we are no longer able to stop 
or change when we wish to. 
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 Both Stobaeus and Galen identify the same three characteristics of an emotional impulse: it 
is excessive, disobedient, and irrational. Being excessive (pleonazein), is illustrated by the example 
of running. Even if the running begins in accordance with impulse, it soon gathers momentum, 
increases, and becomes extremely difficult to control. Long and Sedley’s example of a speedometer 
“which marks all speeds beyond 70mph in red— someone who drives beyond that speed is driving 
excessively ...” (p. 420) is an apt metaphor, in particular if we imagine driving a large truck which 
become more difficult to maneuver and brake when it passes 70 mph. Disobedient (ἀπειθὸς), if we 
follow the examples above, is something that happens contrary to our reason. Just as the 
disobedient horse stops listening to its rider, the emotions are no longer under the control of our 
reason. The disobedient horse in Plato’s Phaedrus is quite similar to the disobedient Stoic horse: 
βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ῥέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων ᾧ μὴ καλῶς ἦν 
τεθραμμένος τῶν ἡνιόχων. (Plato Phaed. 247b (Yunis)): "For the horse from bad stock proceeds 
heavily, sinking to the earth and weighs down on his charioteer if the horse has not been well 
trained."). This horse also causes trouble for the charioteer in the Phaedrus because it has been 
poorly trained. The implication that the horse is poorly trained leaves open the possibility that with 
proper effort it is possible to have an obedient horse. The main difference between the Stoic 
account and the Plato’s however, is that Plato posits two horses: one good and one bad. 
 The different number of horses in the Platonic and Stoic accounts only serves to highlight 
the differences in their philosophies. The Platonic soul consists of both a rational and irrational 
part, which compete with each other. The Stoic soul, however, is entirely rational and every aspect 
of the process of forming an emotion (representation, assent, impulse, and reason) is under the 
authority of the commanding faculty. 
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 How, then, can emotion, which arises from a rational judgment of the soul, be called 
irrational? Plutarch’s account illustrates that we may distinguish between the state of being 
irrational and simply using the term irrational: 
καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾶι τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς 
τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι 
διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι 
καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς, κακίαν τε γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετήν, καὶ 
μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῶί· λέγεσθαι δὲ ἄλογον, ὅταν τῶι πλεονάζοντι τῆς 
ὁρμῆς, ἰσχυρῶι γενομένωι καὶ κρατήσαντι, πρός τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν 
αἱροῦντα λόγον εκφέρηται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ 
ἀκόλαστον, ἐκφαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην 
προσλαβούσης.  
Plutarch de virt. mor. cp. 3, p. 441c173 
 
“And they think that the feeling and the illogical parts are not distinguished by 
any difference or nature of the soul; but it is all the same part of the soul, what 
they call the intellect and ruling faculty, which is totally turned and changed in 
both experiencing emotions and changes arising according to habit or disposition, 
and thus evil and virtue arise. And the soul does not have anything irrational in it. 
But it is called irrational whenever it is carried away to something unnatural 
because of an excess of impulse, which becomes strong and overpowering. 
Emotion is bad and undisciplined reason, formed from a base and flawed 
judgment which gains strength and violence.”174 
 G.E.R. Lloyd sees in Zeno that “contrary to nature” and “contrary to reason” seem to be 
interchangeable (SVF 1.205)175 and thus also in the case of emotions, we can substitute “contrary 
to nature”, in the sense that it goes against our natural tendencies to do healthy things for ourselves 
(and having emotions is not healthy). The problem with reading “irrational” as “contrary to nature” 
is that Stobaeus points out that irrational and contrary to nature are in fact two different things each 
with a specific meaning: 
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν “ἄλογον” ἴσον τῶι “ἀπειθὲς τῶι λόγωι.” ... καὶ τὸ “παρὰ φύσιν” 
δ’εἴληπται ἐν τῆι τοῦ πάθους ὑπογραφῆι, ὡς συμβαίνοντος παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν καὶ 
κατὰ φύσιν λόγον. πάντες δ’ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον 
...  
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Stobaeus 2.89, 4176 
 
“‘Irrational’ is equivalent to ‘disobedient to reason’... the sense of ‘contrary to 
nature’, in the outline account of passion, is of something that happens contrary 
to the right and natural reason. Everyone in states of passion turns aside from 
reason...” 
 So instead of reading “irrational” and “contrary to nature” as equivalent and 
interchangeable, we should instead see ‘disobedient to reason’ as ‘irrational’ behavior. It is here 
that the metaphor of the disobedient horse fits in: a horse disobedient to its master exhibits 
irrational behavior, just as emotions which become disobedient to reason are irrational. We may 
also want to keep in mind Plutarch’s distinction between being irrational and simply being called 
irrational, in which he also points toward a reading of irrational as tied to the disobedient nature of 
an excessive impulse. 
 
propathēia 
 That the Stoics advocated apathēia, the absence of emotion, is a common conception 
treated in recent philosophical scholarship. It is also readily found in common parlance amongst the 
general public, as evidenced by the fact that in modern English, the term “stoic” is virtually 
synonymous with emotionless. Our ancient sources also tell a similar story. Seneca draws a 
specific distinction between the Stoics and the Peripatetics in this regard: utrum satius sit modicos 
habere adfectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum est: nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant. 
(Seneca ep. 116, 1 (SVF 443) “It is often asked whether it is better to have moderate emotions or 
no emotions: we get rid of them, the Peripatetics temper them.”). Although on the face of it, Stoic 
apathēia seems to be an eradication of all emotion, the specifics are more complex. Not only is the 
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Stoic sage allowed eupathēia, or “good” emotions, but according to some later sources, he is also 
allowed to exhibit some propathēia, “pre-emotions”, referred to in Latin as primi motus animi, 
“first movements of the mind”. The introduction of first movements solves a potential problem of a 
Stoic sage seemingly exhibiting signs of emotions, but in fact upholding the tenets of apathēia. 
primus motus animi. 
 Seneca, writing his Stoic treatise De Ira, is our earliest extensive source for the pre-
emotions. In addition to the strict definition of pathē, there are also pathē-like states that are not 
within our control, or, perhaps more importantly, are not indicative of true emotion. He describes 
certain human experiences that may look like emotions, but in fact are nothing more than 
proludentia, a prima agitatio animi, or primus motus. These are not emotions, but rather feelings in 
that they resemble emotions but do not involve an act of assent and thus are not up to us. This 
appears then to be an invention of Seneca’s, as we do not find any sources who summarize 
Chrysippus outlining this kind of idea. Although he does not use the specific terminology present 
in Seneca, Aulus Gellius describes certain reactions such as jumping at a loud noise as a state 
occurring before assent. The later attestation of these feelings which are not true emotions would 
point to the primi motus being a later development; their addition may have been in response to 
criticisms launched against the long-standing ideas of Chrysippus. We see, for example, one such 
development in Galen’s summary of Stoic views on emotion: he remarks that you can be rationally 
persuaded not to be afraid, but nevertheless if you encounter representations yourself, you may feel 
afraid in any case. He then asks: 
πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις λόγωι κινήσειε τὸ ἄλογον, ἐὰν μή τινα ἀναζωγράφησιν 
προσβάληται αἰσθητῆι παραπλησίαν; οὕτως γοῦν ἐκ διηγήσεως τινες εἰς 
ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκπίπτουσιν καὶ ἐναργῶς ἐγκελευσαμένου φεύγειν τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον 
λέοντα οὐκ ἰδόντες φοβοῦνται. Galen plac. 5.6.25-31 Posidonious fr. 162177  
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“How could anyone initiate the irrational with reason, unless he set some picture 
in front of it like a perceptual impression? Thus, some people’s appetites are 
roused by a description, and when someone tells them to flee an approaching lion 
using vivid descriptions, they are frightened without having seen it.” 
As we will see shortly, Seneca would not accept reactions to descriptions, either oral or visual, as 
inciting real emotion. That this is summarizing Posidonius is significant. Sorabji (1999) has pointed 
out that Seneca's account may be a defense of Chrysippus' doctrine against the criticisms of both 
Posidonius and Aristotle. Questions such as Galen's, summarizing Posidonius a century after 
Seneca’s explanation of first movements, exemplify the sort of interaction others had with Stoic 
explanations of emotion. However, the difference between feelings and emotions in the Stoic 
framework may extend further back than Seneca. Cicero speaks of “bites” that afflict us before the 
act of assent in his Tusculan Disputations: 
aegritudinem omnem procul abesse a sapiente, quod inanis sit, quod frustra 
suscipiatur, quod non natura exoriatur, sed iudicio, sed opinione, sed quadam 
invitatione ad dolendum, cum id decreverimus ita fieri oportere. Hoc detracto, 
quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa maerens, morsus tamen et 
contractiuncula quaedam animi relinquetur. hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum 
aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, 
ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit.  
Cicero tusc. disp. 3.82178 
 
“All grief is far removed from the wise person, because it is useless, because it is 
taken up in vain, because it arises not from nature but judgment, opinion, from a 
certain invitation for grieving, we decided that it is thus appropriate come about. 
When this judgment is withheld, because it is completely voluntary, that 
mournful grief will be eliminated, although there will nevertheless still remain a 
bite and a kind of little depression of the mind. The latter they could reasonably 
say is natural, as long as they do not use the troublesome name ‘grief’, horrid and 
dreadful as it is, because grief cannot in any way exist, or live, as it were, along 
with wisdom”.179 
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 Here we can see that Cicero makes a clear distinction between the emotional state of grief 
and a “bite” or “contraction” that should not be called grief. Grief, he points out, is a result of 
judgment (iudicio) and thus is completely voluntary (totum est voluntarium). This underlines the 
fact that emotional states are completely up to us; they involve assent. On the other hand, even the 
wise man cannot escape the bites and contractions that happen without assent. Indeed, the 
vocabulary used — morsus — emphasizes that something is happening to us. We are being bitten 
by something, but we should not call it grief because we haven’t given assent to these attacks on 
our mind. Even the diminutive contractioncula underlines the difference between grief and 
involuntary feelings. These are tiny depressions and are qualified even more by quaedam; this is a 
particular type of tiny depression which is not grief. Given that there would be no reason for 
Cicero, who is summarizing the views of many different philosophical schools, to innovate or 
develop the Stoic doctrine, we can assume that Cicero is drawing upon already established Stoic 
frameworks on what constitutes an emotion and what does not. In this case, we can assume that the 
distinction between emotions and feelings extends back to earlier Stoic authors, although given 
Cicero's less-detailed explnation, it may have been Seneca who first gave feelings a more specific 
and in-depth analysis.  
 Seneca's detailed discussion of feelings and emotions comes roughly a century after Cicero. 
The “first movements” that he discusses in De Ira are not emotions, although they do resemble 
what we would commonly consider indicative of feeling an emotion, such as growing red when 
angry. Seneca mentions other uncontrollable effects on the human body: shivering when cold, 
shrinking back from a touch, hair standing on end, blushing when hearing profane language, or 
dizziness in confrontation with a precipice. He points out that these reactions cannot be controlled 
by reason: “Because none of these are in our control, no reason can persuade them (quorum quia 
nihil in nostra potestate est, nulla quo minus fiant ratio persuadet, 2.2.1).” But, if we closely 
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analyze Seneca’s further examples of instances not under the control of reason, we see that the 
category expands considerably to include not only effects which act exclusively on the body, but 
also things which affect both the body and the mind simultaneously. After citing examples of 
changes in the body which are not voluntary, and thus not indicative of a true emotion, Seneca goes 
on to explain that there also exists a sort of blow to the mind (ictus animi) which even wise people 
suffer. The shock is one qui nos post opinionem iniuriae movet, (‘which moves us after (we have) 
the impression of an injury’). The examples he cites to illustrate this phenomenon include seeing 
plays, reading stories, listening to music, and enjoying other sorts of art. We seem to grow angry 
when we read about Antony ordering the death of Cicero, and likewise when we see a painting our 
minds can be moved: 
Hic subit etiam inter ludicra scaenae spectacula et lectiones rerum vetustarum. 
Saepe Clodio Ciceronem expellenti et Antonio occidenti videmur irasci; quis non 
contra Mari arma, contra Sullae proscriptionem concitatur? Quis non Theodoto 
et Achillae et ipsi puero non puerile auso facinus infestus est  
Seneca de ira 2.2.3-5180 
 
“This indeed occurs amongst stage plays, theater, and the readings of ancient 
deeds. We often seem to be angry because Clodius exiled Cicero, or because 
Anthony killed him; who is not stirred up against Marius’ arms, against Sulla’s 
proscription program? Who has not been infuriated at Theodotus or Achilles, and 
that child himself who dared to commit an unchildish crime?” 
 This also applies to sympathetic emotional responses, such as smiling when others smile or 
growing sad when others mourn. These are things which patitur magus animus quam facit (2.3.1: 
“the mind suffers rather than creates”). Similar to Cicero’s bites of grief, what may seem to us to be 
emotions arising when we read literature or experience other sorts of art forms are in fact 
involuntary states which hit us from the outside. These responses are not real emotions: they are 
rather nec adfectus sed principia proludentia adfectibus (2.2.5: “Not emotions but their 
                                                      
180 Seneca, L. Annaeus., Basore, J. W. (1970). Moral essays. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
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preliminaries which are pretending to be emotions”). When Seneca describes the reactions to 
stories as proludentia, although this can also have the meaning of a prelude or practice beforehand, 
I believe Seneca is getting at more precise point. The prefix pro, although often meaning “before”, 
can also have the sense of “instead of”. If we see pathē-like reactions in this way, then Seneca 
means to say that there are some reactions that simply masquerade as emotions that occur in the 
place of emotions but aren’t actually emotions themselves. This reading makes better sense of the 
examples Seneca uses as well. Nowhere does he indicate that feelings that arise at seeing a sad play 
occur in temporal relation to real emotions. The feelings one experiences in response to various 
forms of art are not said to occur before real emotion. Instead, with a clever word play in the choice 
of proludentia, aptly used in the context of performance, the feelings are just simulating real 
emotion. What action could possibly follow a reading of Cicero's murder? What impulse would 
arise to create real emotion? There doesn't seem to be a next step in this type of feeling, nor does 
Seneca mention one explicitely. 
 The key to real emotion in Seneca is neither involuntary changes in the body nor even 
particular types of movements of the mind. Real emotion necessarily is a type of impulse, one that 
urges action. Seneca too, enforces this idea on De Ira 2.3.1. Here he cautions that not everything 
which moves the mind ought to be called an emotion: Nihil ex his, quae animum fortuito impellunt, 
adfectus vocari debet (“None of these things, which strike the mind by chance, ought to be called 
emotions”). Indeed, he goes on to say that being moved is not enough, as we must follow up on the 
movement: Ergo adfectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moveri, sed permittere se illis et hunc 
fortuitum motum prosequi. (“Therefore, emotion is not being moved to the exhibited appearances 
of circumstances but allowing them and following this chance movement”). He reiterates this 
sentiment in 2.3.3: Ira non moveri tantum debet sed excurrere. (“Anger ought not only to be 
moved, but to rush out.”). To rush out would be to say that it needs to be channeled somewhere, 
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namely, into action. In 2.3.5, he says: Numquam dubium est quin timor fugam habeat, ira impetum. 
(“There is no doubt that fear entails flight, anger entails assault”). This underlines Seneca's strong 
position on action being a necessary component of emotion and illustrates the difference between 
“being moved” and “following”. The former refers to the primary movements: we are their passive 
recipients and have no control over their effects on us. What we do have control over, however, is 
the latter, namely, our assent to the movements. In 2.4.1, Seneca describes three movements. The 
first (primus) is involuntary (non voluntarius), the second (alter) arises along with a desire which is 
not yet unruly (cum voluntate non contumaci), and finally the third (tertius) one is already out of 
control (iam impatiens). The progression from entirely involuntary to voluntary but commiserate 
with intent, and finally to completely out of control is similar to the metaphor of running or sitting 
atop an unruly horse which appear in Stobaeus and Galen. 
 Thus, we have seen the Stoics distinguish true emotional states from pre-emotions, which 
are simply a form of phantasia and are not within our control. The formation of a true emotion 
involves first the arrival of a representation (phantasia), then assent (sunkatathêis) to the 
resprensentation, thereby creating an emotional impulse (hormê), ultimately resulting in an 
emotion-driven action. We will next examine how Origen adapted and incorporated the Stoa’s 
general mistrust for emotion, the pre-emotion, and the process of emotion formation into his work. 
 
Origen and Emotion 
 Origen’s discomfort with emotions is apparent when reading his work. He often interprets 
emotional vocabulary in scripture in a highly specific and qualified way that does not assign any 
 
111 
true emotion to a wise man, to Jesus, or to God himself.181 Although he does not fully explain why 
emotions should be avoided, he does equate them with powerful storms that agitate the soul, and he 
often cites reason as a preventative measure to protect against their turmoil. As I will demonstrate, 
his treatment of emotion is heavily influenced by the Stoic emotional framework. In warning 
against potential troubles for the soul, Origen posits four ‘winds’: “But there are four wind types, 
troubling the soul of man: desire, fear, pleasure, and grief. (ἄνεμοι δὲ τέσσαρες γενικοί, 
ταράσσοντες τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχήν, ἐπιθυμία,φόβος, ἡδονή, λύπη)”. These are also the four 
categories of emotion according to the Stoic doctrine: “An emotion is an illogical movement of the 
soul and is contrary to nature, or it is an excessive impulse. But the emotions are, more generally, 
divided in four types: pain, fear, desire, pleasure.” (πάθος ἐστὶν ἄλογος ψυχῆς κίνησις καὶ παρὰ 
φύσιν ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. τὰ δὲ γενιδώτερα πάθη τέσσαρα· λύπη, φόβος, ἐπιθυμία, ἡδονή.) 
 Origen’s terminology mirrors the categories of emotion and his description of these 
categories as disturbances of weather that should thus be avoided also mimics the Stoic mistrust of 
tumultuous and excessive emotions. In his Commentary on John, Origen is quite careful to 
interpret scripture in such a way that it does not assign any sort of emotion to God, despite the fact 
that in the original scriptural passage it would be much easier to see God as an emotional figure. 
For example, he is quite preoccupied with the notion that the “anger of God”, which shows up 
often in scripture, should not be read to mean that God is angry, or even can be angry, as he is 
completely emotionless: 
<Πολλαχοῦ τῶν γραφῶν> αἱ κατὰ τῶν φαύλων τιμωρίαι ὀργὴ λέγονται θεοῦ· ὡς 
τὸ λεχθὲν περὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ὑπὸ Μωϋσέως· "Ἐξαπέστειλας τὴν ὀργήν σου, καὶ 
κατέφαγεν αὐτὸς ὡσεὶ καλάμην." <καὶ Παῦλος περὶ τῶν Ἰουδαίων γράφει· 
"Ἔφθασεν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἡ ὀργὴ εἰς τέλος", ὀργὴν λέγων τὰς ἐπελθούσας ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς 
θεηλάτους τιμωρίας. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν καταφρονοῦντα τῆς χρηστότητος καὶ 
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μακροθυμίας φησί· "Κατὰ δὲ τὴν σκληρότητά σου καὶ ἀμετανόητον καρδίαν 
θησαυρίζεις σεαυτῷ ὀργὴν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς”.> οὐ γὰρ νομιστέον πάθος εἶναι 
θεοῦ τὴν ὀνομαζομένην αὐτοῦ ὀργήν. πῶς γὰρ δυνατὸν πάθος εἶναι περὶ τὸν 
ἀπαθῆ; ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ μὴ πάσχει θεὸς ἀναλλοίωτος ὤν, ἑρμηνευτέον τὴν λεγομένην 
αὐτοῦ ὀργὴν καθ’ ἃ εἴρηται.  
Origen frag. comm. in Joann. iii.36182 
 
“Often in scripture the punishments of the evildoers are said to be ‘the anger of 
God’, as, for example, in what Moses says about the Egyptians: ‘You dispatched 
your anger and it consumed them just like straw.’ and Paul when he writes the 
following about the Jews: ‘And the anger overtook them in the end.’ says that the 
god sent punishments coming upon them were anger. But to those who look 
down upon goodness and patience, he says ‘Because of your hardness and 
unrepentant heart, you will store up anger in yourself until the day of anger.’ But 
we should not think that what is called an emotion of God is his anger. For how 
can there be emotion in the case of one that is emotionless? Instead, since God is 
immutable and does not suffer emotions, we must not say that it is his anger that 
is being spoken about.”183 
 Although ὀργὴ θεοῦ could be quite simply understood as God’s anger, his attempt to avoid 
assigning emotion to God indicates that he has a commitment to avoiding it entirely. What is 
inappropriate for God, however, need not necessarily be a problem for a mere mortal. But we see a 
similar exhortation from Origen that prohibition of emotion does not just apply to God: 
καὶ ποιήσωμεν τὸ ἀποστολικὸν ἐκεῖνο τὸ «βούλομαι οὖν προσεύχεσθαι τοὺς 
ἄνδρας ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ ἐπαίροντας ὁσίους χεῖρας χωρὶς ὀργῆς καὶ διαλογισμῶν». 
Ἐὰν περιέλωμεν τὴν ὀργήν, περιείλομεν τὸ κάλυμμα, ἐὰν τὰ πάθη πάντα· ὅσον 
δὲ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ νῷ ἡμῶν, ἐν τῷ λογισμῷ ἡμῶν, ἐπίκειται τῷ ἔνδον 
προσώπῳ, <τῷ> ἡγεμονικῷ ἡμῶν, τὸ κάλυμμα καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία, τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν ἡμᾶς 
τὴν δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ λάμπουσαν. Οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἀποκρύπτων αὐτοῦ τὴν 
δόξαν ἀφ’ ἡμῶν, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς τὸ κάλυμμα ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας ἐπιτιθέντες τῷ 
ἡγεμονικῷ.  
Origen Hom. Jer. 5.9184 
  
“And let us consider that saying that ‘I want therefore to pray for the men in 
every place who raise up their sinless hands without anger and calculations’. If 
we remove anger, we remove the veil which allows all the emotions to happen. 
                                                      
182 Origen., Brooke, A. England. (1896: 51). The commentary of Origen on S. John's Gospel: the 
text. Cambridge: University Press. 
183 Trans. Heine, R. E. (1989). Commentary on the Gospel according to John. Washington, D.C.: 
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184 SC 232, 302 
 
113 
As long as these emotions exist in our mind, in our thought, they lie in our 
countenance, in our commanding faculty, the veil and the disgrace, they do not 
see the shining glory of God. God is not hiding his glory from us, but we place 
the veil of evil on our commanding faculty.”185 
 Here, not only anger but all other emotions are depicted as a veil which obscures our access 
to God. Although the specific image of a veil is not present in the Stoic sources examined, the Stoic 
ideals are similarly obscured and unattainable if assent is given to emotions. 
 
Propathēia in Origen 
 There is likewise evidence that Origen considered pre-emotional states, just as Seneca. In 
his Commentary on John, Origen speaks again on Jesus' apparent displays of emotion: 
Πᾶσαι αἱ τοῦ Σατανᾶ δυνάμεις ἅμα τοῦ αὐτῆς ἡγεμόνος κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ 
σωτηρίου πάθους ἐπεστράτευσε τῷ σωτῆρι· ἃς ὁρῶσα ἡ τοῦ σωτῆρος ψυχὴ 
ἀνθρωπίνως ἐταράττετο, οὐ τὸν θάνατον δειλιῶσα, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπινον, 
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἡττηθῆναι...διὰ τοῦτο περὶ τούτων ἐλυπεῖτο αὐτοῦ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ 
ἐταράττετο, οὐχ ὡς ἄν τις νομίσειεν ὑπὸ τῆς ταραχῆς κατακρατούμενος ἀλλ’ 
ἀκαριαίως· τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ νῦν· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἄρξασθαι καὶ ἐπαύσατο, καὶ 
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σημεῖον ἦν χρόνου.  
Origen frag. in Joann. xii. 27186 
 
“All of the powers of Satan, together with their leader, turned against the savior 
in due proportion with the emotions of the savior. And upon seeing them, the 
soul of the savior was stirred as humans are, But he did not fear death, even 
though this is a human condition, but he was afraid of being overcome. For 
Christ allowed his soul to suffer so long as they were his own, and since he was 
about to become the cause of eternal salvation to those who were below him, his 
soul was sad and worried at the sight of them. But he was not completely 
dominated by his concern, as someone might think, but only briefly. This is what 
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the ‘νῦν’ indicates. For his concern stopped in its beginning, as if to say it was in 
an instant.”187 
 Again, the prevalence of passive verb forms in Origen's descriptions of Jesus' emotional 
stirrings (ἐταράττετο, ἐλυπεῖτο, κατακρατούμενος) indicates that he is not the initiator of these 
'stirrings'; he simply suffers them. We also find again that his emotion never gets past a mere 
beginning (τῷ ἄρξασθαι). That he has not been an active participant in the feelings he starts to 
experience, and that they never get past the initial stages is a reading of John that falls in line with 
Seneca's description of pre-emotions. It is also consistent with how Origen has interpreted 
emotional vocabulary in other contexts. 
 
Phantasia and Hormê in Rufinus 
 Rufinus’ translation collapses strict distinctions between borrowed Stoic terms. In his 
translation of Book 3, on the arbitration and assent of the souls, he makes the decision to use the 
Latin transliteration fantasia, a word that is quite full of connections to both Stoic and Neoplatonic 
philosophy: 
A se autem moventur animantia, cum eis fantasia, id est voluntas quaedam vel 
incitamentum, adfuerit, quae e amoveri ad aliquid vel incitari provocaverit. 
Denique etiam in quibusdam animalibus inest talis fantasia, id est voluntas vel 
sensus, qui ea naturali quodam instinctu provocet et concitet ad ordinatos et 
conpositos motus ... 
Rufinus, De Principiis 3.1.2188 
 
 
“Ensouled beings move by themselves when a representation, i.e. a will or 
impulse, hits them, which then provokes or incites them to move towards 
something. There is also a type of a represention, i.e. a will or inclination, in 
                                                      
187 Trans. Heine, R. E. (1989). Commentary on the Gospel according to John. Washington, D.C.: 
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every animal, that calls them forth as if through some kind of natural instinct and 
incites them to regular and fixed movements …” 
  
 He qualifies the term fantasia first with the phrase id est voluntas quaedam vel 
incitamentum, and then later id est voluntas vel sensus. By doing this, he presents two partially 
overlapping definitions of fantasia. He also collapses the traditionally Stoic distinction between 
phantasia and horme, and thus cuts a tie between Origen and the Stoics. In De Principiis, 3.1.2, he 
states: fantasia, id est voluntas quaedam vel incitamentum, adfuerit… (“a representation, a 
particular will or impulse, arises, which arouses them to move towards something or arouses them 
…”). 
Rufinus conflates Origen’s originally sharp distinction between representation and impulse, 
explaining that by a "representation" (phantasia) he means "a particular will or impulse" (id est 
voluntas quaedam vel incitamentum). We have seen a clear distinction in Stoic sources between a 
representation and impulse; the representation arises on its own, and our assent to it constitutes an 
impulse. We see in the original Greek that Origen writes something quite different: "when the 
representation arises and brings forth an impulse" (φαντασίας ἐγγινομένης ὁρμὴν προκαλουμένης). 
Representation and impulse are never used synonomously as Rufinus explains them in his 
translation. Thus, it is in translation that the conformation to Stoic terminology is lost. 
 
Conclusion on Emotions 
Origen’s doctrine on the psychological processes of emotions is informed by the Stoic 
doctrine of emotions, as I have shown. Origen is quite careful about ascribing real emotion to God, 
and similarly advises all wise men to avoid succumbing to emotion. He likewise leans on Seneca’s 
conception of pre-emotion. When we turn to Rufinus’ discussion of emotions in translation, 
however, we find that the Latin text conflates key emotional terms. Rufinus blurs the strict line 
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between pre-emotions (for which we are not responsible), and true emotions (for which we are). 
Further, he equates a fantasia, something which is presented to our senses or mind, with a voluntas, 
or emotional impulse that provokes action. He thus creates an inconsistent picture of Origen’s 
precise formulation of the formation of and consequences for emotions. As we will see in the next 
section, the process of embodied thought is tightly connected to the formation of emotions, and in 
this step Rufinus makes the most significant alteration, one which has far-reaching consequence. 
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Step Four: The Psychological Processes of Embodied Thought 
 
 The fourth and final step is the soul’s encounter with thoughts. I will demonstrate that 
Origen borrows Stoic terminology when discussing different types of thoughts: the noēsis, a type of 
thought for which we are not ourselves responsible, and logismos, a thought that we have accepted 
and for which we must take responsibility. In Latin, both of these terms are translated as cogitatio. 
This dramatically changes the meaning of the translated text. In his book, Emotion and Peace of 
Mind, Richard Sorabji identifies the seemingly inconsistent use of cogitatio in Peri Arkhōn. He 
points out that: "Origen, if we can trust Rufinus’ Latin paraphrase, makes a decisive change. In 
mentioning first movements, he connects them with the idea of bad thoughts (logismoi, Latin 
cogitationes)... Origen’s shift is a major one."189 He further argues that the result of this shift can be 
made "... more intelligible by thinking of it as a change of focus from Seneca's first movement, the 
shock, to its cause, the appearance."190 That thoughts are appearances need not be a shift, as 
Origen, in particular in the original Greek, describes thoughts as having an effect on us and thus 
causing pre-emotions, as we shall see. However, we shall also see that Origen does not explicitly 
connect his discussion of thoughts as representations and pre-emotions. There still does seem to be 
inconsistency in the Latin use of cogitationes. I will demonstrate that these misinterpretations or 
modifications were in fact no more than a symptom of the process of translation that the text 
underwent at the hands of Rufinus. 
 In conflating thoughts that are our responsibility and those that are not, Rufinus not only 
makes a big change in Origen’s doctrine on thought, but also weakens Origen’s emphasis on free 
will. As I will demonstrate, Rufinus’ Latin allows for thoughts to be implanted into our head for 
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which we must be responsible. However, this circumvents our free will to choose and decide which 
thoughts to accept, thereby undermining the strong emphasis on free will as an explanation for evil 
in steps two and three. 
 
Thoughts: The Philosophical Background 
 There are a number of terms in Greek that could be rendered with the English word 
“thought,” although they each have a different semantic range within the Stoic philosophy. Of 
particular interest to this study are the terms noēsis and logismos. According to Diogenes Laertius, 
a noēsis is a type of representation: 
Τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἱ μέν εἰσιν αἰσθητικαί, αἱ δ’ οὔ· αἰσθητικαὶ μὲν 
αἱ δι’ αἰσθητηρίου ἢ αἰσθητηρίων λαμβανόμεναι, οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ δ’ αἱ διὰ τῆς 
διανοίας καθάπερ τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν λόγῳ λαμβανομένων... Ἔτι 
τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι λογικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι· λογικαὶ μὲν αἱ τῶν λογικῶν 
ζῴων, ἄλογοι δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀλόγων. αἱ μὲν οὖν λογικαὶ νοήσεις εἰσίν, αἱ δ’ ἄλογοι οὐ 
τετυχήκασιν ὀνόματος.  
Diog. Laert. 7.49-51191 
 
“According to the Stoics, some representations are sensory, others are not. The 
sensory ones are experienced through the faculty of sense perception, and the 
non-sensory ones through the faculty of mental comprehension, such as the 
comprehensions of incorporeals or other things understood through reason... 
Some representations are rational, others irrational. The logical ones belong to 
rational animals, the irrational to irrational animals. The logical representations 
are thoughts (νοήσεις), whereas the illogical ones do not have a name.” 
 Here he explicitly compares sensory perception and non-sensory, which is experienced 
through thoughts in the same way that our sense organs experience the blow of a representation. 
Although the term dianoia is used to indicate all forms of non-sensory experiences, the noēsis is 
the particular type of thought that rational animals (such as we humans) have, through which we 
experience non-sensory information. If we follow the paralellism of the passage, both experiences 
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(sensory and non-sensory) here are passive. The topic of discussion is representation, which is 
something that acts upon us. Diogenes Laertius shows us that we can be acted upon both by 
sensory objects, such as an image acting upon our eyes, as well as non-sensory objects, such as an 
incorporeal concept acting upon our minds. Plutarch similarly corroborates this definition of a 
noēsis: 
φαντασία γάρ τις ἡ ἔννοιά ἐστι, φαντασία δὲ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ· ... τὰς ἐννοίας 
<ἐν>ἀποκειμένας τινάς ὁριζόμενοι νοήσεις, μνήμας δὲ μονίμους καὶ σχετικὰς 
τυπώσεις.  
Plutarch comm. not. 1084F-1085A192 
 
“For a conception is a certain type of representation, and a representation is an 
imprint on the soul... they define some conceptions as underlying thoughts 
(νοήσεις), but memories as permanent and fixed imprints.” 
Although he uses ennoia instead of dianoia as the more generic category of non-sensory 
representation, he states that a noēsis is a particular type of ennoia. This amounts to a particular 
type of thought, which is nothing other than a type of representation, and thus would not be 
something that is up to us. This further suggests that impressions can contain a propositional 
aspect, in the form of a thought, but it is not until we assent to the thought that we have accepted 
the content therein. 
 We will see that there do seem to be certain thoughts or mental events which do in fact 
involve assent. Dianoiai, however, as well as the noeseis which rational animals experience, are 
simply a type of representation and thus having a thought does not always constitute having an 
emotion. 
 Another type of thought exists, however, which is treated differently from noēsis. This type 
of thought has already been assented to and has a particular place in the discussion of emotion. 
Plutarch reports on the relationship between logismoi and emotions: 
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ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ Ἀνομολογίας ὁ Χρύσιππος εἰπὼν "ὅτι τυφλόν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ 
πολλάκις μὲν οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁρᾶν τὰ ἐκφανῆ, πολλάκις δὲ τοῖς καταλαμβονομένοις 
ἐπιπροσθεῖ" μικρὸν προελθὼν "Τὰ γὰρ ἐπιγιγνόμενα," φησὶ "πάθη ἐκκρούει τοὺς 
λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ ὡς ἑτέρως φαινόμενα, βιαὶως προωθοῦντα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐναντίας 
πράξεις. 
Plutarch de virt. mor. cp 10 p. 450c193 
 
“In his ‘On Disagreements’ Chrysippus says: ‘Anger is something blind, and 
often it both does not allow you to see things clearly and comes before 
circumstances have been grasped. A little earlier, he said ‘For emotions, when 
they are present, drive out reasoned thoughts (λογίσμους) and things that appear 
differently, forcefully urging one towards contrary acts.’” 
 Here, the sense of what may be translated simply as ‘thoughts’ (logismoi) is different. The 
thoughts that emotions drive away are not the same types of thoughts that are representations 
(noēseis). The noēsis is passively received, and here Chrysippus specifically discusses an emotion, 
which must involve active assent. However, the “opposite acts” (ἐναντίας πράξεις) seem to be 
opposite to what our chased away logismoi would proscribe. These reasoned thoughts would 
normally, if we make correct judgments, lead us towards correct actions. Emotions, however, no 
matter whether one has assented to good judgments, can overturn these judgments and make us act 
in the exact opposite way we normally would. 
 
Thought Processes in Origen 
 In the original Greek, we will see that Origen draws a distinction between noēseis, which 
are representations, and logismoi, which are involved in the case of true emotions.  
 To demonstrate this, I will closely examine examples in his corpus of the use of two 
different terms for “thought” in Greek: noēsis and logismos. Finally, a close reading of the 
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problematic sections of Peri Arkhōn 3.1-2 in light of Origen’s other works will illuminate whether 
there is in fact conflation between first movements and emotions. 
 As we saw, the distinction between different types of thought or mental processes (noēsis 
vs. logismos) is an important one in the Stoic framework, in particular when dealing with the line 
between pre-emotion and true emotion. The status of noēsis as a representation renders a thought 
not up to us. It would be prudent, then, to determine whether Origen’s thoughts similarly can be 
deemed representations, or whether thought has somehow blurred the boundary between pre-
emotion and emotion itself. 
 The noun noēsis shows up relatively infrequently in Origen’s works. The main meaning it 
seems to have is “comprehension” or “understanding”, and Origen usually uses it to describe 
knowledge of particular passages of scripture that could properly be understood as comprehension. 
He also distinguishes between utterance and noēsis: "Not because of the utterance but rather 
because of the force of the meaning.” (Οὐ κατὰ τὴν προφορὰν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ τῆς νοήσεως 
ἐπιτεταμένον).194 
 This usage parallels the Stoic usage of noēsis. Much like a representation imprints its object 
onto us through our sense perception, reading a passage of scripture can imprint its meaning onto 
us through the conceptions of our mind. Indeed, Origen himself makes the comparison between 
sense perception and perception through thought, noēsis, which is quite similar to Diogenes 
Laertius 7.49-51: 
διὸ οὐ καθάπαξ εἴρηκεν· «Θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν», ἀλλὰ μετὰ προσθήκης τῆς 
«Πώποτε», σημαινούσης χρονικόν τι, ἵν’ ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον· ὅσον χρόνον 
τὸ «Πώποτε» δύναται λέγεσθαι, ὡς σημαῖνόν τι ὑποκείμενον, ὁ νοῦς ἐμπέπραται 
τῇ ἐνύλῳ ζωῇ. διὸ ἰδεῖν τὸν θεὸν οὐ δύναται κατὰ προσβολὴν νοήσεως.  
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Origen frag. comm. in Joann. 13195 
 
“Therefore each time he said: ‘’No one has seen God’, but with the addition of 
‘ever’ as a temporal marker, then the meaning is the following: in as much as the 
word ‘ever’ can be said to be something assumed, the mind holds sway in 
material animals. Therefore not being able to see God is not being able to see him 
with a striking of a thought.”196 
 He draws a comparison between sight perception and perception facilitated through one’s 
mind, which he calls ‘the striking of a thought’ (προσβολὴν νοήσεως). To see someone is not to 
assent to any proposition about him; your sight is a product of the representation hitting you with 
an image of its object. In a like manner, perceiving someone through a noēsis does not require 
assent, since it is simply your mind being struck by a representation coded in thought. Indeed the 
language of striking (προσβολὴν) brings to mind the action of a representation striking the senses 
from the Stoic sources. 
 Noēseis, though appearing rather rarely in Origen, do appear to have the same semantic 
force in both Stoic sources and Origen. However, Origen uses another word that appears to 
undermine his strict adherence to the emotional framework laid out by the Stoics: logismos. 
Appearing much more often in Origen’s corpus, logismoi, although they can also be translated as 
“thoughts” in English (and, as we shall see, both noēsis and logismos are translated as cogitatio in 
Latin), should be distinguished from noēseis. We have seen above the relation of the word logismos 
and emotion in Origen’s Commentary on Jeremiah 5.9. There, emotions are said to lie “in our 
thoughts” (̌ἐν τῷ λογισμῷ ἡμῶν). If logismoi were thoughts in the same sense as noeseis, in that 
they happen to us and are thoughts which may not have been assented to, this would cause a bit of 
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confusion indeed, as the Stoic emotions are necessarily the result of an assent. In an interpretation 
of a line of scripture, however, Origen explicitly states that logismoi are judgments (κρίματά): "He 
loves the judgment of just men, whose thoughts are the judgments about which it is said: 'give a 
just judgment’." (Ἀγαπᾷ δὲ κρίσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαίων, ὧν οἱ λογισμοὶ κρίματά εἰσι, περὶ ὧν 
λέγεται· “Κρίμα δίκαιον κρίνατε.”) If we then read logismos as a judgment, a reading of Jer. 5.9 on 
Stoic lines makes sense. Emotions do consist of judgments, as we have already seen concisely put 
by Diogenes Laertius: “But it seems to them that the emotions are judgments” (δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὰ 
πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι). We may be better off thinking of logismoi as judgments than simply thoughts. 
Another indication of Origen’s consideration of logisimoi is that he describes God as hearing our 
prayers and overlooking our judgments (ἐφορᾶν τοὺς πάντων λογισμοὺς). He also mentions in this 
context that God hears our prayers. Origen seems to be making the point that in the same way that 
we direct prayers towards God, and hope for a positive result, we should similarly keep in mind 
that he also is aware of our judgments. We may similarly expect something in response to our 
judgments, perhaps positive or negative, depending on the correctness of these judgments. Without 
relying too heavily on an argument ex silentio, he does not indicate that God keeps track of our 
noēseis, which reinforces the notion that we cannot be held responsible for them. 
 Origen also makes a similar delineation between rational and irrational animals. He says of 
ants and bees that although they may seem to be acting rationally or thoughtfully (ἐπὶ λογικῶν 
τεταγμένα), are not, as they “do not act with judgment” (οὐ γὰρ σὺν λογισμῷ ποιοῦσι). This falls in 
line with the Stoic argument that non-rational animals react simply based on impulse and not with 
judgment. 
 Finally, in his Commentary on John 6.2.9 (PG v. 14), Origen presents a personal anecdote 
in which he uses his reason as the first line of defense against bad judgments: "... reason called me 
to stand up to the fight and to guard my commanding faculty, lest evil judgments be able to let 
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loose a storm in my soul ..." (...στῆναι μᾶλλόν με πρὸς τὸν ἀγῶνα παρεκάλει ὁ λόγος καὶ τηρῆσαι 
τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, μήποτε μοχθηροὶ λογισμοὶ ἐξισχύσωσι τὸν χειμῶνα καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μου 
ἐπεισαγαγεῖν...) The metaphorical use of unfavorable weather is reminiscent of his description of 
the emotions as ‘winds’. It is then likely that these bad judgments will stir up emotions if the mind 
is not protected from them. Once again the choice of the term logismos in this situation is telling. If 
left unchecked, noēseis pose no threat, any more than another type of representation is not up to us 
until there is an act of assent. Bad judgments, on the other hand, as we saw in Galen and Stobaeus 
examples of the disobedient horse and running downhill, though they may initially be obedient to 
reason, soon gain momentum and strength and are quite difficult, if not impossible, to stop. It is 
thus incorrect judgments, or assents to incorrect stimuli that must be guarded against. In Origen’s 
Greek, the various terms for thought demonstrate a consciousness about two different types of 
mental events. 
 In his analysis of the use of ὀργίζεσθε in Psalm 4:5 (“Be angry and do not sin”), Origen 
explains how being angry could not be a sin in the following way:  
Ὅσον ὀργίζεσθε καὶ συμβαίνει τοῦτο ὑμῖν οὐκ ἔχουσι πρὸς τοῦτο λογισμοὺς 
ἀλλὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτῶν μὴ προσθῆτε· ἀλλὰ τῷ συμβαίνοντι οὐ ψεκτῷ ψεκτόν τι μὴ 
ἀκολουθησάτω.  
Origen sel. ps. 4:5197 
 
“Insofar as you are angry, and this happens to you despite the fact that you don't 
have any judgments to pursue anger, do not pursue that which comes out of these 
things. Do not allow something blameworthy to come from what has happened 
that is not blameworthy.” 
 Origen’s explanation qualifies this use of being angry with ‘insofar as’, creating a 
difference between the true emotion of anger and what does not yet count fully as anger. This is 
further strengthened by the logismoi not being present if you are angry only in this very specific 
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and limited way. The distinction between what is blameworthy (feeling the real emotion of anger) 
and what is not (feeling some sort of anger but having not yet committed to it) parallels the 
distinction between first movements, which may resemble emotions in one way or another, but 
have not been assented to, and true emotions, which involve active assent. Origen cannot ignore 
that the psalmist wrote ὀργίζεσθε but makes a concerted effort to explain its presence using the 
Stoic framework. In doing so, he highlights the narrower semantic range that an emotional verb 
such as “to be angry” has in philosophical texts. The Psalms use vocabulary more loosely and in 
more common ways, whereas Origen seeks to define more precisely by borrowing and adapting 
useful emotional terminology from the Stoa. 
 
Types of Thought in Rufinus’ Translation 
 
 In Origen’s Greek, the various terms for thought demonstrate a consciousness about two 
different types of mental events (noēsis and logismos). However, the distinction collapses in the 
Latin translation, as both are rendered with the Latin term cogitatio. In one particularly telling 
example, Origen's commentary on the same quotation of scripture remains both in the original 
Greek of the Contra Celsum, as well the Latin translation of the Commentary on John (for which 
we do not have the Greek). The Greek text makes mention of logismoi: 
Οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ δίκαιοι πᾶσαν τὴν τῶν πολεμίων καὶ ἀπὸ κακίας 
ἐρχομένων «ζωγρίαν», ὡς μηδὲ νήπιον καὶ ἄρτι ὑποφυόμενον κακὸν 
καταλείπεσθαι. Ἡμεῖς οὕτως ἀκούομεν καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἑκατοστῷ καὶ τριακοστῷ καὶ 
ἕκτῳ ψαλμῷ ῥητοῦ, οὕτως ἔχοντος· «Θυγάτηρ Βαβυλῶνος ἡ ταλαίπωρος, 
μακάριος, ὃς ἀνταποδώσει σοι τὸ ἀνταπόδομά σου, ὃ ἀνταπέδωκας ἡμῖν 
μακάριος, ὃς κρατήσει καὶ ἐδαφιεῖ τὰ νήπιά σου πρὸς τὴν πέτραν.» «Νήπια» γὰρ 
«Βαβυλῶνος», ἑρμηνευομένης συγχύσεως, οἱ ἄρτι ὑποφυόμενοι 
καὶ ἀνατέλλοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἰσιν συγχυτικοὶ λογισμοὶ οἱ ἀπὸ κακίας· ὧν ὁ 
κρατῶν, ὡς καὶ τῷ στερεῷ καὶ εὐτόνῳ τοῦ λόγου προσρῆξαι αὐτῶν τὰς κεφαλάς, 
ἐδαφίζει «τὰ νήπια» τῆς «Βαβυλῶνος» «πρὸς τὴν πέτραν», γινόμενος διὰ τοῦτο 
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«μακάριος». 
Origen Contra cels. 7.22198 
 
“Thus also just men dedicate every ‘hostage' of their enemies which arise from 
evil so that they spare not even the children, that is the evil that is now growing. 
We thus understand also the meaning of the 137th Psalm: 'Daughter of Babylon, 
miserable one, he who gives back to you your due, what you have given to us, 
will be blessed, he who overpowers and dashes your little ones on the pavement.' 
For 'little ones of Babylon', which introduces some confusion, are the 
troublesome reasoned thoughts (λογισμοὶ) which grow and rise up in the soul out 
of sin: becoming master over them, strikes their heads with a firm and vigorous 
bit of reason, he beats 'the little ones of Babylon against the pavement, and it is 
for this reason that he is ‘blessed'.”199 
 
 The bad judgments are described as “growing” (ὑποφυόμενον), and “rising up” 
(ἀνατέλλοντες), a description that is reminiscent of growing emotional impulses which, once 
assented to, become excessive and uncontrollable. As we saw in Diogenes Laertius, once the horse 
becomes disobedient and you have assented to an unruly emotion, it becomes very difficult to stop. 
The violence of the reaction to these logismoi (striking, beating, a firm and vigorous reason) 
emphasizes the fact that they are very difficult to overcome with reason once they take hold. I do 
not believe these logismoi can be representations since they are said to arise from sin (ἀπὸ κακίας). 
Experiencing a representation cannot be sinful, nor, as we have seen, be indicative of experiencing 
a feeling, or the beginning of emotion. Sin occurs the moment we have assented. The λογισμοὶ οἱ 
ἀπὸ κακίας have already been assented to. Thus Origen holds fast to the distinction between 
noeseis, which do not involve assent, and logismoi, which do. 
 In the Latin translation, we find that logismoi have been rendered as cogitationes, and the 
terms used to describe their behavior seems to introduce some confusion about whether Origen 
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maintains the distinction between the different types of thought, and even more so how the 
philosophical terms are conflated in the Latin:  
Si enim efferuescit animus et conturbatur, etiamsi non implerverit opus, ipsa 
tamen perturbatio indecens est ei, qui sub Iesu militat duce. Similiter et de 
concupiscentiae vitio et de tristitiae ceterisque omnibus sentiendum est. De 
quibus cunctis ita agendum est discipulo Iesu, ut nihil omnino horum in eius 
corde ‘respiret’, ne forte, si parvi alicuius vitii aut consuetudo aut cogitatio 
‘relinquatur’ in corde, processu temporis convalescat et paulatim vires latitando 
conquirat atque ad ultimum revocet nos ‘ad vomitum nostrum’ et ‘fiant hominis 
illius’ cui hoc acciderit, ‘novissima peiora prioribus’. Hoc erat, quod et propheta 
prospiciens in psalmis praemonet dicens: ‘beatus, qui tenet et allidit parvulos 
tuos ad petram,' ‘Babylonis,' scilicet ‘parvulos,' qui nulli allii intelliguntur, nisi 
‘cogitationes malae’ quae cor nostrum confundunt et conturbant. Hoc enim 
interpretatur Babylon. Quae cogitationes, dum adhuc parvulae sunt et initia 
habent, ‘tenendae sunt et allidendae ad petram,' qui est ‘Christus’ et ipso iubente 
iugulandae, ut ‘nihil’ in nobis ‘resideat, quod respiret.' Sicut ergo ibi beatum est 
‘Babylonis parvulos tenere et allidere ad petram’ et ‘cogitationes malas’ statim 
in initiis necare. 
Rufinus comm in Jos 15.3200 
"If indeed the soul rages and is disturbed, even if the work is not complete, 
nevertheless the disturbance itself is unbecoming for the one who marches under 
the leadership of Jesus. We must think similarly about the vice of desire and 
sadness and all the others. With respect to all the others, we must act as Jesus’ 
follower, so that nothing of these things ever ‘breathes’ in his heart, lest by 
chance, if the experience or thought of a small vice ‘remains' in his heart, through 
the passing of time it will grow and little by little it will grow stronger in hiding 
and ultimately it will recall us "to our disgust' and ‘they will become part of that 
man' to whom this happened: "novel things which are worse than before.' This 
was what the prophet was predicting when he warned [us] in the psalms, saying 
‘Blessed is he who takes and dashes his little ones onto the pavement', certainly 
‘little ones of Babylon', which can be understood as nothing else than ‘bad 
thoughts' which agitate our heart and throw it into distress. This is indeed the 
meaning of Babylon. Moreover, these thoughts, while they are still small and in 
their beginnings, ‘must be taken and dashed onto the pavement’ and they must be 
killed under his order, that is to say, ‘Christ,' so that ‘nothing remains which 
breathes’ in us. Therefore, he is happy who ‘takes the little ones of Babylon and 
dashes them into the pavement' and immediately kills ‘bad thoughts.'” 
 
While the basic explanation is the same, we find instead of the cogitationes described as 
growing out of control and rising up; they are instead “small and in their beginnings” (parvulae 
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sunt et initia habent). This language mimics Seneca's first movements. However, the emphasis on 
beginnings is not present in the Greek. Similarly, the soul and heart of the person undergoing these 
bad thoughts are being acted upon in the above Latin. The soul is described as “disturbed” 
(conturbatur) and the bad thoughts “agitate and “throw” the heart “into confusion” (confundunt et 
conturbant). The soul as the subject of a passive verb and the heart as the object acted upon by 
these thoughts again points to an interpretation in line with Seneca’s pre-emotion. The thoughts 
seem to have the agency here, and act upon our souls and hearts without consent. It is 
understandable, then, if one were to read both the Latin and the Greek descriptions of this same 
passage of scripture, that she would find them inconsistent. In the Greek text, the metaphorical 
language points towards a parallel for the Stoic emotional impulse, and thus makes it clear that 
these logismoi have been assented to. On the other hand, in the Latin, the vocabulary changes, 
bringing to mind Seneca's first movements, and the person who must dash the Babylonian infants 
changes from active subject to passive object, further emphasizing that no assent has occurred. 
 
Analysis of Target Text Only 
 
 Unfortunately, in the case of Origen, we often are left only with the Latin translation. 
However, given what we know about the existing Greek of Origen, we can still make some 
analysis of a Latin translation in order to give some indication of the process of translation. 
Furthermore, we can follow Venuti's example when dealing only with the translated version of the 
text and examine it for internal inconsistencies or irregularities. For example, if we take the 
following problematic passage in Rufinus' translation of the Peri Arkhōn, we can determine some 
of the factors present in Rufinus' translation process. Rufinus' translation begins 3.2.4 by saying: 
Cogitationes quae de corde nostro procedunt, vel memoria quorumeumque 
gestorum, vel quarumlibet rerum causarumque contemplatio, invenimus quod 
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aliquoties ex nobis ipsis procedant, aliquoties a contrariis virtutibus concitentur; 
interdum etiam a Deo, vel a sanctis angelis immittantur. 
Rufinus de princip 3.2.4201 
“We find that thoughts which proceed from our heart, whether they are a memory 
of deeds we have done or a contemplation of any things or causes whatsoever, 
sometimes proceed from ourselves, sometimes are aroused by the opposing 
powers, and occasionally also are implanted in us by God or by the holy angels.” 
 
 The species of cogitationes being described here are ones that come from the heart. These 
thoughts sometimes come “from ourselves”, and other times are “aroused” or “implanted” by 
outside powers (whether good or evil). Already the fact that thoughts can both come from our own 
heart (seeming to indicate agency) and be implanted by outside powers (a description more fitting 
to a representation) may appear irreconcilable -- how can these types thoughts both come from 
inside us and be implanted? To complicate matters further, the same types of thoughts are later said 
to be “suggested to the heart”: 
Nihil tamen aliud putandum est accidere nobis ex ipsis quae cordi nostro 
suggeruntur bonis vel malis, nisi commotionem solam et incitamentum 
provocans, nos vel ad bona vel ad mala. Possibile autem nobis est cum maligna 
virtus coeperit ad malum incitare, abiicere a nobis pravus suggestiones, et 
resistere suasionibus pessimis, et nihil prorsus culpabiliter gerere. 
Rufinus de princip 3.2.4202 
“Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that nothing else happens to us from these 
things [thoughts from 3.2.4 above] which are suggested to our heart, whether 
good or bad, except provoking a movement and inclination, whether it be 
towards good or evil. It is possible for us, however, when an evil power begins to 
incite us to evil, to cast away the bad suggestions from us, and to resist against 
the worst of persuasions, and ultimately to do nothing blameworthy.” 
 
 That thoughts are said to be suggested, and that they are said to “happen to us” (accidere 
nobis) but not arise from our hearts is more in line with Seneca’s pre-emotion. We also see the idea 
of “beginning” (coeperit). Note also that the voice changes to make us the active agents when we 
                                                      
201 Crouzel, H. (1978). Traité des principes. Paris: Cerf. 
202 Ibid. 
 
130 
cast away the bad suggestions (abiicere a nobis pravus suggestiones). These passages set up all 
types of thoughts, no matter their origin, or whether we have assented to them, as the setting of a 
battleground to fight off temptation. As we will see in the next chapter, this emphasis on the 
battling of evil thoughts is prevalent in Evagrius’ works. 
 Given the inconsistency between these two closely connected translations, combined with 
Rufinus' other confusions (whether intentional or not), it seems that the confounding of the doctrine 
did not occur in Origen's Greek, but rather in the process of translation.  
 
Conclusions on Types of Thoughts 
 Origen borrows Stoic terminology when discussing different types of thoughts: the noēsis, a 
type of thought for which we are not ourselves responsible, and logismos, a thought that we have 
accepted and must take responsibility for. In Latin, both of these terms are translated as cogitatio. 
This dramatically changes the meaning of the text. In conflating thoughts that are our responsibility 
and those that are not, Rufinus not only makes a big change in Origen’s doctrine on thought, but 
also weakens Origen’s emphasis on free will. Rufinus’ Latin allows for thoughts to be implanted 
into our head for which we must be responsible, and which we must battle in order to overcome. 
However, this circumvents our free will to choose and decide which thoughts to accept
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Conclusions 
 
 In the process of translation, the signs of revised and adapted Platonic and Stoic narratives 
are left behind at the border crossing and the result on the other side is that there is a discontinuity 
between the emphasis on the importance of free will and the weakened agency a person has over 
his thoughts. Thus, Rufinus’ translation limits the agency a person has over her thoughts, and 
thereby downgrades her free will as well. 
The obvious outcome is that resulting texts no longer exhibit the symptoms of philosophical 
influence. But there is a further consequence as well: the philosophical purging of the texts disrupts 
the delicate balance and artistry of Origen’s original Greek, thus conflating Origen’s own doctrine. 
As we will see in the next chapter, the portrayal of battling implanted demonic thoughts comes 
from Evagrius’ works. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
In Foreign Lands 
Evagrius’ works as accessory texts and their infiltration into Origen through Rufinus 
 
 
In this chapter, I will explore a model for some of Rufinus' translation choices: Evagrius. I 
will use Marianne Pade’s observation that Guarino made Homer Roman through the use of an 
accessory text (as discussed in Chapter One) as a starting point for the investigation. Where 
Guarino Guarini brought Homer into Latin through the lens of Vergil, I will show that Rufinus 
likewise brought Origen into Latin through the lens of Evagrius. Positing the works of Evagrius as 
accessory texts utilized by Rufinus, this chapter will present the influence of Evagrius' work as an 
important piece of Rufinus' translation practices with respect to the psychology of “sinful” thought. 
 
Evagrius’ Works as Accessory Texts 
 
In Chapter One, I defined an “accessory text” as a third text used by the translator with the 
purpose of strengthening or supplementing the target language text, or simply as an aid in the 
translation process. The range of potential accessory texts is wide: from simple lexica to 
commentaries on the text to be translated. Each accessory text has an inevitable effect on the 
translation process, as using a variety of accessory texts in the process of translation equates to 
adding a variety of small outside influences on the text. The text thus has many authors and many 
sources acting on it. I also demonstrated in Chapter One an example of accessory text use as 
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pointed out by Danish scholar Marianne Pade. Pade examined Guarino Guarini’s fifteenth-century 
translation method in the case of a Hymn of Homer. She demonstrated that in his translation of the 
Hymn from Greek into Latin, Guarino used Vergilian sentiments and even quoted Vergil himself in 
the Latin Homeric verse translation. Guarino made Homer Roman through the use of an accessory 
text, bringing Homer into Latin through the lens of Vergil. In this chapter, I will argue that Rufinus 
likewise brought Origen into Latin through the lens of Evagrius. 
 The chapter begins with a presentation of relevant information about Evagrius and his 
relationship to both Rufinus and Origen, thereby providing the basis for my claim that Rufinus’ 
translation practices reflected the psychological theories of Evagrius. Next, I follow the journey of 
the soul in Rufinus' translations: its descent into body and subsequent struggles with sinful thought. 
I compare Rufinus' text with Evagrius' to demonstrate where Rufinus' alterations bring Origen's 
thoughts in line with the Evagrian model, both conceptually and stylistically. In this way, I will 
argue that Rufinus was standardizing the Christian corpus, and bringing two controversial figures, 
Origen and Evagrius, not only closer to each other but closer to the sentimentalities of his Christian 
readers. This will not only shed light on inconsistencies between the Greek and Latin of Origen's 
works but also serve to highlight Rufinus as a creator and interpreter in his own right. 
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Consequences of Evagrius as Accessory Text 
 
As I will demonstrate, Evagrius is not concerned with distinguishing between different 
types of thoughts. For him, there is the logismos, and it will tempt you, both in its good and evil 
incarnations. He puts great emphasis on fighting the logismos when it arises, as well as a concern 
over whether one allows evil thoughts to linger and take hold in your soul. On the one hand, there 
are some apparent similarities to Origen's Stoic formulation, namely that one should analyze a 
thought, wherever it should arise, and prevent evil thoughts from taking hold by resisting them. 
However, the role that the logismos plays in Evagrius is more in line with Seneca’s propatheia than 
the reasoned logismoi in Origen. Origen's Greek is careful to distinguish that there are phantasia-
type thoughts (noēseis), as well as thoughts that have been rationally assented to (logismoi). 
Further, Origen discusses emotions as having beginnings as well, in a state in which it is possible to 
reject them. Neither logismoi nor noēseis are, in Origen's model, a type of pre-emotion. Because 
the confusion in Origen’s doctrine arises only in the Latin translations of his work, I believe that it 
is more fruitful to treat these as a translator’s interpretation of Origen, one that I will demonstrate 
was heavily influenced by Rufinus’ personal and professional relationship with Evagrius. 
Evagrius suffuses the logismos itself with slightly more agency, as if the presence of a 
thought represents the first line of battle for the integrity of the self, and the battle itself determines 
the whether a sin has been committed. Rufinus’ innovations are a remediation of the meaning of 
thinking as such in the context of Christian eschatology, contemplation, and asceticism. Both 
Rufinus and Evagrius emphasize battling the logismos in order to avoid sin. 
We can see evidence of Rufinus relying on Evagrius’ psychological models throughout the 
journey of the soul, which I will demonstrate. However, the focus of this chapter will be on 
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Evagrius’ unique use of logismos and Rufinus’ infusion of this Evagrian logismos into Origen’s 
work. 
 
Evagrius’ Life, Work, and Connections 
 
 Born in 345, Evagrius belonged to a well-connected Christian family with ties to Basil the 
Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and Macrina the Younger.203 According to a letter from Gregory of 
Nazianzus to Evagrius’ father, the young Evagrius was studying under Gregory in 359.204 At the 
time, Gregory was working with Basil to build an volume of excerpts from Origen, now known as 
the Philokalia. (Not to be confused with the Philokalia from Mt Athos in which some of Evagrius’ 
writings have been preserved. I will follow Casiday in referring to the former as the “Cappadocian 
Philokalia, and the latter as the Athonite Philokalia.). When Basil died in 379, Evagrius left 
Cappadocia and went to Constantinople to join Gregory. In 382, he traveled to Palestine, where he 
was hosted in Jerusalem by Melania, who was supervising a monastery on the Mount of Olives 
along with Rufinus.205 
 
 
 
                                                      
203 For an overview of Evagrius’ life and works, see Konstantinovsky, Julia (2009) Evagrius 
Ponticus: The Making of a Gnostic, Farnham: Ashgate, Casiday (2013: 1-27), P. Rousseau 
(1994:1-26), Basil of Caesarea Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. The date of 345 is 
posited by Casiday (2013). 
204 Gregory of Nazianzus (1894), Letter 6 Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2nd series Oxford: 
Parker, VII: 437-82 
205 Palladius, Lausiac History 38.3-7. See also F.X. Murphy (1945), Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411): 
His Life and Works. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press. 
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Translations of Evagrius 
 Evagrius’ writings appear to have been quite widely known and read, thanks in part to the 
Latin translations that Rufinus made of his work.206 He was not immune to charges of Origenism 
due to his close connections with the Cappadocian Philokalia project, however. Much of his work 
ceased to be transmitted in Greek. These works survive in Syriac and Armenian versions. These 
translations are undoubtedly quite important in their own right. As Casiday rightfully 
acknowledges, they offer us an opportunity to understand more about Evagrius’ thought than we 
otherwise would be able to.207 They have also helped scholars identify some Greek texts which had 
previously been attributed to another author.208 Nevertheless, Casiday also admits in the same 
breath that the translations provide access “at a linguistic remove”. Given that the spirit of this 
dissertation is to shed proper light on the entire process of translation, with a focus on Rufinus as 
the translator, it would be disingenuous to include linguistic analysis of translated works. I caution 
scholars not to use Rufinus’ translations as a substitute for Origen’s thought (in particular when 
dealing with sensitive linguistic nuances such as those present in philosophical terminology). 
Therefore, a fuller analysis of the translation process of Evagrius’ texts would be necessary before 
they could be used to represent Evagrius’ thought in this dissertation. This sort of in-depth analysis 
is outside the scope of a project whose focus is on the translator Rufinus. In some limited cases, 
                                                      
206 See Jerome Ep. 133.3, in which he laments that Evagrius is widely read not only in the East but 
the West, quoted in full below.  
207 Casiday (2013:1). 
208 Some manuscripts have been attributed to Nilus of Ancyra. However, scholars have identified 
many of these as being authored by Evagrius. On this topic, I stand by the consensus of the 
Evagrian scholarship and only rely on texts which are agreed to have been authored by Evagrius 
himself, even if they were at erroneously attributed at one point to Nilus. For a more in-depth 
discussion on how and why these texts were attributed to Nilus, see Dysinger, L. (2005:22-
30). Psalmody and prayer in the writings of Evagrius Ponticus. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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surviving translations of Evagrius’ works will be used to represent Evagrius’ overall doctrines. 
However, because of the aforementioned “linguistic” remove, they will not be used in direct 
comparison with Rufinus’ translations. 
 
“An Origenism of an Original Type” 
 Evagrius had many connections to Origenism. He traveled to Jerusalem in 382, where he 
spent time with Rufinus and Melania the Elder. He continued a correspondence with both of them 
for the duration of his life. After Jerusalem, he went on to study in Egypt under Macarius of 
Alexandria.209 
Evagrius was connected to other Origen sympathizers, such as Melania, and the bishop 
John of Jerusalem (see his letters 2, 9, 24, 50, 51). According to Gabriel Bunge,210 Evagrius’ Great 
Letter was addressed to Melania, and his On Prayer was written for Rufinus himself.211 
 Additionally, Jon F. Dechow links Evagrius with yet more leading Origenist figures: Tall 
Brothers Ammonius, Euthymius, Dioscorus, and Eusebius. Most scholars view Evagrius in the 
light of Origen and see him as systematizing and expanding upon Origen's thoughts.212 Dechow213 
has explicitly traced Evagrius' Origenist influence to the Cappadocians. Origen himself certainly 
                                                      
209 See Ramelli (2013:7): Macarius the Egyptian "was converted to asceticism by St. Antony (an 
Origeian), founded Scetis, and was, like Origen, Antony, and Evagrius himself, a supporter of the 
doctrine of apokatastasis, or universal restoration." 
210 Evagrios Pontikos (2013: 176-206). Briefe aus der Wüste Beuroner Kunstvlg 
211 Cf. A. Guillaumont (1962: 47-77), Les ‘Kephalaia Gnostika' d'Èvagre le Pontique, Patristica 
Sorbonesia, v, 1962: ‘les relations d'Èvagre avec les Origénistes de son temps,' especially p. 69 n. 
92, on the possibility that Rufinus is the addressee of Evagrius' Letter 22, and p. 71-3 on the 
“Evagrian” character of Rufinus' alterations to the Greek translating the Historia Monachorum. 
212 A notable exception to this is Gabriel Bunge, who argues for distancing Evagrius from the 
assumption of influence from Origen. See ‘Origenismus-Gnostizimus, zum geistesgeschichtlichen 
Standort des Evagrios Pontikos’ 25-7. 
213 Dechow (1988: 177). Dogma and Mysticism in Early Christianity: Epiphanius of Cyprus and 
the Legacy of Origen. Mercer Univ Press. 
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had a direct connection with the Cappadocians, as St Gregory Thaumaturgus, one of Origen's 
disciples and his close friend, was the teacher of Macrina the Elder, Basil's grandmother.214  
Jon F. Dechow is likely correct in his assertion that Evagrius was familiar with Origen 
through the Cappadocian Philokalia, but as Julia Konstantinovsky contends, Evagrius’ type of 
Origenism was not the same as that found in the Philokalia. Evagrius is not using material which 
the Cappadocians valued and included in the Philokalia. I assume that, as Konstantinovsky puts it, 
“If Evagrius was an Origenist, his was an Origenism of an original type.”215 The purpose of 
examining Evagrius’ texts will not be to trace the influence of Origen himself, but rather to point 
out thematic and stylistic differences between Origen and Evagrius, and how Rufinus served to 
smooth out these differences in translation.  
 
Evagrius and the Origenist Controversy 
 
Evagrius is mentioned for the first time as a leading Origenist in Jerome’s Letter 133: 
qui librum quoque scripsit quasi de monachis multosque in eo enumerat, qui 
numquam fuerunt et quos fuisse describit Origenistas et ab episcopis damnatos 
esse non dubium est, Ammonium videlicet et Eusebium et Euthymium et ipsum 
Evagrium, Or quoque et Isidorum et multos alios… unum Iohannem in ipsius 
libri posuit principio, quem et catholicum et sanctum fuisse non dubium est, ut 
per illius occasionem certeros, quos posuerat hereticos, ecclesiae introduceret. 
Jerome, Letter 133.3.6-7216 
“He has also written a book which professes to be about monks and includes in it 
many who were never monks at all whom he declares to have been Origenists, 
and who have certainly been condemned by the bishops. I mean Ammonius, 
Eusebius, Euthymius, Evagrius himself, Horus, Isidorus, and many others whom 
it would be tedious to enumerate. the first he posits in his books was Johannes, 
who was undoubtedly both a Catholic and a Saint so that on his occasion he 
introduced others who had been declared heretics.” 
                                                      
214 Konstantinovsky (2009: 21). 
215 Ibi, p. 20. 
216 CSEL 56, p. 250-51. 
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Of the 15 anathemas against Origen declared at the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553, 1, 2, 
3, 4, on the topic of protology, and 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 on eschatology, reflect some of Evagrius’ 
thoughts, especially as laid out in the Kephalaia Gnostika. Additionally, 6, 7, 8, and 9 could be 
attributed to Evagrius’ Christology in the Kephalaia Gnostika.217 Evagrius' name is not explicitly 
mentioned in Justinian’s 553 anti-Origenist condemnations, but according to Guillaumont, it is 
very likely that his works were a direct influence on the anti-Origen positions in the 
condemnations.218 In any case, at the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553, Justinian condemned 
Evagrius individually (in addition to Origen and Didymus). On the other hand, A.M. Casiday 
points out:  
…whether one thinks Evagrius' theology provoked the First Origenist 
Controversy is in large measure a consequence of whether one thinks that his 
theology was exceptionally unusual in the context of late fourth-century Egypt 
(not to mention whether one thinks Evagrius had enough clout to stir up such an 
intense reaction). 
 
Thus, it cannot be certain that Evagrius' writings were a primary source in the writing of the 
condemnations. In fact, it is not necessary to approach this study of Evagrius, Rufinus, and Origen 
from the standpoint of dwelling on the Origenist controversy, nor from the view of the 
Cappadocian influence. It is beyond dispute that Evagrius drew inspiration from Origen, as well as 
Gregory and Basil, with whom he studied personally. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
217 On the attribution of the 553 anathemas, see Refoulé, (1961: 221–266) ‘La christiologie 
d'Évagre.'  Orientalia Christiana Periodica 27. 
218 See Guillaumont, A. (1962). Les "Képhalaia gnostica" d'Évagre le Pontique et l'histoire de  
l'origénisme chez les Grecs et chez les Syriens. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 
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Evagrius and Rufinus 
Jerome describes Rufinus as Evagrius’ “disciple”.219 Besides being engaged in translating 
Evagrius’ work into Latin, Rufinus also held correspondence with him for much of their lives.220 
As for Rufinus’ translations of Evagrius, there are two surviving texts: a set of maxims for monks, 
as well as one for a virgin. However, as Caroline Hammond (1996) points out, Jerome’s letter to 
Ctesiphon implies that Rufinus made many more translations of his friend Evagrius’ work: 
scribit ad virgines, scribit ad monachos, scribit ad eam, cuius nomen nigredinis 
testatur perfidiae tenebras, edidit librum et sententias περὶ ἀπαθείας huius libros 
per orientem Graecos et interpretante discipulo eius Rufino Latinos plerique in 
occidente lectitant. 
Jerome, Ep. 133.3221 
“He writes For Virgins, he writes For Monks, and he writes to the woman whose 
name of darkness invokes the gloom of treachery; he produced a book and 
maxims On Detachment, the Greek books of which people eagerly read 
throughout the east, and, thanks to the translation by his disciple Rufinus, many 
people often read the Latin versions in the west.” 
Scholars have argued that the agenda behind Rufinus' translations of Evagrius is very 
similar to his agenda when translating Origen: he was creating a body of Christian literature that 
would align with the developing orthodoxy Justinian established in 553. However, since Rufinus 
and Evagrius were close friends, his motivations are compounded: they become more personal. As 
Caroline Hammond, puts it: “No doubt Rufinus was not only satisfying contemporary interest but 
also aiming to win sympathy for his own particular friends.”222 Thus, Rufinus' personal connection 
                                                      
219 See Jerome Ep. 133.3, quoted below. 
220 See G. Bunge, Evagrios Pontikos: Briefe asunder Wüste, Sophia, 24 (Trier: Paulinus, 1986), 
176-207. As Sinkewicz (2000:133) points out: ‘Unfortunately, very few of the attributions 
[Bunge’s] can be made with certainty.’ Nevertheless, there was at least some correspondence 
between the two men, in addition to the Rufinus’ extensive translation project. 
221 CSEL lvi, p. 246. 
222 Hammond, C. (1996: 395). She goes on to clarify: "It is likely that the translations of Evagrius 
were made in the same connection, with the aim of popularizing the brand of Egyptian 
monasticism which Rufinus favored. Evagrius was not only a major ascetic writer and friend of 
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with Evagrius undoubtedly had a powerful influence not only on his translations of Evagrius but, as 
I will argue in this chapter, also on his translations of Origen.  
As I will demonstrate, Rufinus’ translations of Origen were heavily influenced by his 
personal and professional relationship with Evagrius, the evidence of which can be seen by 
comparing the Rufinus’ translations of Origen with the texts of Evagrius.223 While there are only 
scant extant translations that Rufinus made of Evagrius’ works, the comparison of Evagrius’ Greek 
with Rufinus’ Latin translations of Origen will also prove to be a fruitful investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Melania and Rufinus, but he was also a prominent member of the group of Origenist monks, only 
escaping persecution with them by his timely death in 399."  
223 Both Toth (2009), and Guillaumont (1962) have also pointed out particular Evagrian influences 
in Rufinus' translations, specifically in the Historia Monachorum in Aegypto (HMA). Toth 
analyzes, in particular, the prevalence of the phrase quae sunt scientiam in Rufinus' Latin 
translation of the HMA, which is inconsistent with the Greek version of the text whi 
ch has the simpler τῆς τῶν ἄλλῶν ἁπάντων γνώσεὠ. He traces Rufinus' translation back to Evagrius 
due to the prevalence of the phrase quae sunt scientiam when referring to things one can learn 
when getting to know God.  
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Evagrius’ Works 
 
Central to this investigation will be the trilogy of Praktikos,224 Gnostikos,225 and Kephalaia 
Gnostika.226 These three present an overview of Evagrius’ thought. .227 The Praktikos focuses on 
the practical stage of the ascetic struggle, the Gnostikos on the spiritual and contemplative part, and 
the Kephalaia Gnostika is a survey of Evagrius’ epistemology. Although the Kephalaia Gnostika 
only exists in its entirety in Syriac translation, there are also extant Greek excerpts, which will be 
utilized in this examination.228 
Further Evagrian texts which have been preserved in a Greek manuscript shall be studied, in 
particular those in which he discusses thoughts. These are the To Eulogios, De octo spiritibus 
malitiae, and the Peri Logismou. The Eulogios presents a case of how to judge thoughts, while the 
latter two texts are primarily about battling the temptation of thoughts, the De octo spiritibus 
malitiae being a more fundamental type of manual, and the Peri Logismou a more advanced 
manual for practitioners. 
                                                      
224 A. and C. Guillaumont (1971), Traite pratique ou le Moine, Paris. SC 170. 
225 A. and C. Guillaumont (1989), Le Gnostiaue ou celui qui est devenu digne de la science, Paris 
SC 356. 
226 Unfortunately, the entire work has only been preserved in Syriac, in two manuscripts, (S1) and 
(S2). There exist also some fragments in the original Greek, which will be referred to in due 
course. In his French translation, Guillaumont does deem the Syriac translation as faithful to the 
original. See Guillaumont, Les six Centuries des Kephalai Gnostika d'Evagre le Pontique, PO 28.1, 
No. 134 (Paris, 1958). Given the nature of this dissertation and its ultimate aims, no assumptions 
will be made about the faithfulness of the Syriac translation, and the scarce Greek manuscripts will 
be points of reference whenever possible.  
227 For a full chronology of Evagrius’ works, see Dysinger, Psalmody and Prayer, 22-30. 
228 These were edited by Hausherr (1939:229-33) ‘Nouveaux fragments grecs d’Evagre le 
Pontique’, OCP 5; Muyldermans (1933:, 74, 85, 89, 93) ‘Á Travers le Tradition d’Evagre le 
Pontique’, Bibliothéque du Muséon 3 Louvain; Muyldermans (1931: 38-44), ‘Evagriana. Extrait de 
la revue Le Muséon, vol. 42, augementé de nouveaux fragments grecs inédits’Paris; and Géhin 
(1996: 59-85), ‘Evagriana d’un Manuscript Basilien, (Vaticanus Gr. 2028; olim Basilianus 67)’, le 
Muséon 109. 
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The Journey 
 
Steps 1 and 2: The Descent of the Soul and Free Will  
The descent of the intellect to soul and further into its embodied state is a central tenet of 
Evagrius’ thought. He mentions the fall in the Letter to Melania 26. He first explains the intellect 
falling to become a soul, then entering a body and finally in the end rising up to become an intellect 
again. While this letter is no longer extant in the original Greek, we see the concept of the descent 
of the intellect descending into embodiment and being called by different names at each stage of 
the descent both in the Letter to Melania 26 and the Kephalaia Gnostika 3.28. The emphasis on the 
intellect in its various stages only being named a body or named a soul,229 rather than becoming is 
also directly reflected in Rufinus' translation of Origen, as we already saw in Chapter Two: 
Ὥσπερ σῶσαι ἦλθεν τὸ ἀπολωλὸς' ὁ σωτήρ, ὅτε µέντοι σῴζεται τὸ ἀπολωλός, 
οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἀπολωλός· οὕτως ἣν σῶσαι ἦλθε ψυχήν, ὡς σῶσαι τὸ ἀπολωλός, 
οὐκέτι µένει ψυχὴ ἡ σωθεῖσα ψυχή. Ἔτι βασανιστέον εἰ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀπολωλὸς ἦν 
ὅτε οὐκ ἀπολώλει καὶ ἔσται ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἔσται ἀπολωλός, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἦν 
ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ψυχὴ καὶ ἔσται ὅτε οὐκ ἔσται ψυχή.  
Origen, Peri Arkhōn, 2.8.3230 
“Just as the savior came to save what was lost, when he saved that which was 
lost, it was no longer lost. Thus, he came to save the soul, to save what was lost. 
And thus, the saved soul was no longer a soul… the intellect, when falling, 
became the soul and the soul, when formed again in virtues, will become the 
intellect again.” 
 
It is possible that Rufinus had used the distinctly Evagrian method for describing the descent of the 
intellect into soul and body when he was translating Origen's strikingly similar (but by no means 
                                                      
229 See also KG 3.28: A soul is an intellect that, in its carelessness, has fallen from Unity, and, due 
to its lack of vigilance, has descended to the order of praktike. Here Evagrius is also following 
Origen by using an etymology of the soul, psyche, deriving from the word psychsis, meaning to 
cool. Thus as the nous descends from the Good, it cools and becomes the soul.  
230 frag 21, Koetschau, from Justinian Ep. ad Menam. 
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identical) passage. Where Origen speaks of actually becoming something different at each stage, 
both Evagrius (as evidenced by the Letter to Melania and Kephalaia Gnostika) and Rufinus’ 
translations of Origen emphasize that the different stages of descent are simply a matter of 
nomenclature. 
Monica Tobon has suggested that, in fact, for Evagrius the intellect has not descended 
entirely, and this can explain the idea of simply being “called” something else, and not becoming 
something new in the process of descent: “The nous remains a nous even as it becomes 
(additionally) a soul and a body; that is, that a part of it remains undescended in the contemplative 
union with God that it hitherto enjoyed in toto,” (Tobon, “Raising Body and Soul”, 53).  
 Besides the change of name in the process of descent, the reason for the descent as 
neglectfulness or idleness became a powerful tenet in later Christian thought. It was represented as 
one of the eight evil thoughts in Evagrius, as we shall see. Ilaria Ramelli notes that the neglectful 
nature231 that causes the fall of the intellect is also stressed in Origen, though the passages in 
question that stress this are Rufinus’ translations: 
In quo utique pro motibus suis unaquaeque mens vel amplius vel parcius bonum 
neglegens in contrarium boni, quod sine dubio malum est, trahebatur. 
Rufinus, De Principiis 2.9.2 
 “Every intellectual being, neglecting the Good to a greater or lesser extent due to 
its own movements, was dragged to the opposite of the Good, that is, evil.” 
                                                      
231 Ramelli (2013: 51). She also points us to more on the logismos of akhdia: Siegfried Wenzel, 
“Akhdia: Additions to Lampe’s Patristic Greek Lexicon,” VC 17 [1963]: 173-76). See also Rüdiger 
Augst, Lebensverwirklichung und christlicher Glaube, Acedia, religiöse Gleichgüldichkeit als 
Problem dear Spiritualität bei Evagrius Ponticus (Frankfurt: Lang, 1990); Christoph Joest, “Die 
Bedeutung von Akedia und Apatheia bei Evagrios Pontikos,” StudMon 35 (1993): 7-53; Barbara 
Maier, “Apatheia be den Stoikern und Akedia bei Evagrios Pontikos: Ein Ideal und die Kehrseite 
seiner Realität,” OrChr 78 (1994): 230-49; R. Pereto Rivas, “Evagrio Póntico y la exclaustración de 
la acedia,” Car 28 (2012): 23-35; and Siegfried Wenzel, The Sin of Sloth: Acedia in Medieval 
Thought and Literature (Chapel Hill: University Of Northern Carolina Press, 2012). 
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Libertas unumquemque uoluntatis suae uel ad profectum per imitationem Dei 
prouocavit uel ad defectum per neglegentiam traxit. 
Rufinus, De Principiis 2.9.6 
“Freedom of will either roused each one to progress by means of the imitation of 
God or dragged each one to deficiency due to neglectfulness,”232  
Thus, I would exercise caution when attributing the emphasis on neglect behind the fall of 
the soul to Origen without any evidence in the Greek text, especially given the potential infiltration 
of Evagrius’ thought in Rufinus’ Latin. 
Examining Rufinus' translation of Origen in isolation, as in Chapter Two, can illustrate the 
stylistic changes Rufinus made to the text but does not provide an explanation for why he made the 
alterations. Seen in the context of the Evagrian hierarchical system, however, the story of Rufinus' 
translation has more clarity. Evagrius' conception of the intellect being named for the different 
stages of its descent, rather than becoming something else as it descends, as we see in Origen, is 
reflected in Rufinus' translations. It is also possible that the idea of neglectfulness, one of the eight 
evil thoughts in Evagrius’ work, has also infiltrated Origen through Rufinus’ translation process. 
The following sections will delve deeper into an understanding of the Evagrian logismos, its 
connection with sin, and how Rufinus’ translations read thoughts in Origen through the lens of 
Evagrius. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
232 Texts and translations found in Ramelli (2013: 52). See also de princip. 1.4.1, 1.6.2, and PArch 
2.8.3, all of which discuss the neglectfulness as a reason for the fall of the soul, and all of which 
exist only in Latin translation. 
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Steps 3 and 4: Emotion and Embodied Thoughts 
 
Classification of Thoughts 
 Evagrius solidified in his work that there are three categories of thought: angelic, human, 
and demonic. After much spiritual exercise and gaining self-awareness, the monk could distinguish 
these three types of thoughts: 
Τῶν ἀγγελικων λογισμῶν, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν ἐκ δαιμόνων ταύτην τὴν 
διαφορὰν μετὰ πολλῆς τῆς παρατηρήσεως ἐγνώκαμεν εἰναι. 
Peri Logismou 8233 
“After lengthy observation, we have learned to recognize this difference between 
angelic and human thoughts, and those that come from the demons.”234 
 The angelic thoughts were a result of contemplation, focused on the realities of the natural 
world and their ultimate principles or logoi, as well as symbols in the spiritual realm. Thoughts that 
are implanted into the human soul by demons seem to be designed solely to invoke human emotion 
in the practical world. Human thoughts fall somewhere in between the angelic and divine, showing 
the intellect the forms of reality around it, without any emotion or deep contemplation.235  
                                                      
233 SC 438, 79.1209a. 
234 Translations of the Greek corpus of Evagrius are taken from Evagrius., Sinkewicz, R. E. (2003). 
Evagrius of Pontus: the Greek ascetic corpus. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
235 See also: Τῷ δαιμονιώδει λογισμῷ τρεῖς ἀντίκεινται λογισμοὶ, τέμνοντες αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ 
διανοιᾳ χρονίζοντα, ὄ τε ἀγγελικὸς, καὶ ὁ ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας προαιρέσεως ῥεπούσης ἐπὶ τὸ 
κρεῖττον, καὶ ὁ ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἀναδιδόμενος φύσεως, καθ' ὃν κινούμενοι καὶ ἐθνικοὶ 
ἀγαπῶσι τὰ ἴδια τέκνα, καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν τιμῶσι γονεῖς. Τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ λογισμῷ δύο μόνον 
ἀντίκεινται λογισμοὶ, ὅ τε δαιμονιώδης, καὶ ὁ ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας προαιρέσεως 
ἀποκλινούσης ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον.Ἐκ δὲ τῆς φύσεως οὐδεὶς ἐξέρχεται λογισμὸς πονηρός. Οὐ 
γὰρ ἀπαρχῆς γεγόναμεν πονηροὶ 
Peri Logismou 31 (40.1240α) ΞΕ; SC,p.260) 
"Opposed to the demonic thought are three thoughts which cut it off when it lingers in the 
intellect: the angelic thought, that which proceeds from our free choice when it leans 
towards the better, and that which is furnished by human nature, according to which even 
pagans love their own children and honor their parents. Opposed to the good thought, 
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Note is often made of the fact that Origen likewise has distinguished three types of 
thoughts. The source for this assertion is Rufinus’ translation: 
Cogitationes quae de corde nostro procedunt, vel memoria quorumeumque 
gestorum, vel quarumlibet rerum causarumque contemplatio, invenimus quod 
aliquoties ex nobis ipsis procedant, aliquoties a contrariis virtutibus concitentur; 
interdum etiam a Deo, vel a sanctis angelis immittantur. 
Rufinus De Principiis 3.2.4236 
“We find that thoughts that proceed from our heart, whether they are a memory 
of deeds we have done or a contemplation of any things or causes whatsoever, 
sometimes proceed from ourselves, sometimes are aroused by the opposing 
powers, and occasionally also are implanted in us by God or by the holy angels.” 
 There is no explicit mention of the three types of thought in Origen’s Greek. However, we 
can find mention of demonic and angelic thoughts in Rufinus’ Latin translation of Origen. This 
lack of discussion of various types of thought in Origen’s extant Greek once again points to an 
Evagrian influence on the Latin translation. 
 
Soul, Intellect, and Heart 
 As noted in Chapter Two, Rufinus often seems to use soul and heart interchangeably in his 
Latin translations of Origen. While, as we saw, Origen does not interchange these two words in his 
Greek texts, and so the answer to why Rufinus has seen fit to do so lies in Evagrius’ work. 
Evagrius does, in fact, seem to use heart and soul interchangeably, and even sees the intellect as 
synonymous with the heart.237 We see in Praktikos 47: Τὸν γὰρ νοῦν μόνος ἐπίσταται ὁ ποιήσας 
ἡμᾶς Θεός͵ καὶ οὐ δεῖται συμβόλων αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸ γινώσκειν τὰ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ κρυπτόμενα. “God 
                                                      
there are only two thoughts, the demonic thought and that which proceeds from our free 
choice when it inclines towards the worse. No evil thought derives from our nature, for we 
were not created evil from the beginning …" 
For more on the three types of thought in Evagrius, see Sinkewicz p. 138-9 
236 Crouzel, H. (1978). Traité des principes. Paris: Cerf. 
237 For more discussion of Evagrius’ view of the intellect as synonymous with the heart as the 
spiritual center of a human being, see Konstantinovsky (2009: p.88) 
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alone, who fashioned us, knows the intellect, and He has no need of signs to know that which is 
hidden in the heart.”238 
 Ilaria Ramelli239 points to a passage of Origen in which he explains that what the Scriptures 
call “heart” is often meant to indicate our intellect, Rufinus’ Latin translation of Commentary on 
Romans Rufinus’ states that “usually the ‘heart' is called the rational faculty of the soul,” 
rationabilem animae virtutem cor solere nominari (Commentary on Romans 2.7. 36-37). This 
evidence is only present in Rufinus' Latin translation. Given Rufinus' penchant for didactic 
interjections in his translations, as discussed in Chapter Two, it is difficult to say for certain that 
this was, in fact, Origen's original explanation.  
 There is, however, a parallel passage in Evagrius, which mimics much of Rufinus’ practice 
of using soul and heart interchangeably: 
Δίκαζε τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐν τῷ βήματι τῆς καρδίας, ἵνα τῶν λῃστῶν 
ἀναιρουμένων, ὁ ἀρχιλῃστὴς φοβηθῇ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ὢν ἀκριβὴς τῶν λογισμῶν 
ἐξεταστὴς, ἔστι καὶ ἀληθὴς τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐραστής. Ἐπὰν οὖν λογισμὸς ἐπιστῇ 
σου τῇ καρδίᾳ δυσεύρετος, τότε ἐπὶ πλεῖον συντόνους πόνους ἐπ’ αὐτὸν 
ἐκπύρωσον· ἢ γὰρ τὴν θέρμην ὡς ἐναντίαν οὐ φέρων ἀποδρᾷ, ἢ ταύτην ὑπομένει 
ὡς οἰκεῖος ὢν τῆς εὐθείας ὁδοῦ. Ἔστι δ’ ὅταν οἱ δαίμονες λογισμὸν δῆθεν καλὸν 
ὑποβάλλοντες τῇ καρδίᾳ, καὶ παρευθὺ μεταμορφούμενοι βάλλοντες τῇ καρδίᾳ, 
                                                      
238 For further examples: KG, VI.87; Praktikos 47.7; 50.9; epil. 6; Thoughts 6.29-32 (the 
intellect is identified with the heart of Matt. 6.21); 17.3ff. KG 6.52: 
Many passions hide in our souls, those that, when they escape us, strong 
temptations reveal to us. Moreover, it is necessary that "with all solicitude, we 
keep our heart," lest, when the object of our passion presents itself, we 
immediately be drawn by demons and make any of those things that are odious to 
God. 
Trans. Ramelli, I. (2015). Evagrius, Kephalaia gnostika: a new translation of the 
unreformed text from the Syriac. Atlanta: SBL Press. 
239 (2011: 349). She goes on to state that “He, like some other Fathers, drawing inspiration from 
Gal 4:19, speaks of the formation and birth of Christ, as Logos and all virtues, in the heart of 
human beings (Commentary on Romans 7.5.41-51)”  
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καὶ παρευθὺ μεταμορφούμενοι ἐναντιοῦσθαι τούτῳ προσποιοῦνται, ἵνα ἐκ τῆς 
ἐναντιώσεως, νομίσῃς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις τῆς καρδίας σου εἰδέναι. 
To Eulogios, 13 
“Judge the thoughts in the tribunal of your heart so that when thieves are done 
away with, the chief thief may take fright; for one who is a rigorous examiner of 
his thoughts will also be truly a lover of the commandments. Thus, whenever 
there arises in the heart a thought that is difficult to discern, then ignite all the 
more against it intense ascetic labors; for either it will depart, unable to bear the 
heat of its opposite, or else it will persevere because it belongs to the straight 
path. However, sometimes the demons suggest to the heart a thought that is 
apparently good and, immediately transforming themselves, they pretend to 
oppose it, so that from this opposition you may think that they know even the 
ideas of your heart.”240 
  As in Rufinus' translation above, thoughts are “suggested to your heart.” They can also 
similarly arise there in the same place and be judged there. Evagrius makes much use of heart, soul, 
and intellect as interchangeable and interconnected terms which all refer to a human's spiritual 
capacity. As we have seen, Rufinus engages in the same practice in his translations of Origen.  
 
Evagrian Logismos 
 
Evagrius uses the term logismos principally for thoughts when he describes thoughts of any 
kind — evil or good, implanted or originating from within ourselves, assented to or not. Because 
this term is used both for thoughts that are implanted, those which come from us, as well as 
thoughts that have “lingered” too long and thus become a symptom of underlying sin, it aligns 
neither with the exacting Stoic distinction between noēsis and logismos, nor with Origen's own 
distinctions between those same terms, as seen in Chapter Two. Origen’s work reflects a distinction 
between a noēsis being something not up to us, and a logismos as something we have assented to, 
and thus are responsible for. The Evagrian process starts with an introduced logismos (whether 
introduced by good or evil forces or originating within the person herself). That the logismos arises 
                                                      
240 Trans. Sinkewicz, R. E. (2003). 
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is not necessarily a problem for Evagrius, as long as it is immediately dismissed. However, if we 
allow the logismos to linger, then it can become fixed in our mind and thus causes sin. Thus, the 
battle against the logismos becomes of extreme importance. 
The logismos also has the curious feature of being relevant only for monks. Evagrius is 
careful to point out that ordinary people are confronted by physical objects meant to deceive them. 
Monks, who do not have the physical possessions of the average person, are attacked using 
logismoi: 
Τοῖς μὲν κοσμικοῖς οἱ δαίμονες διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων μᾶλλον παλαίουσι, τοῖς δὲ 
μοναχοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διὰ τῶν λογισμῶν· πραγμάτων γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐρημίαν 
ἐστέρηνται·καὶ ὅσον εὐκολώτερον τὸ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἁμαρτάνειν τοῦ κατ’ 
ἐνέργειαν, τοσοῦτον χαλεπώτερος καὶ ὁ κατὰ διάνοιαν πόλεμος τοῦ διὰ τῶν 
πραγμάτων συνισταμένου εὐκίνητον γάρ τι πρᾶγμα ὁ νοῦς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀνόμους 
φαντασίας δυσκάθεκτον. 
Prakt. 48241 
"The demons war with seculars more through objects, but with monks, they do so 
especially through logismoi, for they are deprived of objects because of the 
solitude. Further, to the extent that it is easier to sin kata dianoian than in action, 
so is the warfare kata dianoian more difficult than that which is conducted 
through objects. For the nous is a thing easily set in motion and difficult to check 
in its tendency towards unlawful fantasies."242 
Evagrius is careful to refer to thoughts in his treatises and not sin because Evagrius’ 
logismoi are not (at the outset) within our control. However, they can turn into sin if we entertain 
them too long or if they result in emotion.243 
                                                      
241 SC 170 
242 Trans. Sinkewicz, R. E. (2003). 
243; See Harmless (2004: 322-23): “Note that Evagrius calls them ‘thoughts’ and not sins. Sin 
implies consent and responsibility, as Evagrius notes: ‘It is not in our power to determine whether 
we are disturbed by these thoughts, but it is up to us to decide if they are to linger within us or not 
and whether or not they are to stir up our passions.’[Evagrius, Prak 6 SC 171:508; trans. 
Bamberger, CS 4:17]” 
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When discussing evil thoughts, Evagrius is also wont to replace logismos with synonyms 
that describe where he believes these thoughts originate: demons. So, often he uses expressions 
such as daimones when referring to thoughts originated by negative influences.244 
Evagrius’ conception of logismoi, how they fit into emotional states and in what regard and 
circumstance we are responsible for our thoughts is expanded in more detail below. Although 
Evagrius’ works are not structured in such a way as to give a systematic outline of the definition 
and behavior of logismoi, nevertheless I will endeavor to flesh out its structure by comparing 
examples from the texts mentioned above. 
 
To Eulogios 
 
A brief section in Evagrius’ work To Eulogios deals with logismos, encouraging us to judge 
thoughts in our heart so that only the good thoughts will persevere. In this way, his conception of 
dealing with thoughts mirrors the view of the Stoics in that a thought arises and we must then 
decide whether it should be accepted or rejected. However, the terminology for a thought that 
appears before it is judged is different in the Stoic framework (the representation is a noēsis), and 
even in Origen, a logismos is never described in the Greek text as a type of representation, but 
rather a reasoned thought. 
                                                      
244 See Harmless (2004: 323), in his discussion on vainglory: “Note how Evagrius shifts from the 
language of ‘thoughts’ to the language of ‘demons.’ If one surveys his works, one finds that he 
refers almost indifferently to the ‘thought of vainglory’ and the ‘demon of vainglory.’ the same 
flip-flopping between ‘thoughts’ and ‘demons’ appears when he speaks of the other vices.” It 
should be noted that these interchanging synonyms for thoughts should not be read as metaphor or 
exaggeration. Indeed, as we will see, Evagrius does believe that thoughts are often implanted in us 
by demons. See Harmless (2004: 327): “Evagrius, as we saw, speaks of ‘thoughts’ and ‘demons’ as 
though they were synonyms. That does not mean he thought of demons as merely metaphorical, as 
a symbol for psychological dynamics. He believed that there really were demons. ‘Thoughts were 
simply the most common mechanism by which desert solitaries encountered demons.” 
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In terms of the relationship between thoughts and emotions, Evagrius says the following:  
πῇ μὲν οἱ λογισμοὶ ἐφέλκονται τὰ παθη, πῇ δὲ τὰ πάθη τοὺς λογισμοὺς. τὸ 
τηνικαῦτα καὶ οἱ λογισμοὶ διὰ τοῦ πάθους, πολεμοῦσι τὴν ψυχήν. 
To Eulogios, 1109Aff (PG 79) 
“Sometimes the thoughts attract the emotions, and sometimes the emotions the 
thoughts, and then the thoughts through the emotions make war on the soul.”245 
This emphasizes the emotions as the primary source of discord in the soul. The thoughts do not 
cause the war in the soul themselves; they must have emotions as their vehicle to be the agents of 
sin. There is a vicious cycle, in that thoughts can produce emotions and vice versa. 
Additionally, there is a connection made between thoughts and sense perception. Evagrius 
warns: 
ὁ ανήσυχος ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ὄψεις αἰσθήσεων τὴν ψυχήν πολεμεῖται, ὁ δὲ 
φιλήσυχος, τὰς αἰσθησεις φυλάσσων, τοὺς λογισμοὺς πολεμεῖ. 
To Eulogios, 1109Bff246 
“He who does not preserve stillness brings warfare to his soul from the senses 
associated with sight, but the person who loves stillness guards the senses and 
makes war on thoughts.”247 
 There is some parallel here with the Stoics and Origen, in that they too draw close 
comparison between thoughts, the process of developing an emotion, and sense perception. 
Similarly, Evagrius points out that ‘guarding the senses’ can save you from bringing any evil 
thoughts internally to his soul. The Stoics, too, believed that you can accurately analyze your 
sensory inputs, and choose only to pursue the truth. 
 
 
 
                                                      
245 Trans. Sinkewicz, R. E. (2003). 
246 PG 79. 
247 Trans. Sinkewicz, R. E. (2003). 
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Treatise on Thoughts 
Evagrius’ Peri Logismou is meant as a sort of advanced manual on how to deal with 
thoughts, both judging and accepting the good ones, and fighting and expelling the bad ones.248 
He first proceeds by laying out the different types of vices, which are organized into three 
main types of thoughts, from which all other evil thoughts arise. The three primary thoughts are 
gluttony, avarice, and vainglory.249 There are several points in Evagrius’ treatise on thoughts which 
are of particular interest to this study. First, in laying out the primary thoughts, Evagrius states: 
Τῶν ἀντικειμένων δαιμόνων τῇ πρακτικῇ, πρῶτοι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον συνίστανται 
οἱ τὰς τῆς γαστριμαργίας ὀρέξεις πεπιστευμέοι, καὶ οἱ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν ἡμῖν 
ὑποβάλλοντες, καὶ οἱ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαλούμενοι. Οἱ δ' 
ἄλλοι πάντες κατόπιν τούτων βαδίζοντες, τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων [79.1201a] 
τιτρωσκομένους διαδ́εχονται. Οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς χεῖρας τοῦ πνεύματος 
τῆς πορνείας, μὴ ὑπὸ τῆς γαστριμαργίας καταπεσόντα·καὶ οὐκ ἔστι ταράξαι 
θυμὸν, μὴ ὑπὲρ βρωμάτων ἢ χρημάτων, ἢ δόξης ἀλόγων ἐπιθυμιῶν 
μαχόμενον·καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸν τῆς λύπης δαίμονα διαφυγεῖν, τούτων πάντων 
στερηθέντα, ἢ μὴ δυνηθέντα τυχεῖν·οὐδὲ ἀποφεύξεται τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν τις, τὸ 
                                                      
248 See Sinkewicz (2000: 136-7) "Although this treatise examines the subject of ‘thoughts,' it does 
so in a manner quite different from other Evagrian works such as Eulogios, Eight Thoughts, and 
Praktikos. These works address the concerns of the monk still very much engaged in the practical 
life, whereas the treatise On Thoughts offers a more advanced teaching to those who have crossed 
the threshold of impassibility and have begun to enjoy the fruits of the gnostic life. Thoughts offers 
no systematic or detailed treatment of each of the eight thoughts, such as can be found in other 
works, and when it does treat individual vices it takes up special cases or concerns that will be 
particularly relevant to the more advanced stages of spiritual development. The most substantial 
part of the treatise is devoted to an exploration of the typology or categorization of the thoughts as 
well as a detailed examination of their mechanisms and the tactics employed by the demons who 
inspire them."  
249 This structural approach that posits these three as the fundamental vices from which all others 
arise persists in future Byzantine ascetic literature. See, for example, Maximus the Confessor, 
Centuries on Charity 3. 56, PG 90. 1033BC, ‘Self-love, as often has been said, is the cause of all 
the impassioned thoughts. From it are begotten the three main thoughts of concupiscence — 
gluttony, avarice, and vain glory. From gluttony is begotten the thought of fornication, from 
avarice greed, from vain glory pride. All the rest follow upon one or the other of these three — the 
thoughts of anger, sadness, resentment, acedia, envy, slander, and the rest. These passions then 
bind the mind to material objects and hold it down on earth, lying upon it like a massive stone, 
whereas by nature it is lighter and more agile than fire.  
 
 
154 
πρῶτον γέννημα τοῦ διαβόλου, μὴ τὴν τῶν κακῶν ῥίζαν ἐξορίσας φιλαργυρίαν, 
εἴπερ καὶ πενία ἄνδρα ταπεινοῖ, κατὰ τὸν σοφὸν Σολομῶντα·καὶ συλλήβδην 
ἐιπεῖν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον περιπεσεῖν δαίμονι, μὴ πρότερον ὑπ' ἐκείνων τῶν 
πρωτοστατῶν κατατρωθέντα… 
Peri Logismou, 1ff250 
"Among the demons who set themselves in opposition to the practical life, those 
raged first in battle are the ones entrusted with the appetites of gluttony, those 
who make to us suggestions of avarice, and those who entice us to seek human 
esteem. All the other demons march along behind those and in their turn take up 
with the people wounded by these. For example, it is not possible to fall into the 
hands of the spirit of fornication, unless one has fallen under the influence of 
gluttony; nor is it possible to trouble the irascible part, unless one is fighting for 
food or wealth or esteem. Also, it is not possible to escape the demon of sadness, 
if one is deprived of all these things, or is unable to attain them. Nor will one 
escape pride, the first offspring of the devil, if one has not banished avarice, the 
root of all evils (1 Tim. 6: 10), since, according to the wise Solomon ‘poverty 
makes a person humble' (Prov. 10:4). To put it briefly, no one can fall into a 
demon's power, unless he has first been wounded by those in the front line."251 
 The passage is rife with imagery of warfare between the sage and evil thoughts. We see in 
the Stoics and Origen the metaphor of emotions as natural forces, such as storms or winds, or 
unruly animals.  
In his treatise Peri Logismou, Evagrius states that logismoi are introduced to the soul by 
mental representations.252 In this way, his sense of a logismos is something like the Stoic notion of 
a representation, in that it is introduced from the outside and is something not up to us. 
There is also a great deal of emphasis placed on the duration of a thought. Whether one 
dwells on a thought (without any action taken) is itself an indicator of the strength or purity of an 
individual. Thus, even if a thought arises from a demon, or from outside of us in some way, simply 
allowing it to linger is problematic. Evagrius also discusses the lingering of certain representations 
and compares this to the lingering of emotions: 
                                                      
250 SC 438. 
251 Trans. Sinkewicz, R. E. (2003). 
252 Cf. Reflections S2, ‘A demonic thought is a mental representation of a sensible object, which 
moves the irascible or the concupiscible part in a manner contrary to nature.’ 
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Πάντες οἱ ἀκάθαρτοι λογισμοὶ διὰ τὰ πάθη χρονίζοντες ἐν ἡμῖν, κατάγουσι τὸν 
νοῦν εἰς ὄλεθρον, καὶ ἀπώλειαν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ νόημα τοῦ ἄρτου χρονίζει ἐν τῷ 
πεινῶντι διὰ τὴν πεῖναν, καὶ τὸ νόημα τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν τῷ διψῶντι διὰ τὴν δίψαν, 
οὕτω καὶ τὰ νοήματα τῶν κτημάτων, καὶ τῶν χρημάτων, χρονίζει διὰ τὴν 
πλεονεξίαν, καὶ τὰ νοήματα τῶν βρωμάτων, καὶ τῶν τικτομένων αἰσρῶν 
λογισμῶμ ἐκ τῶν βρωμάτων, χρονίζει διὰ τὰ πάθη. 
Peri Logismou, 22253 
“All the impure thoughts that linger within us on account of the passions bring 
the mind down ‘to ruin and destruction (1 Tim. 6:9). For just as the mental 
representation of bread lingers with the hungry person on account of the hunger, 
and the mental representation of water in the thirsty person because of thirst, so 
too the mental representations of food and shameful thoughts begotten by food 
linger with us because of the passions.”254 
 On the one hand, the idea of representations lingering is not consistent with Origen, who 
does not mention any sort of representation lingering in someone's mind to taunt her. The 
connection is made between the image of bread being perpetually in the mind of a hungry person 
and the persistence of an evil thought in a spiritually weak or impure person. Again, here the 
logismos is said to be a mental representation, but one for which we are responsible. 
There is, furthermore, an emphasis on the staying power of logismoi. Evagrius gives the 
example of intervening thoughts: 
Τῶν λογισμῶν οἱ τέμνουσιν, οἱ δὲ τέμνονται· καὶ τέμνουσι μὲν οἱ πονηροὶ τοὺς 
ἀγαθοὺς, τέμνονται δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν οἱ πονηροὶ τὸ τοίνυν Πνεῦμα τὸ 
ἅγιον πρώτως τεθέντι προσέχει λογισμῷ, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον κρίνει ἡμᾶς, ἢ 
ἀποδέχεται. Ὃ δὲ λέγω τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. Ἔχω τινὰ φιλοξενίας λογισμὸν, καὶ 
τοῦτον ἔχω διὰ τὸν Κύριον, ἀλλ' οὑτος [79.1208d] ἐπελθόντος τοῦ πειράζοντος 
τέμνεται καὶ δόξης χάριν φιλοξενεῖν ὑποβάλλοντος. Πάλιν· ἔχω φιλοξενίας 
λογισμὸν πρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φανῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος ἐπελθοντος 
κρείττονος λογισμοῦ διατέμνεται, τοῦ πρὸς τὸν Κύριον μᾶλλον ῾ῶν τὴν ἀρετὴν 
ἀπευθύνοντος.  
Peri Logismou, 7255 
“Among thoughts, some serve to cut off others, while some are themselves cut 
off: evil thoughts cut off good ones, and in turn, evil ones are cut off by good 
ones. The Holy Spirit, therefore, pays attention to the thought that was posited 
first and condemns and approves us with respect to it… If then we stay with the 
                                                      
253 SC 438 
254 Trans. Sinkewicz, R. E. (2003). See also Letter 39, G1. 134. 1-3 for a similar description. 
255 SC 438. 
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former thoughts by our works even while tempted by the latter ones, we will 
receive the reward only of those thoughts posited first, because, being human and 
occupied in the fight with the demons, we do not have the strength always to hold 
onto the right thought intact, nor in turn are we able to keep the evil thought 
unchallenged, for we possess the seeds of virtue. However, if one of the thoughts 
that cuts off the others stays for awhile, it becomes established in the place of the 
one that is cut off, and then the individual will be moved to act according to that 
thought.”256 
The fact that priority goes to the thought that takes hold for the most prolonged period of time 
suggests that these logismoi are changeable and controllable. This is in sharp contrast to the 
logismoi of the Stoics or Origen, which are rational thoughts that have been assented to, for which 
you are responsible, and are nearly impossible to stop or change. Instead, the intervening thoughts 
in Evagrius seem to act more like propatheia, pre-emotions, which can be stopped as long as they 
have not gained too much momentum and you have not been lured into assenting to them. 
 
Thoughts: Rufinus’ Alignment with Evagrius 
Where we have seen Origen mention that noēseis can come from different sources, 
Evagrius systematically sets forth that there are three types of thoughts: angelic, human, and 
demonic. In a formulation similar to Origen’s own, Evagrius refers to the possibility that thoughts 
could be “suggested to the heart” by demons, by angels, or by divine powers: 
Τῶν ἀγγελικων λογισμῶν, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν ἐκ δαιμόνων ταύτην τὴν 
διαφορὰν μετὰ πολλῆς τῆς παρατηρήσεως ἐγνώκαμεν εἰναι, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν οἱ 
ἀγγελικοὶ τὰς φύσεις τῶν πραγμάτων περιεργάζονται, καὶ τοὺς πνευματικοὺς 
αὐτῶν ἐξιχνιάζουσι λογισμούς. Οἷον, τίνος χάριν γεγένηται ὁ χρυσὸς, καὶ διὰ τί 
ψαμμώδης, καὶ κάτω πυ τοῖς μορίοις τῆς γῆς ἐγκατέσπαρται, καὶ μετὰ πολλοῦ 
καμάτου, καὶ πόνου εὑρίσκεται; ὅπως τε εὑρωθεὶς ὕδατι πλύνεται, καὶ πυρὶ 
παραδίδοται, καὶ οὕτως εἰς τεχνιτῶν ἐμβάλλεται χεῖρας, τῶν ποιούντων τῆς 
σκηνῆς τὴν λυχνίαν, καὶ τὸ θυμιατήριον, καὶ τὰς θυΐσκας, καὶ τὰς φιάλας, ἐν αἷς 
οὐκέτι νυν͂ν πίνει διὰ τὴν χάριν τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ὁ Βαβυλώνιος βασιλεύς, 
Κλεόπα δὲ φέρει καρδίαν καιομέην ὑπὸ τούτων μυστηρίων. Ὁ δὲ δαιμονιώδης 
λογισμὸς, ταῦτα μὲν οὔτε οἶδεν, οὔτε ἐπίσταται· μόνην δὲ τὴν κτῆσιν τοῦ 
αἰσθητοῦ χρυσίου ὑποβάλλει, καὶ τὴν ἐκ τούτου τρυφή́ν τε καὶ δόξαν ἐσομένην 
                                                      
256 Trans. Sinkewicz, R. E. (2003). 
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προλέγει· ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπινος λογισμὸς, οὐδὲ τὴν κτῆσιν ἐπιζητεῖ, οὔτε τίνος 
περιεργάζεται σύμβολον ο ῾ χρυσὸς, ἀλλὰ μόνο εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ χρυσοῦ τὴν 
μορφὴν εἰσφέρει ψιλὴν, πάθους πλεονεξίας κεχωρισμένην· ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος, καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πραγμάτων ῥθήσεται, κατὰ τὸν κακόνα τοῦτον μυστικῶς 
γυμναζόμενος. 
Evagrius Peri Logismou 8257 
"After lengthy observation, we have learned to recognize this difference between 
angelic and human thoughts, and those that come from demons. Firstly, angelic 
thoughts are those concerned with the investigation of the natures of things and 
search out their spiritual principles. For example, the reason why gold was made 
and why it is sand-like and scattered… The demonic thought neither knows nor 
understands these things, but without shame, it suggests only the acquisition of 
sensible gold and predicts the enjoyment and esteem that will come from this. 
The human thought neither seeks the acquisition of gold nor is concerned with 
investigating what gold symbolizes; rather, it merely introduces in the intellect 
the simple form of gold separate from any passion of greed."258 
 
In Chapter Two, we saw the same formulation in Rufinus’ translation of Origen: 
Cogitationes quae de corde nostro procedunt, vel memoria quorumeumque 
gestorum, vel quarumlibet rerum causarumque contemplatio, invenimus 
quod aliquoties ex nobis ipsis procedant, aliquoties a contrariis virtutibus 
concitentur; interdum etiam a Deo, vel a sanctis angelis immittantur. 
Rufinus, De Principiis 3.2.4259 
"We find that the 'thoughts which proceed out of the heart (Matt. XV 
18,19; Mark VII 21) whether they are a memory of deeds we have done or 
a contemplation of any things or causes whatsoever, sometimes proceed 
from ourselves, sometimes are aroused by the opposing powers, and 
occasionally also are implanted in us by God or by the holy angels." 
 Again, however, these suggested thoughts are logismoi, which under Origen's framework 
are thoughts that have already been accepted, and thus it would be too late to decide upon them and 
cast them from our hearts. Here, Rufinus' translation renders the text in Latin in a way that aligns 
exactly with Evagrius' outline of the implantation of evil thoughts here in the To Eulogios. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, Rufinus uses the Latin term cogitatio to translate a variety of different 
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specific Greek terms. Unfortunately, since in this particular passage the Greek is not extant, we 
cannot see what Origen's original term in Greek would correspond to the Latin cogitationes. It 
should be noted that Origen does not use logismos to describe thoughts that have not been assented 
to, and thus many scholars have found that this translation of Rufinus presents at best confusion, 
and at worst, inconsistency in Origen's doctrine. While we cannot attempt to recreate the “original” 
text, we can potentially save Origen from inconsistency by tracing the story of his text's translation 
and shining light on Rufinus' agency as a translator. 
 Rufinus’ translation goes on in the same passage to display other striking similarities to 
Evagrius’ description of logismoi: 
Nihil tamen aliud putandum est accidere nobis ex ipsis quae cordi nostro 
suggeruntur bonis vel malis, nisi commotionem solam et incitamentum 
provocans, nos vel ad bona vel ad mala. Possibile autem nobis est cum maligna 
virtus coeperit ad malum incitare, abiicere a nobis pravus suggestiones, et 
resistere suasionibus pessimis, et nihil prorsus culpabiliter gerere. 
Rufinus, De Principiis 3.2.4260 
“Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that nothing else happens to us from these 
things [thoughts from 3.2.4 above] which are suggested to our heart, whether 
good or bad, except provoking a movement and inclination, whether it be 
towards good or evil. It is possible for us, however, when an evil power begins to 
incite us to evil, to cast away the bad suggestions from us, and to resist against 
the worst of persuasions, and ultimately to do nothing blameworthy.” 
 Here, thoughts are described as “suggested” to us and are meant to be “resisted”. If we 
presume these thoughts were originally logismoi in Origen's original Greek, then we encounter a 
problem. However, this formulation of thoughts which are suggested, as if some sort of test of our 
strength and clear-sightedness, and which must be resisted and not allowed to linger, aligns quite 
well with Evagrius and his emphasis on battling and resisting logismoi. 
I have pointed out the clear similarities between Evagrius’ three sources for thoughts and 
the above passages of Origen (in translation). This is an instance for which it would be more 
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fruitful to compare Rufinus to Evagrius. Rufinus’ text has such a striking similarity to Evagrius that 
it points to Evagrius as an accessory text in the process of translating Origen to Latin. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Just as Guarino Guarini brought Homer to Latin through the lens of Vergil, likewise 
Rufinus has brought Origen to his Christian, Latin-speaking audience through the lens of Evagrius. 
In this chapter, I presented the influence of Evagrius’ work as an important piece of Rufinus’ 
translation practices with respect to the psychology of “sinful” thought. I first discussed instances 
in which Rufinus borrowed Evagrian conceptions throughout the first three steps of the soul’s 
journey. However, the primary focus of the chapter was on how Evagrius’ conception of logismos 
infiltrated Origen’s text through Rufinus’ translation. I illustrated that the distinction in Origen’s 
works between thoughts that are up to us and those which are not was confused and retroactively 
made to align with Evagrius’ description of logismoi in his works.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The process of translation is central to the field of Classics as well as Ancient Philosophy 
and Theology. In this dissertation, I have deconstructed the process of translation in these three 
related disciplines by incorporating relevant methodology from the field of Translation Studies. I 
have also endeavored to add new, relevant tools and considerations along the way. Viewing 
translation as a narrative process in which every element is crucial for understanding the overall 
picture gives us a way to study translation in antiquity more holistically.  
I used the above translation methodology to unpack Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s 
psychology. I used an important early Christian narrative, Origen’s narrative of the descent of the 
soul into embodiment, as a case study in this endeavor. The narrative of the soul’s descent is a 
particularly useful one because so much of it is still extant in both Origen’s Greek and Rufinus’ 
Latin translation. This provides a rare opportunity to compare Rufinus’ translations with the 
original. The textual comparison and analysis of the influences acting on Rufinus in his own time 
revealed that Rufinus made a change in how thoughts are judged. Although Origen’s Greek reflects 
a type of thought for which we are not responsible unless we act upon them, Rufinus’ translations 
suggest that thoughts can be sinful even without action. 
Although there is evidence in Rufinus’ translations that suggest Origen viewed thinking as a 
sinful activity, it is not supported by Origen’s extant Greek corpus. Furthermore, Rufinus himself 
admits to altering Origen’s texts in his prefaces. He is also invested in a project of standardizing a 
Latin library of Christian texts and is motivated to “save” Origen from the Origenist controversy. 
Finally, I have argued that the specific changes he makes to Origen’s thought formation have come 
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from the works of Evagrius, which Rufinus also translated. I uncovered Rufinus’ conflation of 
sinful actions and sinful thoughts and the interpolation of Evagrius’ texts in three chapters. 
Chapter One focused on laying the methodological groundwork for investigating Rufinus’ 
process of translation. It began with a review of the importance of translation studies and how 
relevant theories of translation might be incorporated into the study of Rufinus and Origen. It then 
moved on to providing a concise and complete definition of translation. As stated by Roger Bell, a 
complete definition necessarily takes into account the process of translating, the product of the 
translation itself, and translation as the abstract concept that includes both the process and the 
outcome. More complex than simply converting words from one language to the next in a one-to-
one correspondence, my definition of translation was inspired by Jacques Derrida, who stressed 
that the source text can only be converted successfully to another language by the strength of the 
translator’s ability to interpret and contextualize. I uncovered that translation should be seen as a 
form of rewriting, and that no text is free from the influence of its translator. Next, building on 
theories from Lawerence Venuti and Naomi Seidman, I outlined the first two influences acting on 
every translator: the audience of the target text and the contemporary historical and political 
environment. I introduced both the concept of foreignizing translation, staying as true to the source 
text as possible, but potentially alienating the target audience, and domesticizing translation, 
working to make the target text sound as natural as possible, to the possible detriment of the 
message of the source text. Several examples of domesticizing and foreignizing translations were 
employed to show how a translator’s audience can influence her, and it was noted that the current 
prevailing opinion on what makes a “faithful” or “accurate” translation is heavily influenced by the 
notion that a domesticizing translation is superior to a foreignizing one. I next introduce and build 
upon Lawrence Venuti’s concept of the accessory text. An accessory text is a third text used by the 
translator with the purpose of strengthening or supplementing the target language text, or simply as 
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an aid in the translation process. This can be as basic as a lexicon, or as complex as a text covering 
the same or a similar topic. Whatever the accessory text or texts that a translator uses in her work, 
she cannot prevent the outside text infiltrates the translation to a greater or lesser extent. The 
chapter concluded with a discussion of how the above translation theories can be applied to 
Rufinus’ translations of Origen. I remarked that in the study of Origen there is also remarkably 
little conversation about translation. However, the preservation of both the original Greek and the 
Latin translations of much of Origen’s First Principles and Commentary on the Gospels gives us a 
unique opportunity to study the journey of a philosophical idea as it goes through the process of 
translation. In some cases, we are left only with the Latin translation. In such instances, the 
establishment of crucial accessory texts, such as the writings of Evagrius, can provide valuable 
insights into potential alterations to the text and thereby present a clearer picture of the story of 
Rufinus’ translation. 
 Chapter Two initiated the study of Rufinus’ translation process. Viewing the process of 
translation as a journey from one language to another, not unlike a physical journey from one 
country to another, it answered the question of what was present in Origen’s original Greek that 
may have been subject to “border control” measures in Rufinus’ translation process. It also 
illuminated the consequences that their absence had for the Latin text. The investigation was 
framed using Tejaswini Niranjana’s translation border zones. The chapter first engaged with 
Origen’s original Greek works by exploring his descriptions of the journey of the soul in its descent 
into embodiment and struggle with thought and emotion, and subsequently details how Origen 
borrowed and adapted from Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Stoic doctrines. The soul’s journey was 
divided into four steps: the fall of the intellect, the establishment of free will, the embodied battle 
with emotion, and finally the struggle with sinful thoughts. In each of the above steps, Origen 
appropriated Platonic images and Stoic terminology to complete his narrative of the soul’s journey, 
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but these philosophical markers were left behind in the process of translation. The result was a 
discontinuity in Rufinus’ Latin translation between the emphasis on the importance of free will and 
the weakened agency a person has over his thoughts. Rufinus’ translation choices ultimately 
limited the agency a person has over her thoughts and thereby downgrades her free will in the 
process. The chapter closed with an emphasis on the fact that the philosophical purging of the texts 
disrupts the delicate balance and artistry of Origen’s original Greek, thus conflating Origen’s own 
doctrine. I showed that Origen borrows Stoic terminology when discussing different types of 
thoughts: the noēsis, a type of thought for which we are not ourselves responsible, and logismos, a 
thought that we have accepted and must take responsibility for. In Latin, both of these terms are 
translated as cogitatio. This dramatically changes the meaning of the text. In conflating thoughts 
that are our responsibility and those that are not, Rufinus not only makes a big change in Origen’s 
doctrine on thought, but also weakens Origen’s emphasis on free will. Rufinus’ Latin allows for 
thoughts to be implanted into our head for which we must be responsible. However, this 
circumvents our free will to choose and decide which thoughts to accept. 
After the first two chapters established the effect of Rufinus’ translation choices on 
Origen’s overall narrative of the soul’s descent, Chapter Three turned to the infiltration of 
accessory texts on Rufinus’ translations of Origen. I explored a model for some of these translation 
choices: Evagrius. As discussed in Chapter One, Marianne Pade argued that Guarino Guarini made 
Homer Roman through the use of an accessory text. He thus brought Homer into Latin through the 
lens of Vergil. In Chapter Three, I demonstrated that Rufinus likewise brought Origen into Latin 
through the lens of Evagrius. I presented the influence of Evagrius’ work as an important piece of 
Rufinus’ translation practices with respect to the psychology of “sinful” thought. Although I first 
presented instances in which Rufinus borrowed Evagrian conceptions throughout the first three 
steps of the soul’s journey, the primary focus of the chapter was on how Evagrius’ conception of 
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logismos infiltrated Origen’s text through Rufinus’ translation. I illustrated that the distinction in 
Origen’s works between thoughts that are up to us and those which are not was confused and 
retroactively made to align with Evagrius’ description of logismoi in his works.  
Uncovering the complexity of the translation of Origen’s moral psychology helps us better 
to understand the overall story of Origenism. It is also a small but significant piece in the history of 
moral psychology. As I examined in the philosophies of the Stoics and Platonists in Chapter Two, 
there was a long intellectual history before Origen that directly equated thoughts with action. 
Without action, we were not culpable for our thoughts. When Richard Sorabji wrote that Origen’s 
shift to a discussion of sinful thoughts was a significant one, he was correct, although I have argued 
that this shift cannot convincingly be traced to Origen himself, but rather to Rufinus’ translation. 
The idea of sinful thoughts is prevalent in the works of Evagrius and indeed goes on to enjoy a long 
history after the time of Evagrius as well. In fact, the question of whether we are culpable for our 
thoughts is still relevant today as we still debate on the relative importance of intent, action, and 
consequence. 
In sum, I have stressed the importance of viewing Rufinus as a very active and decidedly 
not invisible translator. This demonstrates that we not only must consider whether a translation is 
biased, has been altered, or otherwise does not conform to the spirit and doctrine of the original 
work, but it is also fruitful to uncover what type of contemporary influences might have been 
acting upon the translator when working on the text. The methods outlined in this dissertation 
helped investigate translation as a process and the translator as active agent. These methods can be 
applied to other works of translation in antiquity. Although they are especially suited and crucial 
when looking at Christian translations for the Western Empire (because of the particular power the 
translators had over their increasingly monolingual audiences), they are also relevant to the study 
of translations throughout antiquity. The translator should never be reduced to the status of a 
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conduit or an invisible hand. 
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